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Nukes out of the Kyoto Protocol

The world's nuclear power industry is hoping that genuine public concern over global warming will translate into new atomic reactor orders for this beleaguered industry. In particular, the industry is seeking to take advantage of different schemes and mechanisms developed in the framework of the international climate negotiations. Under such schemes polluting countries could receive greenhouse emission "credits" for building new nuclear reactors in other countries or be given permission to subsidize new-build domestically with public money.

Will nuclear power save the climate ?

• How large would the present nuclear mitigation share be, assumed that nuclear power does not emit carbon dioxide CO2?
• How large could the reduction become in the future, starting from nuclear generating capacity scenarios published by the IAEA, and also assumed that nuclear power does not emit CO2?
• How feasible are the projections of the nuclear industry?
• How large could the actual nuclear CO2 emissions be, estimated on the basis of an independent life cycle analysis?
• Does nuclear power emit also other greenhouse gases?

Nukes at the UN climate conference in Morocco

Nuclear Monitor Issue: 
Vladimir Slivyak ‒ co-chair of Ecodefence

The United Nations' COP22 climate conference finished in Marrakech, Morocco last week and there were quite alarming signs with a strong push by the Russian delegation and others to promote nuclear power.

The Russians were quiet at the Moroccan negotiations until Thursday, November 17. Then two events happened on same day. First, the deputy director of Rosatom, Kirill Komarov, and the head of the World Nuclear Association, Agneta Rising, held a joint press conference where they talked mostly about the Russian nuclear experience.1 They claimed that nuclear power is already saving the climate and has "postponed climate catastrophe for two years". Rising was nearly screaming into the microphone, calling on all world governments to immediately follow Russia and develop nuclear power right now. They promoted the World Nuclear Association's goal of tripling global nuclear power capacity such that it generates 25% of electricity by 2050.2

The press conference was organized in a truly Russian way ‒ very short, three questions allowed and it looked like the three people allowed to ask a question were brought there by Rosatom itself. Then, unexpectedly, UN police showed up and escorted Komarov to the exit. I don't think I've ever seen UN police at a press conference at a UN climate conference before.

Later on November 17, Russia organized a national side-event at COP22 which was formally about Russian strategy for low-carbon development and included Rosatom, an aluminum industry representative and a nanotechnology agency, as well as governmental officials. A lot of funny things were said, but Rosatom was the main player. Rosatom's video showed lots of people hugging each other, smiling and laughing in various countries of the world, as well as a nuclear ice-breaker and a sign: "Rosatom. Energy and More".

Rosatom's Komarov was again peddling falsehoods at the side-event, including things like Russia having achieved a closed nuclear fuel cycle (not true, spent fuel is mostly in storage with no chance for reprocessing), Russia is building over 70 reactors worldwide right now (not true, about 10% of that figure actually) and lots of other stuff. Any country in the world can order Russian reactors, he said (though few can afford to pay for them and Russia can't afford to build them). A few questions were allowed. A lot of people wanted to ask something from Rosatom but were ignored by the chairman who wanted to close down the side-event as soon as possible. In the end he just said we cannot continue because we have food and drinks waiting for us outside. The event was in Russian and the translation was quite poor.

After all this, we (five Russians were at COP22 this time, with some Ukrainians supporting us) went to mobilize the environmental community, in particular the Climate Action Network (CAN). As a result, Russia was given CAN's "Fossil of the Day" anti-award on November 17, specifically for promoting nuclear. The award citation read: "The third Fossil of the Day award goes to Russia for promoting nuclear power as a feasible solution to climate change. We all know that this outdated and risky technology is too slow and expensive to contribute to climate efforts ‒ and if deployed it will steal away resources needed to develop renewables. Not to mention the fact that nuclear is not even a zero-emissions technology ‒ it produces massive amounts of greenhouse gases during the uranium enrichment. Then, of course, there is the question of safety. The Russian government really need to take a look at the long-term, widespread consequences of the Fukushima and Chernobyl, for a start."3

The following day, Russia was given "Collosal Fossil" for being the worst offender throughout the COP22 conference and for its poor energy and climate policies. The award citation read: "This year's Colossal Fossil Award goes to Russia for peddling nonsense and generally being a massive drag on ambition. Throughout the UN climate change negotiations in Marrakech, Russia has blindly lobbied for nuclear power deployment, continued to abstain from ratifying the Paris Agreement, and said that they do not see phasing out fossil fuels as an element of their plan to reduce dangerous emissions."4

COP22 may be the beginning of a serious attempt to promote nuclear by Russia jointly with the World Nuclear Association and maybe others. They probably want to recruit new customers among developing countries, even if they don't succeed in securing UN climate funds to subsidize those projects. We have to mobilize for the next COP and other UN climate meetings to put pressure on the Russian delegation.

Industry front groups were noisy at the COP21 conference in Paris last December5, and some of them were at Marrakech. 'Nuclear for Climate' was one of the front groups promoting nuclear power at both COP21 and COP22.6 'Nuclear for Climate' calls itself a "grassroots organization" but it is no such thing; it is a front group for more than 140 nuclear societies around the world.


1. World Nuclear News, 18 Nov 2016, 'Nuclear vital to challenge of climate change',

2. 4 May 2016, 'Uranium on the rocks; nuclear power PR blunders', Nuclear Monitor #823,



5. 17 Dec 2015, 'COP that: nuclear lobbyists on the offensive', Nuclear Monitor #816,


COP that: nuclear lobbyists on the offensive

Nuclear Monitor Issue: 
Jim Green − Nuclear Monitor editor

The nuclear industry and its supporters were busily promoting nuclear power − and attacking environmentalists − before and during the COP21 UN climate conference in Paris. All the usual suspects were promoting nuclear power as a climate-friendly energy source: the World Nuclear Association, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the International Energy Agency, the OECD's Nuclear Energy Agency, the U.S. Nuclear Energy Institute, and so on.1

The Breakthrough Institute has been promoting its pro-nuclear "paradigm-shifting advocacy for an ecomodernist future" and arguing against the "reactionary apocalyptic pastoralism" of anyone who disagrees with them.2 In reality the Breakthrough Institute is anything but 'paradigm shifting'. A glowing endorsement in the National Review states: "Ecomodernists are pro-fracking. They advocate genetically engineered crops (GMOs) ... Most distinctively, the ecomodernists are pro-growth and pro-free markets. "The Kardashians are not the reason Africans are starving," chides Alex Trembath, a senior researcher at the Breakthrough Institute ..."3

Bill Gates was in Paris to announce the formation of the Breakthrough Energy Coalition. Gates was promoting 'clean energy' but it seems likely the capital the Coalition attracts will be directed disproportionately to nuclear R&D.4

Robert Stone, director of the Pandora's Promise pro-nuclear propaganda film5, launched a 'resource hub' called Energy For Humanity, promoting "more advanced, mass-producible, passively safe, reactor designs".6

Rauli Partanen and Janne Korhonen, members of the Finnish Ecomodernist Society, have been attacking environmentalists for opposing nuclear power − including WISE and the Nuclear Information and Resource Service (NIRS), the organisations that produce Nuclear Monitor. Rebutting7 a rebuttal8 by Michael Mariotte from NIRS, Partanen and Korhonen offer this gem: "even the much-maligned Olkiluoto 3 nuclear project [in Finland] turns out to be very fast way of adding low-carbon energy production when compared to any real-world combination of alternatives." A single reactor that will take well over a decade to build (and is three times over budget) is a "very fast way" of adding low-carbon energy? Huh?

Partanen and Korhanan authored a booklet called Climate Gamble: Is Anti-Nuclear Activism Endangering Our Future?, and crowdfunded the printing of 5,000 copies which were distributed for free at the COP21 conference.9

James Hansen and three other climate scientists were in Paris to promote nuclear power. Hansen attacks the "intransigent network of anti-nukes" that has "grown to include 'Big Green,' huge groups such as the Natural Resources Defense Council, Environmental Defense Fund and World Wide Fund for Nature. They have trained lawyers, scientists, and media staff ready to denounce any positive news about nuclear power."10

By way of sharp contrast, the impoverished U.S. nuclear industry could only rustle up US$60 million (€55m) to lobby Congress and federal agencies in 2013−14.11

So is there an undercurrent of grassroots pro-nuclear environmentalism waiting to burst forth if only their voice could cut through Big Green hegemony? Perhaps Nuclear for Climate12, promoted as a "grassroots organization"1, is the environmental network to take on Big Green? Well, no. Nuclear for Climate isn't a network of grassroots environmentalists, it's a network of more than 140 nuclear societies. It isn't grassroots environmentalism, it's corporate astroturf.

And the list of 140 associations includes 36 chapters of the 'Women in Nuclear' organisation and 43 chapters of the 'Young Generation Network'.13 One wonders whether these organisations have any meaningful existence. Does Tanzania really have a pro-nuclear Young Generation Network? Don't young people in Tanzania have better things to do?

Nuclear for Climate has a website, a hashtag, a twitter handle and all the modern social media sine qua non. But it has some work to do with its messaging. One of its COP21 memes was: 'The radioactive waste are not good for the climate? Wrong!' So radioactive waste is good for the climate?!

Has the nuclear lobby achieved anything?

The nuclear industry's hopes for the COP21 conference were dashed. Michael Mariotte from the Nuclear Information & Resource Service writes:14

"The international Don't Nuke the Climate campaign had two major goals for COP 21: 1) to ensure that any agreement reached would not encourage use of nuclear power and, preferably, to keep any pro-nuclear statement out of the text entirely; and 2) along with the rest of the environmental community, to achieve the strongest possible agreement generally.

"The first goal was certainly met. The word "nuclear" does not appear in the text and there are no incentives whatsoever for use of nuclear power. That was a clear victory. But that is due not only to a global lack of consensus on nuclear power, but to the fact that the document does not specifically endorse or reject any technology (although it does implicitly reject continued sustained use of fossil fuels). Rather, each nation brought its own greenhouse gas reduction plan to the conference. "Details," for example whether there should be incentives for any particular technology, will be addressed at follow-up meetings over the next few years. So it is imperative that the Don't Nuke the Climate campaign continue, and grow, and be directly involved at every step of the way − both inside and outside the meetings.

"As for the strongest possible agreement, well, it may have been the "strongest possible" that could be agreed to by 195 nations in 2015. By at least recognizing that the real goal should be limiting global temperature rise to 1.5 degrees Centigrade rather than the 2 degrees previously considered by most nations to be the top limit, the final document was stronger than many believed possible going into the negotiations. That said, the environmental community agrees that the agreement doesn't go far enough and, importantly, that the commitments made to date do not meet even this document's aspirations."

There is a strong push from the nuclear lobby for nuclear power to be included in the UN's Green Climate Fund. This would enable subsidies for nuclear power − subsidies that would come at the expense of renewables and other climate change mitigation programs.

So the nuclear industry didn't make any gains at COP21, but is it making any progress in its broader efforts to attract public support? It's hard to say, but there's no evidence of a shift in public opinion. A 2005 IAEA-commissioned survey of 18 countries found that there was majority opposition to new reactors in all but one of the 18 countries.15 A 2011 IPSOS survey of nearly 19,000 people in 24 countries found 69% opposition to new reactors, and majority opposition to new reactors in all but one of the 24 countries.16

Is the nuclear industry having any success winning over environmentalists? Around the margins, perhaps, but the ranks of 'pro-nuclear environmentalists' are very thin. As James Hansen complained in the lead-up to COP21, the Climate Action Network, representing all the major environmental groups, opposes nuclear power. 'Big Green' opposes nuclear power, and so does small green. Efforts by nuclear lobbyists to split the environment movement have failed.

And the nuclear lobby certainly isn't winning where it matters: nuclear power has been stagnant for the past 20 years and costs are rising, whereas the growth of renewables has been spectacular and costs are falling. One of the recurring claims in the pro-nuclear propaganda surrounding COP21 is the claim that renewables can't be deployed quickly enough whereas nuclear can. But 783 gigawatts of new renewable power capacity were installed in the decade from 2005−2014.17 That's more power producing capacity than the nuclear industry has installed in its entire 60+ year history!

The nuclear lobby didn't even win the battle of the celebrities at COP21. James Hansen, Bill Gates and other pro-nuclear celebrities put up a good fight against pro-renewable celebrities such as conservationist David Attenborough. But the pro-renewable celebrities raising their voice during COP21 included Pope Francis. And he's infallible.


1. Nuclear Energy Institute, 3 Dec 2015, 'Pro-Nuclear Voices Raised at Paris Climate Talks',

2. Will Boisvert 18 Sept 2014, 'The Left vs. the Climate',

3. Julie Kelly, 2 Dec 2015, 'A New Breed of American Environmentalists Challenges the Stale Dogma of the Left',

4. Tina Casey, 3 Dec 2015, 'COP21 Gets a Spark of Nuclear Energy from Breakthrough Energy Coalition',

5. 'Pandora's Propaganda', Nuclear Monitor #773, 21 Nov 2013,

'Pandora's Promise' Propaganda, Nuclear Monitor #764, 28 June 2013,


7. Rauli Partanen and Janne M. Korhonen, 2 Dec 2015, 'Don't Nuke the Climate: A Response',

8. Michael Mariotte, 30 Nov 2015, 'When a campaign strikes a nerve',


10. Jarret Adams, 26 Nov 2015, 'No Climate Solution Without Nuclear, Experts Say',

11. Daniel Stevens, 17 Feb 2015, 'Platts' Nuclear Conference Attended by Companies Spending Millions on Lobbying',



14. Michael Mariotte, 12 Dec 2015, "The Paris Agreement on climate — a good start, but ...",

15. Globescan, 2005, 'Global Public Opinion on Nuclear Issues and the IAEA: Final report from 18 countries', prepared for the IAEA,

16. IPSOS, June 2011, 'Global Citizen Reaction to the Fukushima Nuclear Plant Disaster',

17. Greenpeace International, September 2015, 'Energy [R]evolution: A sustainable world energy outlook 2015',

Do we need base-load power stations?

Nuclear Monitor Issue: 
Assoc. Prof. Mark Diesendorf − School of Biological, Earth and Environmental Sciences, University of New South Wales, Australia.

One of the principal claims used to justify a substantial role for nuclear energy in combating global climate change is that renewable energy cannot supply base-load electric power. Underlying this claim is the assumption that the only way of supplying base-load electricity demand is by means of base-load power stations, such as nuclear and coal, that operate at full power 24/7. This notion is being widely promulgated.

For example, former Australian Industry Minister Ian Macfarlane claimed at a uranium industry conference that: "Base load, zero emission, the only way it can be produced is by hydro and nuclear".1 UK Energy and Climate Secretary, Amber Rudd, attempted to justify the decision to build the proposed Hinkley Point C nuclear power station on the grounds that "We have to secure baseload electricity".2

The concept of base-load demand is illustrated in Figure 1, which shows the daily variation of electricity demand in summer in a conventional large-scale electricity grid without much solar energy. Base-load demand is the region across the bottom of the graph. Traditionally base-load demand has been supplied by so-called base-load power stations. Because they are inflexible in operation, in the sense that they are unsuitable for following the variations in demand and supply on timescales of minutes and hours, they are supplemented with flexible peak-load and slightly flexible intermediate-load power stations. Peak-load power stations are hydro-electric systems with dams and open-cycle gas turbines (GTs), essentially jet engines. They can respond to variations in demand and supply on timescales of minutes.

The assumptions that base-load power stations are necessary to supply base-load demand and to provide a reliable supply of grid electricity have been disproven by both practical experience in electricity grids with high contributions from renewable energy and by hourly computer simulations.

As an example of practical experience, in 2014 the state of South Australia had 39% of annual electricity consumption from renewable energy (33% wind + 6% solar) and, as a result, the state's base-load coal-fired power stations are being shut down as redundant.3 For several periods the whole state system has operated reliably on a combination of renewables and gas with only small imports from the neighbouring state of Victoria.4

The north German states of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern5 and Schleswig-Holstein6 are already operating on 100% net renewable energy, mostly wind. The 'net' indicates trading with each other and their neighbours. They do not rely on base-load power stations.

"That's cheating", nuclear proponents may reply, "they are relying on power imported by transmission lines from base-load power stations elsewhere." Well, actually the imports from base-load power stations are small. For countries that are completely isolated (e.g. Australia) or almost isolated (e.g. the USA) from their neighbours, hourly computer simulations of the operation of the electricity supply-demand system, based on commercially available renewable energy sources scaled up to 80-100% annual contributions, confirm the practical experience.

In the USA a major computer simulation by a large team of scientists and engineers found that 80-90% renewable energy is technically feasible and reliable. (They didn't examine 100% renewable electricity.) The 2012 report, Renewable Electricity Futures Study. Vol.1. Technical report TP-6A20-A52409-1 was published by the US National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) and can be downloaded.7 The simulation balances supply and demand each hour. The report finds that (p.iii): "renewable electricity generation from technologies that are commercially available today, in combination with a more flexible electric system, is more than adequate to supply 80% of total U.S. electricity generation in 2050 while meeting electricity demand on an hourly basis in every region of the United States."

Similar results have been obtained from hourly simulation modeling of the Australian National Electricity Market with 100% renewable energy, published by Ben Elliston, Iain MacGill and me in 2013 and 2014, based on commercially available technologies and real data on electricity demand, wind and solar energy. (Peer-reviewed publications listed online.8) There are no base-load power stations in the Australian model and only a relatively small amount of storage. Recent simulations (to be published) span 8 years of hourly data.

These, together with studies from Europe, find that base-load power stations are unnecessary to meet standard reliability criteria for the whole supply-demand system, such as loss-of-load probability or annual energy shortfall. Furthermore, they find that reliability can be maintained even when variable renewable energy sources, wind and solar PV, provide major contributions to annual electricity generation, up to 70% in Australia. How is this possible?

Firstly, the fluctuations in variable wind and solar PV are balanced by flexible renewable energy sources that are dispatchable, i.e. can supply power on demand. These are hydro with dams, biofueled open-cycle gas turbines and concentrated solar thermal power (CST) with thermal storage, as illustrated in Figure 2. It is not essential for every power station in the system to be dispatchable. Being able to draw upon a diversity of renewable energy sources, with different statistical properties, provides reliability.

Secondly, spreading out wind and solar PV farms geographically reduces the fluctuations in their total output and so reduces the already small contribution from biofuelled gas turbines.

Thirdly, new transmission lines may be needed to assist achieving wide geographic distribution of renewable energy sources and to multiply the diversity of types of renewable energy source feeding into the grid. For example, an important proposed link is between the high wind regions in north Germany and the low wind, limited solar regions in south Germany. Texas, with its huge wind resource, needs greater connectivity with its neighbouring US states.

Fourthly, introducing smart demand management, to shave the peaks in electricity demand and to manage periods of low electricity supply, can further increase reliability. This can be assisted with smart meters and switches controlled by both electricity suppliers and consumers, and programmed by consumers to switch off certain circuits (e.g. air conditioning, water heating, aluminium smelting) for short periods when demand on the grid is high and/or supply is low.

As summarized by the NREL study (p.iii): "RE (Renewable Energy) Futures finds that increased electricity system flexibility, needed to enable electricity supply-demand balance with high levels of renewable generation, can come from a portfolio of supply- and demand-side options, including flexible conventional generation, grid storage, new transmission, more responsive loads, and changes in power system operations."7

A recent study by Mark Jacobson and colleagues went well beyond above studies. It showed that all energy use in the USA, including transport and heat, could be supplied by renewable electricity. The computer simulation used synthetic data on electricity demand, wind and sunshine taken every 30 seconds over a period of 6 years.

In the words of former Australian Greens' Senator Christine Milne: "We are now in the midst of a fight between the past and the future". The dissemination of the base-load myth and other myths denigrating renewable energy falsely9, and the refutation of these myths, are part of that struggle.

Further reading

Diesendorf M 2014. Sustainable Energy Solutions for Climate Change. Routledge-Earthscan and NewSouth Publishing. ISBN: 9781742233901. 356+xx pp.

Elliston B, MacGill I, Diesendorf M. 2013. Least cost 100% renewable electricity scenarios in the Australian National Electricity Market. Energy Policy 59:270-282.

Elliston B, MacGill I, Diesendorf M. 2014. Comparing least cost scenarios for 100% renewable electricity with low emission fossil fuel scenarios in the Australian National Electricity Market. Renewable Energy 66:196-204,

Jacobson MZ, Delucchi MA, Cameron MA, Frew BA 2015. A low-cost solution to the grid reliability problem with 100% penetration of intermittent wind, water, and solar for all purposes. Proc. Nat. Acad. Sci. 112: doi:10.1073/pnas.1510028112,

Mai T, Wiser R, Sandor D et al. 2012. Renewable electricity futures study. Vol.1. Technical report TP-6A20-A52409-1. National Renewable Energy Laboratory, Golden, CO. Available from











When a campaign strikes a nerve

Nuclear Monitor Issue: 
Michael Mariotte − President of the Nuclear Information & Resource Service

Every successful campaign for social change causes reaction. After all, if the campaign wasn't hitting at vested interests, then there would be no need for a campaign − its goals would simply be adopted by acclamation.

Indeed, campaigns that don't generate reaction are campaigns that don't succeed: that means they haven't attained enough attention or backing to matter to their targets.

Thus, it's always a source of initial gratification when, after launching a new campaign, reaction sets in. When you can see you've struck a nerve. When your opposition attacks you directly. And that high point is elevated further when the best attack your opposition can muster is one against the least important of your arguments.

So it is that the international Don't Nuke the Climate Campaign − which includes the two organisations that produce Nuclear Monitor, the World Information Service on Energy and the Nuclear Information & Resource Service − last week began feeling that warm gratification, that recognition that we are beginning to have an impact.

A small group of Finnish people, who call themselves "ecomodernists" and are affiliated with a group called Energy for Humanity have taken it upon themselves to launch the first direct attack on the Don't Nuke the Climate campaign, in an essay titled 'A Most Unwise Campaign'.1 The essay appears to be a follow-up to a self-published tract called Climate Gamble: Is anti-nuclear activism endangering our future? They're planning to distribute 5,000 copies of these at COP21 in Paris over the next two weeks in an effort to promote nuclear power and beat back our campaign.

Following the distorted and factually-challenged logic of James Hansen2, the group begins by repeating the familiar argument that renewable energy cannot scale up fast enough to solve the climate crisis, that decarbonization of the world's power supply isn't happening quickly enough, and that, ergo, we need a massive amount of new nuclear power.

What does "massive" mean? The authors don't say, but the World Nuclear Association is less shy: it issued a statement3 calling for 1,000 gigawatts (about 1,000 large reactors) of new nuclear power by mid-century. More on that argument in a minute.

The essay then shifts gears to focus on one issue: the carbon footprint of nuclear power, which it calls our "key argument." Actually, it isn't. Indeed, we readily admit that nuclear power is a low-carbon energy source when compared to fossil fuels. We assert that it is high carbon compared to renewables, but really, that's all relative. The essay devotes considerable effort to try (unsuccessfully) to debunk Professor Benjamin Sovacool's 2008 meta-analysis of studies comparing carbon footprints of various energy sources (the authors argue a study showing nuclear as relatively high-carbon should be excluded, although excluding such studies, without excluding studies showing nuclear with an essentially undetectable carbon footprint, defeats the purpose of a meta-analysis).

If nuclear's carbon footprint were really our key argument, the campaign would be far less compelling than it is − and far less threatening to nuclear industry interests.

You'd think that people in Finland, of all places, would get this. Because the most compelling argument against nuclear power as a climate solution (disregarding for the moment issues like nuclear meltdowns, radioactive waste, routine releases of toxic radiation, and nuclear proliferation, and focusing only on climate-related issues), proven over and over and especially in Finland, whose Olkiluoto-3 reactor under construction is the poster child for the failure of the nuclear renaissance, is the industry's inability to deliver a product that can generate electricity in a reasonable time at a reasonable price.

Construction of Olkiluoto-3 began in 2005, with commercial operation scheduled for 2010, at a fixed cost of €3.2 billion. A decade later, the reactor is nowhere near complete and may not be finished this decade either. Its cost has just about tripled − right in line with the U.S. experience of the reactor boom-building years of the 1970s and 1980s. The thing is Olkiluoto is not an outlier, as efforts to build new reactors at Flamanville in France, and Vogtle and Summer in the U.S. demonstrate. Each of these projects is well behind schedule (and slipping further) and well over budget.

Meanwhile, costs for solar and wind power have been plummeting. When construction of Olkiluoto-3 began, solar power was not competitive with other generation sources. Now, even the nuclear / fossil fuel industry dominated International Energy Agency (IEA) admits that solar is not only cheaper than nuclear, it's cheaper than fossil fuels.4 Wind power is so cheap they're literally giving it away in Texas. Energy efficiency remains even cheaper than any generation source.

No new nuclear reactors have come online anywhere in the West since construction of Olkiluto-3 began (Watts Bar-2 is close, but it's a stretch to call that "new," since construction on it began in the 1970s). Meanwhile, nearly half of all new generation last year was renewables, again according to the IEA.

Using outdated data, nuclear advocates like to say that renewables account for only a tiny percentage of worldwide electricity generation. While it certainly remains too low, the reality, according to the same IEA report, is that renewables are now the world's second largest power source, behind coal. And those who are paid to project growth and make money from accurate projections, like UBS, say the period of rapid growth has barely even started.5

So which technology can scale up faster to deal with what is, in fact, a climate crisis?

Nuclear proponents also argue that we should use all low-carbon generation sources, not just renewables. That we should include nuclear "in the mix."

The problem there is that nuclear has priced itself out of the conversation. With new reactor construction cost estimates pushing US$20 billion each (North Anna-3, Hinkley Point) at a time when equivalent amounts of renewables would cost a fraction of that, it makes no sense whatsoever to build nuclear. It would simply take money away from the cheaper, faster sources, which happen to be renewables. If we're facing a crisis − and we are − why divert resources away from the most effective means of addressing it to the least effective? The end result is that you get less low-carbon power, not more. That's why nuclear power is counterproductive at addressing climate change: because we get less carbon reduction per dollar spent.

The nuclear folks also submit that countries like China and India are continuing to pursue nuclear power, and are doing so faster and cheaper than the west. That's true; they're also pursuing renewables and are doing so faster and cheaper than the West as well. Major construction of all kinds is cheaper and faster there. Of course, they're also less transparent, and there are far more government subsidies, making it difficult to determine the real costs. That non-transparent, government-paid construction model isn't going to fly in most nations. And, in China's case at least, its renewables program is far outpacing its nuclear program, which is unlikely to ever get much above its current 2−3% of the nation's generation capacity.

Now add back in all those other arguments that we temporarily dropped before − the ones about nuclear accidents, already nearly one major accident per decade, a number that would soar with 1,000 new reactors; and radioactive waste, which still has (and may never have) no scientifically-defensible solution; releases of toxic radiation even in routine operation that are killing people6, the environmental devastation from uranium mining, and the rest. And, seriously, there are people out there who still argue that nuclear power is an answer to an environmental problem?

That there are those people is, of course, why we have to mount the Don't Nuke the Climate Campaign in the first place. That we've touched a nerve means we know we're beginning to win. That we can expect more pushback simply demonstrates that the time is right. A nuclear-free, carbon-free energy future is within our grasp. We're hoping for real movement at COP21 in Paris these next couple of weeks; and even if not there, inevitably across the world as the decade enters its second half and the reality that this really is the answer takes hold.

For more on the campaign, visit WISE's international website ( and NIRS' U.S. website (

You can support the Don't Nuke the Climate Campaign at








Can nuclear power slow down climate change? An analysis of nuclear greenhouse gas emissions

Nuclear Monitor Issue: 
Jan Willem Storm van Leeuwen − Ceedata Consultancy

This is a summary of a November 2015 report commissioned by the World Information Service on Energy (WISE). The full report is posted at

Nuclear power is claimed to be nearly carbon-free and indispensable for mitigating climate change as a result of anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases. Assuming that nuclear power really does not emit carbon dioxide CO2 nor other greenhouse gases (GHGs), how large is the present nuclear mitigation share and how large could it become in the future? Could the term 'indispensable' in this context be quantified? These issues are assessed from a physical point of view, economic aspects are left outside the scope of this assessment.

How large is the present nuclear mitigation share?

The global GHG emissions comprise a number of different gases and sources. Weighted by the global warming potential of the various GHGs 61% of the emissions were caused by CO2 from burning of fossil fuels for energy generation. Nuclear power could displace fossil-fuelled electricity generation, so hypothetically the maximum nuclear mitigation share would be 61% if the global energy supply were to be fully electric and fully nuclear.

In 2014 the nuclear contribution to the global usable energy supply was 1.6% and consequently the nuclear mitigation share was 1.0%.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) asserts that the nuclear contribution to the global energy supply was 4.6% in 2014. However, this figure turns out to be based on a thermodynamically inaccurate statistical trick using virtual energy quantities.

How large could the nuclear mitigation to climate change become in the future according to the nuclear industry?

We found no hard figures on this issue, for that reason this study analyses the mitigation consequences of the envisioned developments of global nuclear generating capacity. During the past years the International Atomic Energy Agency and the nuclear industry, represented by the World Nuclear Association (WNA), published numerous scenarios of global nuclear generating capacity in the future, measured in gigawatt-electric GWe. Four recent scenarios are assessed in this study, as these can be considered to be typical of the views within the nuclear industry:

  • IAEA low: the global nuclear capacity remains flat at the current level until 2050.
  • IAEA high: the global nuclear capacity grows to 964 GWe by 2050, nearly three times the current global capacity of 333 GWe.
  • WNA low: the global nuclear capacity grows to 1140 GWe by 2060 and to 2062 GWe by 2100.
  • WNA high: the global nuclear capacity grows to 3688 GWe by 2060 and to 11046 GWe by 2100.

The nuclear mitigation share in the four scenarios depends not only on the nuclear generation capacity, but also on the growth rate of the global GHG emissions. The IAEA expects a growth rate of the global energy consumption of 2.0−3.5% per year until 2050. This study assumes that the global GHG emissions will grow during the next decades proportionally to the global energy consumption: also at 2.0−3.5% per year. Based on this assumption – and still assuming nuclear power is free of CO2 and other GHG emissions (which it is not) – the mitigation shares would be as follows, the high figure at a global growth of 2.0%/yr, the low figure at 3.5%/yr:

  • IAEA low: 0.5−0.3% by 2050.
  • IAEA high: 1.4−0.9% by 2050.
  • WNA low: 1.4−0.7% by 2060 and 1.1-0.3% by 2100.
  • WNA high: 4.5−2.4% by 2060 and 6.2-1.8% by 2100.

What next after 2050?

The IAEA scenarios are provided through 2050. Evidently the nuclear future does not end in 2050. On the contrary it is highly unlikely that the nuclear industry would build 964 GWe of new nuclear capacity by the year 2050 without solid prospects of operating these units for 40-50 years after 2050.

How does the nuclear industry imagine development after reaching their milestone in 2050? Further growth, leveling off to a constant capacity, or phase-out? Or: let tomorrow take care of itself?

What global construction rates would be required?
By 2060 nearly all currently operating nuclear power plants (NPPs) will be closed down because they will reach the end of their operational lifetime within that timeframe. The current rate of 3−4 GWe per year is too low to keep the global nuclear capacity flat and consequently the global nuclear capacity is declining. To keep the global nuclear capacity at the current level the construction rate would have to be doubled. The average global construction rates that would be required in the industry scenarios are:

  • IAEA low: 7-8 GWe per year until 2050.
  • IAEA high: 27 GWe/yr until 2050.
  • WNA low: 25 GWe/yr until 2060 and 23 GWe/yr from 2060 until 2100.
  • WNA high: 82 GWe/yr until 2060 and 184 GWe/yr from 2060 until 2100.

In view of the massive cost overruns and construction delays of new NPPs that have plagued the nuclear industry for decades it is not clear how the required high construction rates could be achieved.

How are the prospects of new advanced nuclear technology?

The nuclear industry promises the application within a few decades of advanced nuclear systems that would enable mankind to use nuclear power for hundreds to thousands of years. This promise concerns two main classes of closed-cycle reactor systems: uranium-based systems and thorium-based systems. For reasons discussed in the detailed version of this report, Uranium-Plutonium as well as Thorium-Uranium breeder concepts turn out to be based on inherently unfeasible assumptions. From this observation it follows that nuclear power in the future would have to rely solely on conventional once-through reactor technology based on natural uranium. As a consequence the size of the uranium resources will be a restricting factor.

How much uranium would be needed to sustain the various scenarios?

As pointed out above the nuclear generating capacity in the scenarios will not fall to zero at their end date.

The minimum amounts of uranium that would be required in the IAEA scenario's are estimated here by assuming no new NPPs would be build after 2050 and consequently the nuclear power plants operational in 2050 would be phased out by 2100. In case of the WNA scenario's extension after 2100 seemed too speculative. The masses of uranium are given in teragram (Tg): 1 Tg is 1 million metric tonnes.

  • IAEA low: 2.3 Tg until 2050 plus 1.7 Tg during phase-out by 2100, total 4.0 Tg uranium
  • IAEA high: 4.5 Tg until 2050 plus 4.8 Tg during phase-out by 2100, total 9.3 Tg uranium
  • WNA low: 6.6 Tg until 2060 plus 12.7 Tg from 2060 until 2100, total 19.3 Tg uranium
  • WNA high: 17.5 Tg until 2060 plus 58.4 Tg from 2060 until 2100, total 75.9 Tg uranium.

Obviously the uranium demand in the IAEA scenarios would be higher if the nuclear capacity were to remain flat after 2050, as opposed to phasing out after 2050 as assumed above; in case of a constant capacity after 2050 the total demand would be about 5.7 Tg in IAEA low and 14.1 Tg in IAEA high.

The known recoverable uranium resources of the world in the cost category of up to 130 USD/kg U amounted to 5.9 Tg in 2013 according to the IAEA; the market price in September 2015 was about 82 USD/kg U. An additional amount of 1.7 Tg of uranium is known to exist in the higher cost category 130-260 USD/kg U.

How are the prospects of the global uranium supply?

Uranium in the earth's crust is unevenly distributed among the rocks comprising the crust. The grade distribution of uranium in uranium-bearing rocks in the earth's crust show a geologic pattern common to other metals: the lower the grade of uranium the larger the amounts of uranium present in the crust. The size distribution of uranium deposits show a similar pattern as a result of the geologic ore-forming mechanisms: the larger the size, the more rare the deposits. From this observation it follows that the chance of discovering new resources increases with lower grades and smaller sizes of the deposits. One may assume that the most easily discoverable resources have been found already and that most easily minable deposits are already being mined. The chances of discovering new large high-grade resources seem low; in reality no such discoveries have been reported during the past two decades.

Based on a simple economic model the nuclear industry states that the global uranium resources are practically inexhaustable, apparently suggesting that any scenario could be materialized. However, the generation of nuclear energy from uranium resources is a physical phenomenon governed by the laws of nature, not by economic notions. The economic model does not include physical and chemical realities with regard to uranium deposits in the earth's crust. Thermodynamics sets the boundaries for the resources that fit the conditions of uranium-for-energy resources.

What are the thermodynamic boundaries of uranium-for-energy resources?

Energy cliff

The energy content of natural uranium that is in any sense extractable is limited: the nuclear power stations that would form the backbone of future nuclear capacity could not fission more than about 0.6% of the nuclei in natural uranium.

The thermodynamic boundaries of the uranium-for-energy resources are determined by the energy required to extract uranium from the resources as found in nature. Analysis of the physical and chemical processes needed to recover uranium from the earth's crust and all the processes needed to release the potential energy in uranium and convert it to useful energy proves that the amount of energy consumed per kg recovered natural uranium rises exponentially with declining ore grades. Below a grade of 200−100 ppm (0.2−0.1 grams U per kg rock) no net energy can be generated by the nuclear system as a whole from a uranium resource, this relationship is called the energy cliff. From this conclusion it follows that only uranium resources at grades higher than 200 ppm (0.2 g U/kg rock) are actually energy sources.

The ore grades of the known uranium resources which are by definition economically recoverable varies widely: from about 200 down to 0.1 gram uranium per kg rock. A part of the resources classified by the IAEA as 'recoverable' falls beyond the thermodynamic boundaries of uranium-for-energy resources.

Unconventional uranium resources

The nuclear industry classifies the global uranium resources into two categories: conventional and unconventional resources. Phosphates are the main constituent of unconventional uranium resources, other types of uranium-bearing resources (e.g. black shales) are insignificant on global scale.

Phosphates are irreplaceable for agricultural use, so mining of these minerals should be tailored exclusively to agricultural needs. Moreover, the thermodynamic quality of phosphates as a uranium-for-energy source lies beyond the energy cliff: no net energy generation is possible by exploitation of phosphate rock; this holds true also for other unconventional uranium resources, including uranium from seawater.

How much CO2 does nuclear power emit?

Nuclear CO2 emission originates from burning fossil fuels in all processes and factories needed to extract uranium from the ground, prepare nuclear fuel from the recovered uranium, construct the nuclear power plant and to safely manage the radioactive wastes. The fission process in the nuclear reactor is the only process of the nuclear system that has (virtually) no CO2 emission. In addition CO2 is generated by chemical reactions during the production of necessary materials and chemicals, for example cement (concrete) and steel. A generic NPP contains some 150 000 tonnes of steel and 850 000 tonnes of concrete, in addition to several thousands of tonnes of other materials. The sum of all materials consumed by an NPP during its operational lifetime is about 76 grams per kilowatt-hour delivered to the grid, excluding the mass of rock displaced for mining and final sequestration of the radioactive wastes.

By means of the same thermodynamic analysis that revealed the energy cliff, see above, the sum of the CO2 emissions of all processes constituting the nuclear energy system could be estimated at 88-146 gram CO2 per kilowatt-hour. This figure is based on the assumption that all electric inputs of the nuclear process chain are provided by the nuclear power plant itself, to avoid discussions of the local fuel mix of electricity generation.

The large uncertainty range is chiefly caused by uncertainties regarding the processes of the back end of the process chain, these are the processes needed to safely isolate the inevitable radioactive wastes from the biosphere, including the dismantling of the NPP after its service life. The emission figure will rise with time, as will be explained below.

CO2 trap

The energy consumption and consequently the CO2 emission of the recovery of uranium from the earth's crust strongly depend on the ore grade, and several other physical and chemical factors that are not discussed here. In practice the most easily recoverable and richest resources are exploited first, a common practice in mining, because these offer the highest return on investment. As a result of this practice the remaining resources have lower grades and uranium recovery becomes more energy-intensive and more CO2 intensive. Consequently the specific CO2 emission of nuclear power will rise with time; when the average ore grade approaches 200 ppm, the specific CO2 emission of the nuclear energy system will surpass that of fossil-fuelled electricity generation. This phenomenon is called the CO2 trap.

If no new major high-grade uranium resources are found in the future, nuclear power will run aground in the CO2 trap within the lifetime of new nuclear build.

Does nuclear power also emit other greenhouse gases?

No data are found in the open literature on the emission of greenhouse gases other than CO2 by the nuclear system, likely such data never have been published. Assessment of the chemical processes required to produce enriched uranium and to fabricate fuel elements for the reactor indicates that substantial emissions of fluorinated and chlorinated gases are unavoidable; some of these gases may be potent greenhouse gases, with global warming potentials thousands of times greater than CO2.

Unknown are the GHG emissions of the construction of a nuclear power plant, with its large mass of high-quality and often exotic materials. Unknown are the GHG emissions of the operation, maintenance and refurbishment of nuclear power plants. Unknown are the GHG emissions of the backend of the nuclear process chain: the handling and storage of spent fuel and other radioactive waste.

It is inconceivable that nuclear power does not emit other greenhouse gases, this matter is still a well-kept secret. Absence of published data does not mean absence of emissions.

Nuclear power stations and reprocessing plants discharge substantial amounts of a number of fission products, one of them is krypton-85, a radioactive noble gas. Krypton-85 is a beta emitter and is capable of ionizing the atmosphere, leading to the formation of ozone in the troposphere. Tropospheric ozone is a greenhouse gas, it damages plants, it causes smog and health problems. Due to the ionization of air krypton-85 affects the atmospheric electric properties, which gives rise to unforeseeable effects for weather and climate; the Earth's heat balance and precipitation patterns could be disturbed. Would nuclear power exchange alleged mitigation of CO2 emissions for enhanced emissions of climate changer krypton-85?

Are the published nuclear GHG emission figures comparable to renewables?

Scientifically sound comparison of nuclear power with renewables is not possible as long as many physical and chemical processes of the nuclear process chain are inaccessible in the open literature, and their unavoidable emissions cannot be assessed.

When the nuclear industry is speaking about its GHG emissions, only its CO2 emissions are involved.

Erroneously the nuclear industry uses the unit gCO2eq/kWh (gram CO2-equivalent per kilowatt-hour), this unit implies that other greenhouse gases also are included in the emission figures, instead the unit gCO2/kWh (gram CO2 per kilowatt-hour) should be used. The published emission figures of renewables do include all greenhouse gases. In this way the nuclear industry gives a false and misleading impression of things, comparing apples and oranges.

A second reason why the published emission figures of the nuclear industry are not scientifically comparable to those of renewables is the fact that the nuclear emission figures are based on a very incomplete analysis of the nuclear process chain, for instance the emissions of construction, operation, maintenance, refurbishment and dismantling, jointly responsible for 70% of nuclear CO2 emissions, are either not taken into account, or use unrealistically low figures. It is these exact components that are the only contributions to the published GHG emissions of renewables. Solar power and wind power do not consume materials for conversion into electricity, as nuclear power does.

What is the energy debt and what are the delayed CO2 emissions of nuclear power?

Only a minor fraction of the back end processes of the nuclear chain are operational, after more than 60 years of civil nuclear power. The fulfillment of the back end processes involve large-scale industrial activities, requiring massive amounts of energy and high-grade materials. The energy investments of the yet-to-be fulfilled activities can be reliably estimated by a physical analysis of the processes needed to safely handle the radioactive materials generated during the operational lifetime of the nuclear power plant. No advanced technology is required for these processes.

The energy investments for construction of the nuclear power plant and those for running the front end processes are offset against the electricity production during the operational lifetime. The future energy investments required to finish the back end are called the energy debt.

The CO2 emissions coupled to those processes in the future have to be added to the emissions generated during the construction and operation of the NPP if the CO2 intensity of nuclear power were to be compared to that of other energy systems; effectively this is the delayed CO2 emission of nuclear power. Whether the back end processes would emit also other greenhouse gases is unknown.

Claiming that nuclear power is a low-carbon energy system, even lower than renewables such as wind power and solar photovoltaics, seems strange in view of the fact that the CO2 debt built up during the past six decades of nuclear power is still to be paid off.


Assuming nuclear power emits no greenhouse gases (which is not true), the nuclear mitigation share would grow from the present level of less than 1% to at most 1.4% of the global greenhouse gas emissions by 2050-2060, if the global nuclear capacity were to grow according to scenarios projected by the nuclear industry.

Materialization of the nuclear capacity scenarios proposed by the nuclear industry are doubtful because of the unrealistically high construction rates of new nuclear power plants that would be required.

Nuclear generating capacity in the future will have to rely completely on reactors in the once-through mode, because closed-cycle systems, including the thorium cycle, are inherently unfeasible. As a consequence future nuclear power depends exclusively on the availability of natural uranium resources.

Net energy contribution to the global energy supply by nuclear power is limited by the availability of uranium-for-energy resources. Exploiting resources at ore grades below 0.02-0.01% uranium the nuclear system becomes an energy sink instead of an energy source: nuclear power falls off the energy cliff.

The average ore grade and other qualities of the yet-to-be exploited global uranium resources decline with time, because the highest quality resources available are always mined first.

The chances of discovering new major uranium-for-energy resources are bleak.

Mining of phosphates should be tailored exclusively to agricultural needs, for phosphorus is irreplaceable in agriculture.

Uranium from seawater is no option. If feasible at commercial scale at all, this resource lies far beyond the energy cliff: no net energy generation is possible.

From a practical viewpoint only the low IAEA scenario seems feasible, resulting in a mitigation share of 0.5-0.3% of the global GHG emissions by 2050, provided nuclear power is GHG free. The mitigation share would become negligible if the nuclear GHG emissions are taken into account.

At present nuclear power emits 88-146 gCO2/kWh. Likely the nuclear CO2 emissions will grow from the current level to values approaching fossil fuel generation within the lifetime of new nuclear builds in the scenarios of both the IAEA and WNA.

Emissions of GHGs other than CO2 by nuclear power are not reported, but are almost certain from a technical point of view.

Krypton-85, discharged by all nuclear power plants and reprocessing plants, generates greenhouse gases in the troposphere, in addition it causes other weather and climate changing effects.

The published figures of nuclear GHG emissions are not comparable to the figures of renewables, because different quantities and estimation methods are applied.

Due to the après nous le déluge culture of the nuclear industry the health hazards posed by radioactive materials in the human environment will increase with time, in addition to risks of Chernobyl-like disasters and of nuclear terrorism.

Why not nuclear and renewables?

Nuclear Monitor Issue: 
Dave Elliott − Professor of Technology Policy at the Open University, UK

Nuclear plants do not generate carbon dioxide, so why can't we have nuclear AND renewables, supporting each other, as a response to climate change? In evidence to the UK Energy and Climate Change Select Committee in July, Amber Rudd MP, DECC Secretary of State, suggested that despite its high cost nuclear baseload 'enables us to support more renewables' and was needed since, 'as we all know, until we get storage right, renewables are unreliable'. Can nuclear really support renewables, and is it really low carbon?

The first point to make is that although nuclear plants themselves do not generate CO2, producing the fuel they use does. The mining and fabrication of nuclear fuel is an energy-intense, and hence (at present) carbon-intense, activity and, as demand for this fuel rises, the energy (and carbon) debt will rise since lower grade uranium ores will have to be used, undermining the carbon saving benefits of using nuclear plants.

In theory, nuclear energy or even (perversely) renewables, could be used to power nuclear fuel production so as to avoid this problem but there would still be diminishing returns – there are finite reserves of uranium. Overall, if we attempted to expand the use of nuclear dramatically to deal with climate change, we would exhaust the reserves rapidly unless new more fuel-efficient nuclear plants were developed e.g. fast breeders, and even that would not extend the life of the uranium resource indefinitely.

Nor would it deal with the other problems of nuclear power – safety, security, weapons proliferation and terrorist attack risks, rising costs, inflexible operation and active waste disposal. Indeed it could make them worse. There may be some technical options for limiting some of these problems (e.g. the development of smaller plants, plants using thorium and perhaps recycling some nuclear wastes) but, although there are (strong!) disagreements, some say nuclear fission may not be a significant energy supply option for the future.

Even so, it might be argued that nuclear plants can still prove useful in the interim, before the fuel scarcity problem kicks in, for example to backup variable renewables, as Rudd suggested. For good or ill, in fact it does not seem so. Nuclear plants can't vary their output rapidly or regularly without safety problems. It takes time for the activated xenon gas that is produced when reaction levels are changed to dissipate – it can interfere with proper/safe reactor performance.

In any case nuclear plants need to be run 24/7/365 to recoup their large capital cost. So nuclear plants can just about deal with some of the daily energy demand cycles (demand peaks in the evening, low demand at night) but not with the fast irregular variations likely with wind etc. on the grid – they can't be used to back up the short-term variable output from renewables. It is conceivable that they could be used to cover the occasional longer periods when wind etc. is at minimum. This seems to be what is offered as one option in a new report from the Energy Research Partnership.1 However, that would mean running the plants at lower levels at other times, ready to ramp up slowly to meet the lull periods, which would undermine their economics.

Moreover, if there is a large nuclear contribution and also a large renewables contribution, there can be head-to-head operational conflicts when energy demand is low e.g. at night in summer, when in the UK demand is around 20 GW. The UK is aiming for 16 GW of nuclear by around 2030 and more later (there is talk of 75 GW by 2050) and maybe 30 GW of renewables by around 2020, perhaps more later. Assuming you can't export all the excess, or store it all, which do you turn off when demand is low? The nuclear operators do not want nuclear output to be "curtailed". Neither do the renewable plant operators – they would lose money. It would be a waste either way.

Basically the two technologies are incompatible at large scale on the grid. What you need is one or the other: large, essentially inflexible, nuclear plants with large (very expensive) energy stores to take excess output at low energy demand times, coupled possibly with exporting any excess (as France does) OR a renewables-based system, with a flexible smart grid that balances the variations, using back-up plants (small cheap-to-run gas-fired plants initially, but biomass-fired increasingly), some energy storage (but not much – it is expensive) and demand-side management to reduce/delay peak demand until later. Surplus power at times of low demand can be exported (as with nuclear) and balanced with power imported from overseas if available – the time difference in demand and local variations in wind availability, e.g. across the EU, would help. Having a large inflexible nuclear base-load component on the grid, in such a system, just gets in the way, though a small nuclear component might just about be accommodated.

Basically, in the new system, unless you have a vast energy storage capacity (which would be very expensive), having large base-load plants is a PROBLEM not a solution. The old system, with base-load plus top-up, was OK with large inflexible plant, although wasteful (with huge thermal conversion losses), but if we are to use variable renewables on a large scale we need a more flexible system.

There are some other angles: the surplus power from renewables can be converted into hydrogen gas by electrolysis of water and stored, ready for use in a gas turbine plant to make power when demand is high. Or for use as a vehicle fuel. Germany is already doing this via several wind-to-gas/power-to-gas plants, some of them converting the hydrogen to methane gas, using CO2 captured from the air or from power station exhausts, to feed into the national gas main. It has been argued that if you do happen to have a large, already built, nuclear component (as in France) you could do the same with the excess power from that at night, but that seems to be just a way to sustain the over large nuclear fleet for a bit longer! It would not be economic to build large numbers of new nuclear plants to do this, even if their fuel supply could be guaranteed and low carbon long term. On that last point, interestingly, a new study suggests that using thorium could lead to higher net carbon emissions.2

It is conceivable that nuclear fusion may be viable in the longer term (possibly post 2050). Some say that, rather than being used for base-load, fusion might be used for hydrogen production, in which case it might offer a way to balance variable renewables. However that is very speculative, and fusion is still some way off. Certainly, even if all goes well with the current research work, fusion won't be available in time to deal with the urgent problem of climate change, or to help renewables to do that in the near term.

In terms of the main focus for energy supply, both now and long term, it seems that we really do need to make a choice between nuclear and renewables.

[Reprinted from




Nuclear power: No Solution to Climate Change

Nuclear Monitor Issue: 
Jim Green − Nuclear Monitor editor


1. Nuclear Power is Not a Silver Bullet

Nuclear power could at most make a modest contribution to climate change abatement. The main limitation is that it is used almost exclusively for electricity generation, which accounts for less than 25% of global greenhouse emissions. Even tripling nuclear power generation would reduce emissions by less than 10% − and then only if the assumption is that it displaces coal.

2. Greenhouse Emissions from the Nuclear Fuel Cycle

Claims that nuclear power is 'greenhouse free' are false. Nuclear power is more greenhouse intensive than most renewable energy sources and energy efficiency measures. Life-cycle greenhouse emissions from nuclear power will increase as relatively high-grade uranium ores are mined out.

3. Nuclear Power – A Slow Response to an Urgent Problem

The nuclear industry does not have the capacity to rapidly expand production as a result of 20 years of stagnation. Limitations include bottlenecks in the reactor manufacturing sector, dwindling and ageing workforces, and the considerable time it takes to build a reactor and to pay back the energy debt from construction.

4. Nuclear Power and Climate Change

Countries and regions with a high reliance on nuclear power also tend to have high greenhouse gas emissions.

Some countries are planning to replace fossil fuel-fired power plants with nuclear power in order to increase fossil fuel exports − in such cases any potential climate change mitigation benefits of nuclear power are lost.

5. Climate Change and Nuclear Hazards

Nuclear power plants are vulnerable to threats which are being exacerbated by climate change. These include dwindling and warming water sources, sea-level rise, storm damage, drought, and jelly-fish swarms.

'Water wars' − in particular, disputes over the allocation of increasingly scarce water resources between power generation and agriculture − are becoming increasingly common and are being exacerbated by climate change

6. Weapons Proliferation and Nuclear Winter

Civil nuclear programs have provided cover for numerous covert weapons programs and an expansion of nuclear power would exacerbate the problem.

Nuclear warfare − even a limited nuclear war involving a tiny fraction of the global arsenal − has the potential to cause catastrophic climate change.

7. Renewables and Energy Efficiency

Global renewable power capacity more than doubled from 2004 to 2014 (and non-hydro renewables grew 8-fold). Over that decade, and the one before it, nuclear power flatlined.

Global renewable capacity (including hydro) is 4.6 times greater than nuclear capacity, and renewable electricity generation more than doubles nuclear generation. A growing body of research demonstrates the potential for renewables to largely supplant fossil fuels for power supply globally.

Energy efficiency and renewables are the Twin Pillars of a clean energy future. A University of Cambridge study concluded that 73% of global energy use could be saved by energy efficiency and conservation measures − making it far easier to achieve a low-carbon, non-nuclear future.


"Saying that nuclear power can solve global warming by itself is way over the top".

-- Senior International Atomic Energy Agency energy analyst Alan McDonald, 2004.[1]

Nuclear power could at most make a modest contribution to climate change abatement. The main limitation is that it is used almost exclusively for electricity generation, which accounts for less than 25% of global (anthropogenic) greenhouse emissions.[2]

Doubling current nuclear capacity would reduce emissions by roughly 6% if nuclear displaced coal[3] − or not at all if nuclear displaced renewables and energy efficiency. Doubling nuclear power generation would require building 437 reactors to add to the 437 existing 'operable' reactors (380 gigawatts). It would also require new reactors to replace shut-down reactors − the International Energy Agency anticipates almost 200 shut downs by 2040.[4]

A 2007 report by the International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM) states that if nuclear power grew approximately three-fold to about 1000 GWe in 2050, the increase in global greenhouse emissions projected in business-as-usual scenarios could be reduced by about 10−20% − assuming that nuclear displaced coal.[5] The IPFM scenario (which it does not advocate) assumes a business-as-usual doubling of greenhouse emissions by 2050, with 700 additional reactors reducing emissions from 14 billion metric tons to 13 billion metric tons. Thus the increase in emissions would be reduced by 1/7 or 14% and overall emissions would be reduced by 1/14 or 7% − assuming that nuclear displaces coal.

According to a 2007 article in Progress in Nuclear Energy, a ten-fold increase in nuclear capacity by the end of the century would reduce greenhouse emissions by 15%.[6]

Clearly, nuclear power is not a 'silver bullet'.


Claims that nuclear power is 'greenhouse free' are false. Nuclear power is more greenhouse intensive than most renewable energy sources and energy efficiency measures. Life-cycle greenhouse emissions from nuclear power will increase as relatively high-grade uranium ores are mined out and give way to the mining of lower-grade ores.

Greenhouse emissions arise across the nuclear fuel cycle – uranium mining, milling, conversion, and enrichment; reactor construction, refurbishment and decommissioning; waste management (e.g. reprocessing, and/or encasement in glass or cement); and transportation of uranium, spent fuel, etc.

Academic Benjamin Sovacool wrote in a 2008 paper:

"To provide just a rough estimate of how much equivalent carbon dioxide nuclear plants emit over the course of their lifecycle, a 1,000 MW reactor operating at a 90 percent capacity factor will emit the equivalent of 1,427 tons of carbon dioxide every day, or 522,323 metric tons of carbon dioxide every year. Nuclear facilities were responsible for emitting the equivalent of some 183 million metric tons of carbon dioxide in 2005. Assuming a carbon tax of $24 per ton − nothing too extreme − and that 1,000 MW nuclear plant would have to pay almost $12.6 million per year for its carbon-equivalent emissions. For the global nuclear power industry, this equates to approximately $4.4 billion in carbon taxes per year."[7]

In a ground-breaking study Sovacool screened 103 lifecycle studies of greenhouse emissions from the nuclear fuel cycle to identify the most current, original, and transparent studies.[8] He found that the mean value from those studies was 66 grams of carbon dioxide equivalent per kilowatt-hour (gCO2e/kWh).

Sovacool's paper provides the following figures (gCO2e/kWh):







Solar thermal




Solar PV








Natural gas




Heavy oil




Sovacool states: "Offshore wind power has less than one-seventh the carbon equivalent emissions of nuclear plants; large-scale hydropower, onshore wind, and biogas, about one-sixth the emissions; small-scale hydroelectric and solar thermal one-fifth. This makes these renewable energy technologies seven-, six-, and five-times more effective on a per kWh basis at fighting climate change. Policymakers would be wise to embrace these more environmentally friendly technologies if they are serious about producing electricity and mitigating climate change."[9]

In a 2009 paper prepared for the Australian Uranium Association, academic Manfred Lenzen concluded that life-cycle greenhouse emissions for nuclear power range from 10−130 gCO2e/kWh with the main variables being ore grades, enrichment technology, reactor fuel re-load frequency and burn-up, and to a lesser extent enrichment level, plant lifetime, load factors, and enrichment tails assay. Lenzen calculates a "worst case" – 0.01% ore grade, 75% load factor, 25 year lifetime, only diffusion enrichment, and a carbon-intensive background economy – resulting in emissions of 248 gCO2e/kWh.[10]

Others calculate still higher values, for example by assuming energy- and emissions-intensive burial of large volumes of low-level ore, waste rock, and mill tailings, rather than the current practice of surface storage.

Life-cycle greenhouse emissions from nuclear power will increase as relatively high-grade uranium ores are mined out. In 2009, mining consultancy firm CRU Group calculated that the average grade of uranium projects at the feasibility study stage around the world was 35% lower than the grades of operating mines, and that exploration projects had average grades 60% below existing operations.[11]

The extent of the increase in the greenhouse intensity of uranium mining is the subject of debate and considerable uncertainty. It depends not only on declining ore grades but also on other variables such as the choice of tailings management options at uranium mines.

Writing in the Journal of Industrial Ecology in 2012, Warner and Heath stated that emissions from the nuclear fuel cycle could increase by 55−220% with declining uranium ore grades.[12]

Academic Dr Mark Diesendorf states: "In the case where high-grade uranium ore is used, CO2 emissions from the nuclear fuel cycle are much less than those of an equivalent gas-fired power station. But the world's reserves of high-grade uranium are very limited and may only last a few decades. The vast majority of the world's uranium is low-grade. CO2 emissions from mining, milling and enrichment of low-grade uranium are substantial, and so total CO2 emissions from the nuclear fuel cycle become greater than or equal to those of a gas-fired power station."[13]

Keith Barnham, Emeritus Professor of Physics at Imperial College London, states that for ore with uranium concentration around 0.01%, the carbon footprint of nuclear electricity could be as high as that of electricity generation from natural gas.[14]

The German Environment Ministry stated in a 2006 report that a modern gas-fired power station in connection with heat production (co-generation) could be less carbon intensive than nuclear power.[15]

Some nuclear lobbyists claim that Generation IV fast neutron reactors would reduce emissions from the nuclear fuel cycle by using waste products (esp. depleted uranium and spent fuel) as fuel instead of mined uranium. One of the problems with that arguments is that Generation IV reactors are − and always have been − decades away:

  • The Generation IV International Forum states: "Depending on their respective degree of technical maturity, the first Generation IV systems are expected to be deployed commercially around 2030−2040."[16]
  • The International Atomic Energy Agency states: "Experts expect that the first Generation IV fast reactor demonstration plants and prototypes will be in operation by 2030 to 2040."[17]
  • A 2015 report by the French government's Institute for Radiological Protection and Nuclear Safety states: "There is still much R&D to be done to develop the Generation IV nuclear reactors, as well as for the fuel cycle and the associated waste management which depends on the system chosen."[18]
  • The World Nuclear Association noted in 2009 that "progress is seen as slow, and several potential designs have been undergoing evaluation on paper for many years."[19]

As for the real-world experience with fast neutron reactors, for the most part they have failed every test including carbon intensity. White elephants such as Japan's Monju reactor and France's Superphenix produced so little electricity that the carbon intensity must have been high. Monju operated for 205 days after it was connected to the grid in August 1995, and a further 45 days in 2010; apart from that it has been shut-down because of a sodium leak and fire in 1996, and a 2010 accident when a 3.3 tonne refuelling machine fell into the reactor vessel.[20] The lifetime load factor of the French Superphenix fast reactor − the ratio of electricity generated compared to the amount that would have been generated if operated continually at full capacity − was just 7% percent, making it one of the worst-performing reactors in history.[21]


Expanding nuclear power is impractical as a short-term response to the need to urgently reduce greenhouse emissions. The industry does not have the capacity to rapidly expand production as a result of 20 years of stagnation. Limitations include bottlenecks in the reactor manufacturing sector, dwindling and ageing workforces, and the considerable time it takes to build a reactor and to pay back the energy debt from construction.

One constraint is the considerable time it takes to build reactors. The World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2014 noted that the average construction time of the last 37 reactors that started up was 10 years; and that at least 49 of the 67 reactors listed as under construction have encountered construction delays.[22]

The development of new reactor types − even those which are just modified versions of conventional reactor technology − further delays the construction and deployment of nuclear power. For example the EPR in Finland is 7−9 years behind schedule, and the EPR in France is five years behind schedule (and counting).[23]

Nuclear power is still slower for countries building their first reactor. The IAEA sets out a phased 'milestone' approach to establishing nuclear power in new countries, lasting from 11−20 years: a pre-project phase 1 (1−3 years), a project decision-making phase (3−7 years) and a construction phase (7−10 years).[24]

The French Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN) says that the initial development of a nuclear power industry requires at least 10−15 years in order to build up skills in safety and control and to develop a regulatory framework − that's 10−15 years even before reactor construction begins. Even with rapid progress, ASN estimates a minimum lead time of 15 years before a new nuclear power plant can be started up in a country that does not already have the required infrastructure.24

In addition to reactor construction, further years elapse before nuclear power has generated as much as energy as was expended in the construction of the reactor. One academic report states: "The energy payback time of nuclear energy is around 6½ years for light water reactors, and 7 years for heavy water reactors, ranging within 5.6–14.1 years, and 6.4–12.4 years, respectively."[25]

By contrast, construction times for renewable energy sources are typically months not years, and likewise the energy pay-back period is typically months not years.

Another constraint is bottlenecks in the reactor manufacturing sector. Sharon Squassoni noted in a 2009 paper:

"A significant expansion will narrow bottlenecks in the global supply chain, which today include ultra-heavy forgings, large manufactured components, engineering, and craft and skilled construction labor. All these constraints are exacerbated by the lack of recent experience in construction and by aging labor forces. Though these may not present problems for limited growth, they will certainly present problems for doubling or tripling reactor capacity."[26]

Another constraint is the pattern of ageing nuclear workforces − the 'silver tsunami'.[27] In the UK, for example, a recent government report says that attrition rates in the ageing nuclear workforce are "high and growing" with more than 8,000 new employees a year needed every year for the next six years if the country's ambitious new-build programme is to succeed.[28] In addition, research and training facilities and courses have been on the decline.

A major expansion of nuclear power is theoretically possible over the medium- to long-term. The depletion of uranium resources could be a constraint. According to the World Nuclear Association, the world's present measured resources of uranium (5.9 Mt) in the cost category around 1.5 times present spot prices, are enough to last for about 90 years at the current usage rate of 66,000 tU/yr.[29]


Countries and regions with a high reliance on nuclear power also tend to have high greenhouse gas emissions. For example, the US operates 99 power reactors with a capacity of 98.8 GW (26% of the world total), with nuclear power generating over 19% of its electricity. Yet the US is one of the world's largest greenhouse polluters both in per capita and overall terms.

Some countries are planning to replace fossil fuel-fired power plants with nuclear power in order to increase fossil fuel exports. In such cases any potential climate change mitigation benefits of nuclear power are lost. World Nuclear News reported in 2010 that Venezuela, Russia, and some Middle East countries such as the UAE and Iran would prefer to export oil and gas rather than use them in domestic power plants.[30] Saudi Arabia is another country planning to build nuclear power plants in order to boost fossil fuel exports.[31]


Nuclear power plants are vulnerable to threats which are being exacerbated by climate change − discussed in detail in Nuclear Monitor #770.[32]

A 2013 report by the US Department of Energy details many of the interconnections between climate change and energy.[33] These include:

  • Increasing risk of shutdowns at thermoelectric power plants (e.g. coal, gas and nuclear) due to decreased water availability which affects cooling, a requirement for operation;
  • Higher risks to energy infrastructure located along the coasts due to sea level rise, the increasing intensity of storms, and higher storm surge and flooding;
  • Disruption of fuel supplies during severe storms;
  • Power plant disruptions due to drought; and
  • Power lines, transformers and electricity distribution systems face increasing risks of physical damage from the hurricanes, storms and wildfires that are growing more frequent and intense.

At the lower end of the risk spectrum, there are many instances of nuclear plants operating at reduced power or being temporarily shut down due to water shortages or increased water temperature (which can adversely affect reactor cooling and/or cause fish deaths and other problems with the dumping of waste heat in water sources). Reactors in several countries have been forced to close during heat waves, when they're needed the most. For example, France had to purchase power from the UK in 2009 because almost a third of its nuclear generating capacity was lost when it had to cut production to avoid exceeding thermal discharge limits.[34]

At the upper end of the risk spectrum, climate-related threats pose serious risks, such as storms cutting off grid power, leaving nuclear plants reliant on generators for reactor cooling. A 2004 incident in Germany illustrates the risks. Both Biblis reactors (A and B) were in operation when heavy storms knocked out power lines. Because of an incorrectly set electrical switch and a faulty pressure gauge, the Biblis-B turbine did not drop, as designed, from 1,300 to 60 megawatts. Instead the reactor scrammed. When Biblis-B scrammed with its grid power supply already cut off, four emergency diesel generators started. Another emergency supply also started but, because of a switching failure, one of the lines failed to connect. These lines would have been relied upon as a backup to bring emergency power from Biblis-B to Biblis-A if Biblis-A had also been without power. The result was a partial disabling of the emergency power supply from Biblis-B to Biblis-A for about two hours.[35]

'Water wars' will become increasingly common with climate change − in particular, disputes over the allocation of increasingly scarce water resources between power generation and agriculture. Nuclear power reactors consume massive amounts of water − typically 36.3 to 65.4 million litres per reactor per day − primarily for reactor cooling.[36]

Jellyfish swarms have caused problems at many nuclear plants around the world.[37] Increased fishing of jellyfish predators and global warming are contributing to higher jellyfish populations. Monty Graham, co-author of a study on jellyfish blooms published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, blames global warming, overfishing, and the nitrification of oceans through fertiliser run-off.[38]

The Union of Concerned Scientists argued in a 2013 report:

"Low-carbon power is not necessarily water-smart. Electricity mixes that emphasise carbon capture and storage for coal plants, nuclear energy, or even water-cooled renewables such as some geothermal, biomass, or concentrating solar could worsen rather than lessen the sector's effects on water. That said, renewables and energy efficiency can be a winning combination. This scenario would be most effective in reducing carbon emissions, pressure on water resources, and electricity bills. Energy efficiency efforts could more than meet growth in demand for electricity in the US, and renewable energy could supply 80% of the remaining demand."[39]

The REN21 'Renewables 2015: Global Status Report' states:[40]

"All energy systems are susceptible to climate variability and extremes. For example, decreasing water levels and droughts can lead to the shutdown of thermal power plants that depend on water-based cooling systems. Dry periods, alternating with floods, can shift erosion and deposition patterns, altering growth rates of biomass and affecting the quality and quantity of the potential fuel output. The melting of glaciers, induced by temperature increases, can have a negative effect on hydropower systems by causing infrastructure damage from flooding and siltation, as well as affecting generation capacity. The efficiency of solar PV declines with high temperatures and dust accumulation, and most of today's wind turbines shut down in winds exceeding 100 to 120 kilometres per hour.

"Typical responses to reducing system vulnerability involve reinforcing existing infrastructure (including strengthening transmission towers and lines); ensuring redundancy of critical systems; building seawalls around power plants; reducing the need for power plant cooling water; and storing larger quantities of fuel at plants. More innovative strategies include local generation and storage, diversification of energy sources, use of a combination of smart grids and technologies, and improving capabilities to couple and decouple individual systems from the central grid system during emergencies.

"Although renewable energy systems are also vulnerable to climate change, they have unique qualities that make them suitable both for reinforcing the resilience of the wider energy infrastructure and for ensuring the provision of energy services under changing climatic conditions. System modularity, distributed deployment, and local availability and diversity of fuel sources − central components of energy system resilience − are key characteristics of most renewable energy systems. Ultimately, renewable energy systems improve the resilience of conventional power systems, both individually and by their collective contribution to a more diversified and distributed asset pool."


Global expansion of nuclear power would inevitably involve the growth and spread of stockpiles of weapons-useable fissile material and the facilities to produce fissile materials (enrichment plants for highly enriched uranium; and reactors and reprocessing plants for plutonium). Global expansion of nuclear power would lead to an increase in the number of 'threshold' or 'breakout' nuclear states which could quickly produce weapons drawing on expertise, facilities and materials from their 'civil' nuclear program.

Former US Vice President Al Gore has neatly summed up the problem: "For eight years in the White House, every weapons-proliferation problem we dealt with was connected to a civilian reactor program. And if we ever got to the point where we wanted to use nuclear reactors to back out a lot of coal ... then we'd have to put them in so many places we'd run that proliferation risk right off the reasonability scale."[41]

Running the proliferation risk off the reasonability scale brings the debate back to climate change − a connection explained by Alan Robock in The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists:

"As recent work ... has shown, we now understand that the atmospheric effects of a nuclear war would last for at least a decade − more than proving the nuclear winter theory of the 1980s correct. By our calculations, a regional nuclear war between India and Pakistan using less than 0.3% of the current global arsenal would produce climate change unprecedented in recorded human history and global ozone depletion equal in size to the current hole in the ozone, only spread out globally."[42]

Nuclear expansion would also increase the availability of nuclear materials for radioactive 'dirty bombs'. It would also increase the number of potential targets for terrorist attacks or conventional military strikes by nation-states (such as the repeated military strikes and attempted strikes on nuclear sites in the Middle East).

The US National Intelligence Council argued in a 2008 report that the "spread of nuclear technologies and expertise is generating concerns about the potential emergence of new nuclear weapon states and the acquisition of nuclear materials by terrorist groups."[43]

As long ago as 1946, the Acheson-Lilienthal Report commissioned by the US Department of State identified intractable problems:

"We have concluded unanimously that there is no prospect of security against atomic warfare in a system of international agreements to outlaw such weapons controlled only by a system which relies on inspection and similar police-like methods. The reasons supporting this conclusion are not merely technical, but primarily the inseparable political, social, and organizational problems involved in enforcing agreements between nations each free to develop atomic energy but only pledged not to use it for bombs. National rivalries in the development of atomic energy readily convertible to destructive purposes are the heart of the difficulty."[44]

Fissile materials

A May 2015 report written by Zia Mian and Alexander Glaser for the International Panel on Fissile Materials provides details on stockpiles of fissile materials. As of the end of 2013, civilian stockpiles contained 57,070 weapon-equivalents: 61 tons of highly enriched uranium (4,070 weapons), and 267 tons of (separated) plutonium (53,000 weapons).[45] The figures are far greater if plutonium in spent fuel is included.

Harold Feiveson calculates that with an increase in nuclear power capacity to 3,500 GW (compared to 380 GW as of June 2015), about 700 tonnes of plutonium would be produced annually.[46] That amount of plutonium would suffice to build 70,000 nuclear weapons, and if we assume an average 40-year reactor lifespan the accumulated plutonium would suffice to build 2.8 million weapons.

Similarly, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change maps out a scenario whereby nuclear capacity would grow to about 3,300 gigawatts in 2100 and the accumulated plutonium inventory would rise to 50-100 thousand tonnes (IPCC, 1995). That amount of plutonium would suffice to build 5−10 million nuclear weapons.[47]

The challenge is still greater as a result of the practice of plutonium stockpiling. Japan's plutonium stockpiling, for example, clearly fans proliferation risks and tensions in north-east Asia. Diplomatic cables in 1993 and 1994 from US Ambassadors in Tokyo questioned the rationale for the stockpiling of so much plutonium. A 1993 US diplomatic cable posed these questions: "Can Japan expect that if it embarks on a massive plutonium recycling program that Korea and other nations would not press ahead with reprocessing programs? Would not the perception of Japan's being awash in plutonium and possessing leading edge rocket technology create anxiety in the region?"[48]

A 2007 report by the International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM) states:

"Even a modest expansion of nuclear power would be accompanied by a substantial increase in the number of countries with nuclear reactors. Some of these countries would likely seek gas-centrifuge uranium-enrichment plants as well. Centrifuge-enrichment plants can be quickly converted to the production of highly enriched uranium for weapons. It is therefore critical to find multinational alternatives to the proliferation of national enrichment plants.

"If a large-scale expansion of nuclear power were accompanied by a shift to reprocessing and plutonium recycle in light-water or fast reactors, it would involve annual flows of separated plutonium on the scale of a thousand metric tons per year − enough for 100,000 nuclear bombs." [49]


The REN21 'Renewables 2015: Global Status Report' details the striking growth of renewables over the past decade.[50] Renewable energy provided an estimated 19.1% of global final energy consumption in 2013, and growth in capacity and generation continued to expand in 2014. Heating capacity grew at a steady pace, and the production of biofuels for transport increased.

The most rapid growth, and the largest increase in capacity, occurred in the power sector, led by wind, solar PV, and hydropower. Renewables accounted for approximately 59% of net additions to global power capacity in 2014, with significant growth in all regions of the world.

Global renewable power capacity − excluding hydro − grew eight-fold from 85 GW in 2004 to 657 GW in 2014. Solar PV capacity has grown at a phenomenal rate, from 2.6 GW in 2004 to 177 GW in 2014. Over the same period wind power capacity increased from 48 GW to 370 GW.

Global renewable power capacity − including hydro − more than doubled from 800 GW in 2004 to 1,712 GW in 2014 (an estimated 27.7% of the world's power generating capacity in 2014).

In 2014, total installed renewable capacity (including hydro) increased by 8.5%, compared to 0.6% for nuclear power. Hydro capacity rose by 3.6% while other renewables collectively grew nearly 18%.

By way of sharp contrast, nuclear power has flatlined for the past two decades. Nuclear power capacity was 365 GW in 2004 and 376 GW in 2014, and the number of reactors declined from 443 to 439 over that period.[51]

Renewable capacity (including hydro) of 1,712 GW is 4.6 times greater than nuclear capacity of 376 GW.

But the capacity factor of some renewables (e.g. solar PV and wind) is lower than that of nuclear power, so how do the figures stack up when comparing electricity generation? The REN21 report states that as of the end of 2014, renewables (including hydro) supplied an estimated 22.8% of global electricity (hydro 16.6% and other renewables 6.2%). Nuclear power's share of 10.8%[52] is less than half of the electricity generation from renewables − and the gap is widening.

Renewables jobs have also increased dramatically, with more than 7.7 million people now employed in the sector worldwide.

The REN21 report notes that the growth of renewables is being driven by declining costs and that "in many countries renewables are broadly competitive with conventional energy sources." Further, "growth in renewable energy (and energy
efficiency improvements) continues to be tempered by subsidies to fossil fuels and nuclear power, particularly in developing countries."

One final point from the REN21 report warrants mention. The report states: "Despite rising energy use, for the first time in four decades, global carbon emissions associated with energy consumption remained stable in 2014 while the global economy grew; this stabilisation has been attributed to increased penetration of renewable energy and to improvements in energy efficiency."

Deep cuts

Renewables are leaving nuclear power in their wake. But is the growth trajectory of renewables commensurate with the deep cuts in greenhouse emissions required to avert climate change? The short answer is: no.

Could renewables largely supplant fossil fuelled power plants if there was the political will to make the transition happen? Or is an 'all of the above' approach including renewables and nuclear necessary? There is a growing body of research on the potential for renewables to largely or completely supplant fossil fuels for power supply globally.[53]

Of particular interest are:

  • countries with a large number of reactors − only France (58) and the US (99) have more than 50 power reactors;
  • countries with a very heavy reliance on nuclear power (e.g. nuclear supplies around 75% of France's electricity); and
  • countries with very large and growing populations and increasing energy demand (e.g. India and China).

USA: The Nuclear Information & Resource Service maintains a list of reports demonstrating the potential for the US (and Europe) to produce all electricity from renewables.[54]

France: A recent report by ADEME, a French government agency under the Ministries of Ecology and Research, shows that a 100% renewable electricity supply by 2050 in France is feasible and affordable.[55] For an all-renewables scenario, the report proposes an ideal electricity mix: 63% from wind, 17% from solar, 13% from hydro and 7% from renewable thermal sources (including geothermal energy). The report estimates that the electricity production cost (currently averaging 91 euros per MWh) would be 119 euros per megawatt-hour in the all-renewables scenario, compared with a near-identical figure of 117 euros per MWh with a mix of 50% nuclear, 40% renewables, and 10% fossil fuels.

China: A 2015 report by the China National Renewable Energy Centre finds that China could generate 85% of its electricity and 60% of total energy from renewables by 2050.[56]

India: A detailed 2013 report by WWF-India and The Energy and Resources Institute maps out how India could generate as much as 90% of total primary energy from renewables by 2050.[57] The study develops and evaluates a potential growth path involving large deployment of renewables − especially solar, wind and hydro − for electricity generation, with second-generation and algal biofuels meeting the additional demands of the transport sector. It argues that aggressive efficiency improvements also have large potential and could bring in savings of the order of 59% by 2050.

Twin Pillars: Energy efficiency and renewables

A June 2015 report by the International Energy Agency (IEA) compares an 'INDC' scenario, based on 'Intended Nationally Determined Contributions' nominated by (some) countries in advance of the UN climate conference in December 2015, with a more ambitious 'Bridge Scenario'.[58] Energy efficiency does much of the heavy lifting in reducing energy-related greenhouse emissions in the Bridge Scenario compared to the INDC scenario. Energy efficiency accounts for 49% of the reduction by 2030, renewables 17%, upstream methane reductions 15%, fossil-fuel subsidy reform 10%, and reducing inefficient coal 9%.[59]

The IEA report's comments on renewables are worth noting. In the Bridge Scenario, 60% of new power capacity between 2015 and 2030 comes from renewables (23% wind, 17% solar PV, 14% hydro, 6% other renewables) compared to just 6% for nuclear, with fossil fuels accounting for the remaining 34%.[60] In the Bridge Scenario, nuclear accounts for 13% of global power capacity in 2030, almost three times lower than renewables' share of 37% (hydro 18%, wind 9%, solar PV, 4%, bioenergy 4%, geothermal 1%, and concentrated solar power 1%).

In the scenario presented in the International Energy Agency's 'World Energy Outlook 2014', which envisages modest efforts to reduce emissions, oil demand in 2040 would be 22% higher without the cumulative impact of energy efficiency measures, gas demand 17% higher and coal demand 15% higher.[61] The report states: "Beyond cutting energy use, energy efficiency lowers energy bills, improves trade balances and cuts CO2 emissions. Improved energy efficiency compared with today reduces oil and gas import bills for the five largest energy-importing regions by almost $1 trillion in 2040."

The REN21 report notes that renewables and energy efficiency are twin pillars of a sustainable energy future − enabling applications that otherwise might not be technically or economically practical and rendering the outcome greater than the sum of the parts. The report provides examples of the synergies:

  • Synergies for greater system benefits: Efficient building systems and designs, combined with on-site renewable energy generation, reduce end-use energy demand, electrical grid congestion and losses, and the monetary and energy expenditures associated with fuel transportation.
  • Synergies for greater renewable energy share in the energy mix. Improving end-use efficiency and increasing use of on-site renewables reduce primary energy demand. With lower end-use energy requirements, the opportunity increases for renewable energy sources of low energy density to meet full energy-service needs. Targets to increase the share of renewables in total energy consumption can be achieved through both increasing the amount of renewable energy and reducing total energy consumption.
  • Synergies for greater investment in renewables and efficiency. Improvements in end-use energy efficiency reduce the cost of delivering end-use services by renewable energy, and the money saved through efficiency can help finance additional efficiency improvements and/or deployment of renewable energy technologies. These synergies exist across numerous sectors, from buildings and electrical services to transportation and industry.

A 2011 study by University of Cambridge academics concluded that a whopping 73% of global energy use could be saved by practically achievable energy efficiency and conservation measures.[62] Julian Allwood, one of the authors of the study, said: "We think it's pretty unlikely that we'll find a good response to the threat of global warming on the supply side alone. But if we can make a serious reduction in our demand for energy, then all the options look more realistic."[63]


[1] Quoted in Geoffrey Lean, 27 June 2004, Nuclear power 'can't stop climate change', The Independent,

[2] Electricity plus heat account for 25% of emissions. IPCC, 2014: Summary for Policymakers. In: Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Work­ing Group III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the IPCC, p.9,

[3] The basis for the calculation is as follows: Ian Hore-Lacey from the World Nuclear Association claims that doubling nuclear power would reduce greenhouse emissions from the power sector by 25%, and the power sector accounts for less than 25% of total emissions. Ian Hore-Lacy, 4 May 2006, 'Nuclear wagon gathers steam', Courier Mail.

[4] International Energy Agency, 2014, 'World Economic Outlook 2014',

[5] International Panel on Fissile Materials, 2007, 'Global Fissile Material Report 2007', Chapter 7,

[6] Tae Joon Lee, Kyung Hee Lee, and Keun-Bae Oh, 'Strategic Environments for Nuclear Energy Innovation in the Next Half Century', Progress in Nuclear Energy, Vol. 49 (2007), p.399 (pp.397−408),

Cited in Moeed Yusuf, Nov 2008, 'Does Nuclear Energy Have a Future', Boston University, fn.54,

[7] Benjamin Sovacool, 2008, 'Nuclear power: False climate change prophet?',

[8] Benjamin K. Sovacool, Aug 2008, 'Valuing the Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Nuclear Power: A Critical Survey', Energy Policy 36 (8), pp.2940-2953,

[9] Benjamin K. Sovacool, 11 Dec 2009, 'Nuclear Energy and Renewable Power: Which is the Best Climate Change Mitigation Option', Nuclear Monitor #699,

[10] Manfred Lenzen, 2009, 'Current state of development of electricity-generating technologies – a literature review',

[11] CRU Group, 2009, 'Next generation uranium – at what cost?',

[12] Ethan S. Warner and Garvin A. Heath, April 2012, 'Life Cycle Greenhouse Gas Emissions of Nuclear Electricity Generation: Systematic Review and Harmonization', Journal of Industrial Ecology, Vol. 16, Issue Supplement s1, pp.S73–S92,

[13] Mark Diesendorf, 2005, ABC 'Ask an Expert',

[14] Keith Barnham, 5 Feb 2015, 'False solution: Nuclear power is not 'low carbon''

[15] German Environment Ministry, March 2006, 'Atomkraft: Ein teurer Irrweg. Die Mythen der Atomwirtschaft'.

[17] Peter Rickwood and Peter Kaiser, 1 March 2013, 'Fast Reactors Provide Sustainable Nuclear Power for "Thousands of Years"',

[18] Institute for Radiological Protection and Nuclear Safety, 2015, 'Review of Generation IV Nuclear Energy Systems',

[19] World Nuclear Association, 15 Dec 2009, 'Fast moves? Not exactly...',

[21] Mycle Schneider, 2009, 'Fast Breeder Reactors in France', Science and Global Security, 17:36–53,

[22] World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2014,

[23] Jim Green and Oliver Tickell, 15 May 2015, 'Finland cancels Olkiluoto 4 nuclear reactor - is the EPR finished?', The Ecologist,

[24] World Nuclear Association, June 2015, 'Emerging Nuclear Energy Countries',

[25] University of Sydney / Integrated Sustainability Analysis, 2006, 'Life-cycle energy balance and greenhouse gas emissions of nuclear energy in Australia', A study undertaken for the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet of the Australian Government,

[26] Sharon Squassoni, 2009, 'Nuclear Energy: Rebirth or Resuscitation?', Carnegie Endowment Report,

[27] Sylvia Westall, 29 Nov 2010, 'Nuclear's 'silver tsunami'',

[28] HM Government, 2015, 'Sustaining Our Nuclear Skills,

[29] World Nuclear Association, 8 Oct 2014, 'Supply of Uranium',

[30] World Nuclear News, 11 Nov 2010, 'Venezuela puts nuclear over oil',

[31] Nick Butler, 7 April 2014, 'The Risks of a Nuclear Saudi Arabia',

[32] Nuclear Monitor #770, 24 Oct 2013, 'Feature: Water & The Nuclear Fuel Cycle',

[33] Department of Energy, July 2013, 'U.S. Energy Sector Vulnerabilities to Climate Change and Extreme Weather',

[34] Robert Krier, 15 Aug 2012, 'Extreme Heat, Drought Show Vulnerability of Nuclear Power Plants', InsideClimate News,

[35] Helmut Hirsch, Oda Becker, Mycle Schneider and Antony Froggatt, April 2005, 'Nuclear Reactor Hazards: Ongoing Dangers of Operating Nuclear Technology in the 21st Century', Report prepared for Greenpeace International,

[36] 'How much water does a nuclear power plant consume?', Nuclear Monitor #770, 24 Oct 2013,

[38] Glenda Kwek, 11 July 2011, 'Jellyfish force shutdown of power plants',

[39] Union of Concerned Scientists, July 2013, 'Water-Smart Power: Strengthening the U.S. Electricity System in a Warming World',

[40] REN21 (Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century), 2015, 'Renewables 2015: Global Status Report',

[41] Quoted in David Roberts, 9 May 2006, 'An interview with accidental movie star Al Gore',

[42] Alan Robock, 14 Aug 2008, 'We should really worry about nuclear winter', The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,

[43] US National Intelligence Council, 2008, "Global Trends 2025 – a Transformed World",

[44] Acheson-Lilienthal Report, 16 March 1946, 'A Report on the International Control of Atomic Energy', Prepared for the Secretary of State's Committee on Atomic Energy, Department of State, Publication 2498.

[45] Zia Mian and Alexander Glaser, 2015, 'Global Fissile Material Report 2015: Nuclear Weapon and Fissile Material Stockpiles and Production', International Panel on Fissile Materials,

[46] Harold Feiveson, 2001, 'The Search for Proliferation-Resistant Nuclear Power', The Journal of the Federation of American Scientists, Volume 54, Number 5,

[47] Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 1995, 'Climate Change 1995: Impacts, Adaptations and Mitigation of Climate Change: Scientific-Technical Analyses', Contribution of Working Group II to the Second Assessment of the IPCC, R.Watson, M.Zinyowera, R.Moss (eds), Cambridge University Press: UK.

[48] Greenpeace, 1 Sept 1999, "Confidential diplomatic documents reveal U.S. proliferation concerns over Japan's plutonium program",

[49] International Panel on Fissile Materials, 2007, 'Global Fissile Material Report 2007', Chapter 7,

[50] REN21 (Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century), 2015, 'Renewables 2015: Global Status Report',

[51] International Atomic Energy Agency, 'Nuclear Power Capacity Trend',

[52] Mycle Schneider, April 2015, World Nuclear Industry Status Report,

[53] Mark Z. Jacobson and Mark A. Delucchi, Nov 2009, 'A Plan to Power 100 Percent of the Planet with Renewables', Scientific American,

Mark Z. Jacobson and Mark A. Delucchi, July/August 2013, 'Meeting the world’s energy needs entirely with wind, water, and solar power', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 69: pp.30-40,

WWF International, Ecofys and the Office for Metropolitan Architecture, 2011, 'The Energy Report: 100% Renewable Energy by 2050',

Greenpeace International, 'Energy [R]evolution 2012',

A number of other useful reports are listed at the following webpages: (Global, Europe, America, Asia, Pacific, Others)

[54] Nuclear Information & Resource Service, 'Nuclear-Free, Carbon-Free',

See also the NIRS 'Alternatives to Nuclear page' resources:

For European studies see also

[55] English language summary: Terje Osmundsen, 20 April 2015,

Full report (in French): L'Agence de l'Environnement et de la Maîtrise de l'Energie (ADEME), 2015, 'Vers un mix électrique 100% renouvelable en 2050',

[57] WWF India and The Energy and Resources Institute, 2013, 'The Energy Report − India 100% Renewable Energy by 2050',

Summary: Emma Fitzpatrick, 17 Jan 2014, 'Even India could reach nearly 100% renewables by 2051',

[58] International Energy Agency, June 2015, 'World Energy Outlook Special Report 2015: Energy and Climate Change',

[59] Ibid., p.74

[60] Ibid., p.155

[61] International Energy Agency, 'World Energy Outlook 2014',

[62] Jonathan M. Cullen, Julian M. Allwood, and Edward H. Borgstein, Jan 2011, 'Reducing Energy Demand: What Are the Practical Limits?', Environmental Science and Technology, 45 (4), pp 1711–1718,

[63] Helen Knight, 26 Jan 2011, 'Efficiency could cut world energy use over 70 per cent',

Don't Nuke the Climate! Launch of a new campaign

Nuclear Monitor Issue: 

On June 16, seven international clean energy organizations launched a major new campaign aimed at keeping nuclear power out of all negotiations at the upcoming UN climate talks in Paris. The UN Climate Change Conference ('COP-21') will be held in Paris from November 30 to December 11.

The seven initiating groups are the two organisations behind the Nuclear Monitor − the World Information Service on Energy (WISE-Amsterdam) and the Nuclear Information & Resource Service (NIRS) − along with Sortir du Nucleaire (France), Ecodefense (Russia), Global 2000 (Austria), Women in Europe for a Common Future (WECF), and Burgerinitiative Umweltschutz (Germany).

Some of the same groups were critical to a similar effort at the UN negotiations in The Hague in 2000, which succeeded in barring nuclear power from the Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development Mechanism. And some of the groups also organized the large Nuclear-Free, Carbon-Free contingent to last year's People's Climate March in New York City.

Peer de Rijk of WISE-Amsterdam said: "We are calling on 1,000 civil society organisations to join us for a campaign to block the nuclear industry's lobby activities at COP-21 and instead ensure the world chooses clean energy."

Sign the petition! The first step of this new international campaign is a petition that will be presented to world leaders in December.

Organizations can sign the petition at:

Individuals can sign the petition at:

The text of the petition is available in English French, Spanish, and German.

Join us in Paris. On December 12, groups will organize an anti-nuclear block in the Global Climate March. Buses and trains will bring people to Paris.

Danyel Dubreuil from Sortir du Nucléaire said: "The government keeps extending the lifetime of aging reactors and supporting a dirty, expensive, dangerous and declining nuclear industry and will most probably use the COP-21 to try saving its national nuclear industry while promoting it as clean and climate-friendly. We condemn the sponsoring of the COP by polluting companies − and especially by EDF − and will denounce the greenwashing of the nuclear industry in Paris."

International day of actions against nukes. On October 10−11 an international day of action against false solutions will take place in as many countries as possible.

Sascha Gabizon from the global women's network WECF said: "Nuclear power manifests a wide range of human rights violations, from the universal human rights to life and health, to disproportionate impacts on indigenous peoples, women, children, and future generations."

Vladimir Sliviak of Moscow-based Ecodefense said: "Russia has had a catastrophic experience with nuclear power and nuclear waste management. At the same time, the Russian government is increasing its efforts to sell new reactors across the world as safe and climate friendly. This is cynical and irresponsible and must be stopped. There must be a clear statement made in Paris: no nukes; yes to clean energy."

Join the virtual march. You can buy a banner (for as little as 5 euros) which will appear on the campaign homepage ( Your donation will be used to finance the Don't Nuke the Climate campaign. The best banner messages will be printed on real banners and taken to the march in Paris.

Websites. NIRS has set up a new 'Don't Nuke the Climate' website for US organizing and actions:

The international campaign website is:

Accidents, waste and weapons: nuclear power isn't worth the risks

Nuclear Monitor Issue: 
Mark Diesendorf - Associate Professor and Deputy Director, Institute of Environmental Studies, University of New South Wales, Australia

The case for expanding nuclear energy is based on myths about its status, greenhouse gas emissions, proliferation, accidents, wastes and economics. Let's take each in turn.


Nuclear is not, and has never been, a major energy force. Global annual nuclear energy generation peaked in 2006. Meanwhile its percentage contribution to global electricity generation has declined from its historic peak in 1993 of 17% to about 10% today. The only countries with significant growth are China, India, Russia and South Korea. In the rest of the world, retirements of ageing reactors are likely to outweigh new builds.1

Greenhouse emissions

Nuclear advocates are fond of claiming that nuclear energy has negligible greenhouse gas emissions and hence must play an important role in mitigating climate change. However, the greenhouse case for new nuclear power stations is flawed.

In a study published in 2008,2 nuclear physicist and nuclear energy supporter Manfred Lenzen compared life-cycle emissions from several types of power station. For nuclear energy based on mining high-grade uranium ore, he found average emissions of 60 grams of CO2 per kilowatt hour of electricity generation, compared with 10–20 g per kWh for wind and 500–600 g per kWh for gas. Now comes the part that most nuclear proponents try to ignore.

The world has, at most, a few decades of high-grade uranium ore reserves left. As ore grades inevitably decline, more diesel fuel is needed to mine and mill the uranium, and so the resulting CO2 emissions rise. Lenzen calculated the life-cycle emissions of a nuclear power station running on low-grade uranium ore to be 131 g per kWh.

This is unacceptable in terms of climate science, especially given that Lenzen's assumptions favoured nuclear energy. Mining in remote locations will be one of the last industries to transition to low-carbon fuels, so new nuclear reactors will inevitably become significant greenhouse gas emitters over their lifetimes.3

The next generation of reactors

Some generation IV reactors4 are potentially lower in life-cycle greenhouse gas emissions, but these are not yet commercially available.

All are likely to be even more expensive than conventional reactors. The fast breeder reactor is even more complex, dangerous, expensive and conducive to weapons proliferation than conventional nuclear reactors. Despite several decades of expensive pilot and demonstration plants, fast breeders have not been successfully commercialised, and may never be.

Advocates try to justify the integral fast reactor and the thorium reactor on the fallacious grounds that they cannot be used to produce nuclear weapons explosives. However, if not operated according to the rules, the integral fast reactor can actually make it easier to extract weapons-grade plutonium and hence make bombs.4 To be useful as a nuclear fuel, thorium must first be converted to uranium-233, which can be fissioned either in a nuclear reactor or an atomic bomb, as the United States has demonstrated.

The small modular reactor (SMR) has been a dream of the nuclear industry for decades, amid hopes that future mass production could make its electricity cheaper than from existing large reactors. However, offsetting this is the economy of scale of large reactors. The Union of Concerned Scientists, which is not anti-nuclear, has serious safety and security concerns about SMRs.6

Weapons proliferation

Nuclear proponents dismiss the danger that civil nuclear energy will drive the development of nuclear weapons, by saying that the nuclear industry is now under strong international oversight. This ignores the harsh reality that India, Pakistan, North Korea and South Africa have all used civil nuclear energy to help build their nuclear weapons. Furthermore, Australia, Argentina, Brazil, Iran, Libya, South Korea and Taiwan all used civil nuclear energy to cloak their commencement of nuclear weapons programs, although fortunately all except Iran have now discontinued them.7

Thus nuclear energy contributes to the number of countries with nuclear weapons, or the capacity to build them, and hence increases the probability of nuclear war.


Analyses of the damage done by major nuclear accidents, such as Chernobyl in 1986 and Fukushima in 2011, should properly consider not just the short-term deaths from acute radiation syndrome, but also the cancers that appear over the ensuring decades, and which represent the major contribution to death and disabilities from these incidents.

Estimates of future Chernobyl deaths by reputable impartial authors range from 16,000 by the International Centre for Research on Cancer8, to 93,000 by an international group of medical researchers.9

Four years after Fukushima, the plant is still leaking radiation10, while a reported 120,000 people remain displaced11 and Japanese taxpayers face a bill that could run to hundreds of billions of dollars.


Proponents often cherry-pick highly optimistic projections of the future cost of nuclear energy. However, past and present experience suggests that such projections have little basis in reality. Apart from the Generation IV reactors, which are not commercially available and hence cannot be costed credibly, all of the much-touted current (Generation III+) power reactors under construction (none is operating) are behind schedule and over budget.

In Finland, Olkiluoto-3 is nearly a decade behind schedule and nearly three times its budgeted cost; in France, Flamanville-3 is five years behind schedule and double budgeted cost; in Georgia, USA, Vogtle is three years behind schedule and about US$700 million over budget. Britain's proposed Hinkley Point C will receive a guaranteed inflation-linked price for electricity over 35 years, starting at about US$180 per megawatt hour – double the typical wholesale price of electricity in the UK. It will also receive a loan guarantee of about US$20 billion and insurance backed by the British taxpayer.12 It's doubtful whether any nuclear power station has ever been built without huge subsidies.13

Nuclear waste vs renewable energy

High-level nuclear wastes will have to be safeguarded for 100,000 years or more, far exceeding the lifetime of any human institution.

Meanwhile, Denmark is moving to 100% renewable electricity by 203514, and Germany to at least 80% by 2050.15 Two German states are already at 100% net renewable energy.16

The variability of wind and solar power can be managed with mixes of different renewable energy technologies, at geographically dispersed locations to smooth out the supply.17 Why would we need to bother with nuclear?



















Reprinted from The Conversation,

Fukushima and beyond: nuclear power in a low-carbon world

Nuclear Monitor Issue: 
Peter Karamoskos − Nuclear Radiologist, member of the National Council of the Medical Association for Prevention of War (Australia)

Review of: Christopher Hubbard, 2014, 'Fukushima and beyond: nuclear power in a low-carbon world', Ashgate Publishing, ISBN 978-1-4094-5491-5

When Tony Benn was Britain's Energy Secretary, he warned about people who came to you with a problem in one hand, and a solution in their back pocket. He learnt this from Britain's nuclear industry. One should keep this in mind when considering climate change as the latest rationale for expansion of the nuclear industry.

This book, authored by a lecturer in International Relations and International Security at Edith Cowan University in Perth, Australia, is rooted in the premise that nuclear power is essential to climate change mitigation.

The Fukushima nuclear disaster is used as a contextual leverage point to argue the counterfactual that this event, and more particularly the response to it, has made nuclear power more desirable than he contends it previously was. As the author states, rather blithely, on the issue of safety, "... simply put, the nuclear energy sector is extremely safe because it must be."

The foundational premise of the book, that nuclear power is essential to climate change mitigation is axiomatic to all arguments which follow. If it is not, then nuclear power becomes nothing more than a 'climate choice'.

The problem with this premise, which the author does not challenge, is that if we only address greenhouse gas emissions from electricity generation, then we can't avert climate change. Indeed, an important point not stated until the last chapter is that electricity does not account for the majority of greenhouse gas emissions, yet, this is the only sector that nuclear power can influence.

The latest IPCC Report1 states that the latest global greenhouse gas emissions were 49 gigatonnes (Gt) CO2-eq/yr as of 2010. Electricity and heating accounted for 12 Gt, with electricity alone about 9 Gt. Agriculture, forestry and other land use account for 12 Gt, transport 7 Gt, industry 10 Gt. Other energy sources account for the balance. So, approximately 80% of greenhouse gases (GHG) have nothing to do with electricity.

We need to reduce our GHG emissions by 40–70% of 2010 emissions by 2050 and near-zero emissions by the end of this century if we are to maintain a global temperature rise of <2 °C and thus avoid distressing climate change impacts in ecological and socio-economic systems.

If we assume the (incorrect) argument that nuclear power produces no CO2 emissions and that every kW produced avoids 500 g of CO2-e/kWh being released into the atmosphere (the average carbon intensity of global electricity generation), nuclear power currently abates 1.5 Gt per annum of GHG.

The IAEA in a report advocating nuclear power as a solution to climate change, forecasts two scenarios for the future of nuclear power: a 'low' scenario (435 GW), and a 'high' scenario (722 GW) generation capacity by 2030. However, the claim that the nuclear industry will more than double its capacity over the next few decades (in the 'high scenario') is pure fantasy.

We currently commission about one new reactor a year somewhere in the world. If under the most optimistic conditions we raise that to 8 a year for the next 10 years and 15 a year for the 10 years after that, we simply have replaced the reactors that will be de-commissioned by then. And for every year we do not meet this rate of build, the hill to be climbed gets steeper.

However, assuming that the nuclear industry pulled the proverbial rabbit out of a hat and was able to double its capacity over this time period, and (falsely) assuming that it generates no greenhouse gases itself, it would only abate an additional 2 billion tonnes of greenhouse gases per annum over the existing 1.5 Gt it already abates, i.e. 4% abatement on 2010 emissions. Therefore, how can a 3.6 Gt abatement (assuming it replaces mainly fossil fuels for electricity generation and it does not generate GHG in its life cycle – clearly not the case) be considered indispensable?

Surely it can be readily and quickly replaced with renewables, which can also address several of the other non-electricity GHG-emitting sectors. In 2013 alone, the world brought online 69 GW of solar PV and wind capacity.

If simple arithmetic escapes Hubbard's sanguine assertions as to the desirability and indispensability of nuclear power, also missing from his treatise is consideration of the blatant evidence of nuclear power being in long-term decline – long before Fukushima. The nuclear share of the world's electricity generation has declined steadily from a historic peak of 17.6% in 1996 to 10.8% in 2013.

Nuclear power and renewables in China

Even in China, which has the most ambitious nuclear power programme in the world and is the poster child for nuclear boosters, including Prof. Hubbard, more renewable electricity capacity was brought online than nuclear and fossil fuels combined in 2013. This is also reflected in a new assessment by the OECD's International Energy Agency. During 2000–2013, global investment in power plants was split between renewables (57%), fossil fuels (40%) and nuclear power (3%).

China set the world record for solar PV implementation in one year at 12 GW (compared with 3 GW for nuclear) and as of the end of 2013 has more solar PV capacity than nuclear, and five times more wind power than nuclear – and the gap between renewables and nuclear in China keeps increasing. China sees electricity generation capacity as a portfolio enterprise and is clearly putting vastly more bets on renewables than nuclear – as is the rest of the world. China's plan is for 58 GW of nuclear capacity by 2020, but wind alone already exceeded this capacity last year.

Hubbard uses optimistic projections of 300–500 GW nuclear capacity in China by 2050, but doesn't divulge that these have been promoted by the industry itself and have not been approved by the government and are certainly not government policy.

Furthermore, rapid technological advances are also making low-carbon alternatives to nuclear power appear more attractive. Bloomberg New Energy Finance, an industry publisher, forecasts that onshore wind will be the cheapest way to make electricity in China by 2030.

Nuclear output accounts for only 4.4% of global energy consumption, the smallest share since 1984. Renewable energy, on the other hand, provided an estimated 19% of global final energy consumption in 2012 (electricity, heating, transport) and continued to grow in 2013. Of this total share in 2012, modern renewables accounted for approximately 10%, with the remainder (estimated at just over 9%) coming from traditional biomass. Heat energy from modern renewable sources accounted for an estimated 4.2% of total final energy use; hydropower made up about 3.8% and an estimated 2% was provided by power from wind, solar, geothermal and biomass, as well as by biofuels.

Nuclear safety

Hubbard writes off concerns of nuclear safety in the industry with the circular assertion 'safe because it must be' (although the Fukushima disaster, which he analyses in detail using the excellent independent report of the Japanese Diet which declared the 'myth of nuclear safety', actually contradicts his assertion).

Hubbard insists on using China as an exemplar of nuclear safety, yet his research is wanting. Philippe Jamet, a French nuclear safety commissioner, told his country's parliament earlier last year that Chinese counterparts were 'overwhelmed'. Wang Yi of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, an expert body, has warned that there are indeed 'uncertainties' in China's approach to nuclear safety.

Hubbard doesn't even touch on the proliferation hazards of an expansion of the nuclear industry (Iran is clearly an inconvenient truth); waves away nuclear waste disposal problems (science will fix it); and fudges the (increasingly deteriorating) economics of nuclear power (conveniently absent is the fact that private investors haven't put a cent into nuclear power for decades, unlike renewables).

Furthermore, Hubbard's description of new Generation IV and small modular reactors (these apparently will solve all major problems, e.g. waste, proliferation, accidents) might as well be no more than a cut and paste from a nuclear reactor sales brochure, in its lack of any critical appraisal of these fantasy claims. These designs are literally still only on paper with no track record, and won't be implemented for decades – if at all (too bad for GHG abatement).

The UK Government's Nuclear National Laboratories have released several reports stating that purported benefits of these new-generation reactors are at best overstated. Furthermore, proliferation hazards abound from proposals to use up existing plutonium stocks in these reactors (it needs to be converted to the bomb-ready metallic form first). Their safety is also questionable despite claims to the contrary, as their designs contravene the 'Defence in Depth' principles of nuclear safety of most nuclear regulators (most lack proper secondary containment, especially small modular reactors). In other words, they might never be licensed because they are not safe.

The author's forte is not radiation science and it shows. He lacks an understanding of the various world bodies involved in nuclear power and radiation science. This is disappointing for someone who claims expertise in the nuclear sector. For example, the IAEA is not a global regulatory body, as he claims, but an advisory body that member states join to provide guidance on implementation of nuclear activities. It has no legal jurisdiction to investigate or advise any member state without an invitation by the relevant member state.

The IAEA does have teeth to investigate suspected clandestine-prohibited proliferation-sensitive nuclear-cycle activities, but cannot impose itself (Iran is a case in point) without permission – hardly the global cop the author seems to think it is.

It is the member states themselves which regulate their own nuclear activities. This distinction is critical because it means nuclear safety is dependent on member states willingly implementing international best practice, and furthermore, not engaging in clandestine weapons development. However, where there is a lack of transparency and accountability − the two main principles of nuclear safety − safety is compromised. It is noteworthy that the main countries expanding their nuclear industries are those which rank low on Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index.

It is difficult to reconcile the author's views with the real world. The author engages in wishful, uncritical, almost magical thinking on a grand scale in its blandishments of the nuclear power industry.

1. IPCC. 2014. "Summary for Policymakers." In Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. Edited by C. B. Field et al., pp.1–32.

Abridged from Medicine, Conflict and Survival, March 2015,

An open letter to nuclear lobbyists in response to their open letter to environmentalists

Nuclear Monitor Issue: 
Jim Green − Nuclear Monitor editor

A group of conservation scientists has published an open letter urging environmentalists to reconsider their opposition to nuclear power.1 The letter is an initiative of Australian academics Barry Brook and Corey Bradshaw, and has been endorsed by 69 (other) scientists from Australia, Canada, China, Finland, France, India, Indonesia, Italy, Norway, Singapore, South Africa, Switzerland, the UK, and the US.

The co-signatories "support the broad conclusions drawn in the article 'Key role for nuclear energy in global biodiversity conservation', published in Conservation Biology."2 The open letter states: "Brook and Bradshaw argue that the full gamut of electricity-generation sources − including nuclear power − must be deployed to replace the burning of fossil fuels, if we are to have any chance of mitigating severe climate change."

So, here's my open letter in response to the open letter initiated by Brook and Bradshaw:

Dear conservation scientists,

Space constraints prohibit the usual niceties that accompany open letters so I'll get straight to the point. If you want environmentalists to support nuclear power, get off your backsides and do something about the all-too-obvious problems associated with the technology. Start with the proliferation problem since the multifaceted and repeatedly-demonstrated links between the 'peaceful atom' and nuclear weapons proliferation pose profound risks and greatly trouble environmentalists and many others besides.3

The Brook/Bradshaw journal article (rightly) emphasises the importance of biodiversity − but even a relatively modest exchange of some dozens of nuclear weapons could profoundly effect biodiversity, and large-scale nuclear warfare undoubtedly would.4

As Australian scientist Dr Mark Diesendorf notes: "On top of the perennial challenges of global poverty and injustice, the two biggest threats facing human civilisation in the 21st century are climate change and nuclear war. It would be absurd to respond to one by increasing the risks of the other. Yet that is what nuclear power does."5

The Brook/Bradshaw article ranks power sources according to seven criteria: greenhouse gas emissions, cost, dispatchability, land use, safety (fatalities), solid waste, and radiotoxic waste. WMD proliferation is excluded. By all means ignore lesser concerns to avoid a book-length analysis, but to ignore the link between nuclear power and weapons is disingenuous and the comparative analysis of power sources is a case of rubbish in, rubbish out.

Integral fast reactors

While Brook and Bradshaw exclude WMD proliferation from their comparative assessment of power sources, their journal article does address the topic. They promote the 'integral fast reactor' (IFR) that was the subject of R&D in the US until was abandoned in the 1990s.6 If they existed, IFRs would be metal-fuelled, sodium-cooled, fast neutron reactors.

Brook and Bradshaw write: "The IFR technology in particular also counters one of the principal concerns regarding nuclear expansion − the proliferation of nuclear weapons − because its electrorefining-based fuel-recycling system cannot separate weapons-grade fissile material."

But Brook's claim that IFRs "cannot be used to generate weapons-grade material"7 is false.8 IFR advocate Tom Blees notes that: "IFRs are certainly not the panacea that removes all threat of proliferation, and extracting plutonium from it would require the same sort of techniques as extracting it from spent fuel from light water reactors."9 George Stanford, who worked on an IFR research program in the US, states: "If not properly safeguarded, [countries] could do [with IFRs] what they could do with any other reactor – operate it on a special cycle to produce good quality weapons material."10

The presentation of IFRs by Brook and Bradshaw contrasts sharply with the sober assessments of the UK and US governments. An April 2014 US government report notes that pursuit of IFR technology would be associated with "significant technical risk" and that it would take 18 years to construct an IFR and associated facilities.11 A recent UK government report notes that IFR facilities have not been industrially demonstrated, waste disposal issues remain unresolved, and little can be ascertained about cost.12

Brook and Bradshaw argue that "the large-scale deployment of fast reactor technology would result in all of the nuclear-waste and depleted-uranium stockpiles generated over the last 50 years being consumed as fuel." Seriously? An infinitely more likely outcome would be some fast reactors consuming waste and weapons-useable material while other fast reactors and conventional uranium reactors continue to produce such materials.

The Brook/Bradshaw article ignores the sad reality of fast reactor technology: over US$50 billion (€40.2b) invested, unreliable reactors, numerous fires and other accidents, and one after another country abandoning the technology.13

Moreover, fast reactors have worsened, not lessened, proliferation problems. John Carlson, former Director-General of the Australian Safeguards and Non-proliferation Office, discusses a topical example: "India has a plan to produce such [weapon grade] plutonium in fast breeder reactors for use as driver fuel in thorium reactors. This is problematic on non-proliferation and nuclear security grounds. Pakistan believes the real purpose of the fast breeder program is to produce plutonium for weapons (so this plan raises tensions between the two countries); and transport and use of weapons-grade plutonium in civil reactors presents a serious terrorism risk (weapons-grade material would be a priority target for seizure by terrorists)."14

The fast reactor techno-utopia presented by Brook and Bradshaw is attractive. Back in the real world, there's much more about fast reactors to oppose than to support. And the large-scale deployment of Generation IV reactor technology is further away than they care to admit. The Generation IV International Forum website states: "It will take at least two or three decades before the deployment of commercial Gen IV systems. In the meantime, a number of prototypes will need to be built and operated. The Gen IV concepts currently under investigation are not all on the same timeline and some might not even reach the stage of commercial exploitation."15

Creative accounting and jiggery-pokery

Brook and Bradshaw also counter proliferation concerns with the following argument: "Nuclear power is deployed commercially in countries whose joint energy intensity is such that they collectively constitute 80% of global greenhouse-gas emissions. If one adds to this tally those nations that are actively planning nuclear deployment or already have scientific or medical research reactors, this figure rises to over 90%. As a consequence, displacement of fossil fuels by an expanding nuclear-energy sector would not lead to a large increase in the number of countries with access to nuclear resources and expertise."

The premise is correct − countries operating reactors account for a large majority of greenhouse emissions. But even by the most expansive estimate − Brook's16 − less than one-third of all countries have some sort of weapons capability, either through the operation of reactors or an alliance with a nuclear weapons state. So the conclusion − that nuclear power expansion "would not lead to a large increase in the number of countries with access to nuclear resources and expertise" − is nonsense and one wonders how such jiggery-pokery could find its way into a peer-reviewed journal.

The power−weapons conundrum is neatly summarised by former US Vice-President Al Gore: "For eight years in the White House, every weapons-proliferation problem we dealt with was connected to a civilian reactor program. And if we ever got to the point where we wanted to use nuclear reactors to back out a lot of coal ... then we'd have to put them in so many places we'd run that proliferation risk right off the reasonability scale."17


Apart from the their misinformation about IFRs, and their nonsense argument about the proliferation implications of expanding nuclear power, Brook and Bradshaw add one further comment about proliferation: "Nuclear weapons proliferation is a complex political issue, with or without commercial nuclear power plants, and is under strong international oversight."

Oddly, Brook and Bradshaw cite a book by IFR advocate Tom Blees in support of that statement.18 But Blees argues for the establishment of an international strike force on full standby to attend promptly to any detected attempts to misuse or to divert nuclear materials (p.269). That is a far cry from the International Atomic Energy Agency's safeguards system. In articles and speeches during his tenure as the Director General of the IAEA from 1997−2009, Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei said that the Agency's basic rights of inspection are "fairly limited", that the safeguards system suffers from "vulnerabilities" and "clearly needs reinforcement", that efforts to improve the system have been "half-hearted", and that the safeguards system operates on a "shoestring budget ... comparable to that of a local police department".

Moreover, Blees argues that: "Privatized nuclear power should be outlawed worldwide, with complete international control of not only the entire fuel cycle but also the engineering, construction, and operation of all nuclear power plants. Only in this way will safety and proliferation issues be satisfactorily dealt with. Anything short of that opens up a Pandora's box of inevitable problems." (p.303)

Blees doesn't argue that the nuclear industry is subject to strong international oversight − he argues that "fissile material should all be subject to rigorous international oversight" (emphasis added).19

Of course, the flaws in the nuclear safeguards system are not set in stone.20 And this gets me back to my original point: if nuclear lobbyists want environmentalists to support nuclear power, they need to get off their backsides and do something about the all-too-obvious problems such as the inadequate safeguards system. Environmentalists have a long record of working on these problems and the lack of support from nuclear lobbyists has not gone unnoticed.

To give an example of a topical point of intervention, Canada has agreed to supply uranium and nuclear technology to India with greatly reduced safeguards and non-proliferation standards, Australia seems likely to follow suit, and those precedents will likely lead to a broader weakening of international safeguards (and make it that much more difficult for nuclear lobbyists to win support from environmentalists and others). The seriousness of the problem has been acknowledged by, among others, a former Chair of the IAEA Board of Governors21 and a former Director-General of the Australian Safeguards and Non-proliferation Office.14 It is a live debate in numerous nuclear exporting countries and there isn't a moment to lose.

Nuclear lobbyists should join environmentalists in campaigning for a strengthening of the safeguards system and against efforts to weaken the system. But Brook and Bradshaw have never made even the slightest contribution to efforts to strengthen safeguards, and it's a safe bet that the same could be said of the other signatories to their open letter.

To mention just one more point of intervention, the separation and stockpiling of plutonium from power reactor spent fuel increases proliferation risks. There is virtually no demand for the uranium or plutonium separated at reprocessing plants, and no repositories for the high-level waste stream. Yet reprocessing continues, the global stockpile of separated plutonium increases year after year and now stands at around 260 tons.22 It's a problem that needs to be solved; it's a problem that can be solved.

Endorsing the wishful thinking and misinformation presented in the Brook/Bradshaw journal article is no substitute for an honest acknowledgement of the proliferation problems associated with nuclear power, coupled with serious, sustained efforts to solve those problems.


1. 15 Dec 2014, 'An Open Letter to Environmentalists on Nuclear Energy',
2. Brook, B. W., and C. J. A. Bradshaw. 2014. Key role for nuclear energy in global biodiversity conservation. Conservation Biology.
5. Dr Mark Diesendorf, University of NSW, 'Need energy? Forget nuclear and go natural', 14 Oct 2009,
7. Barry Brook, 9 June 2009, 'Nuking green myths', The Australian,
11. US Department of Energy, April 2014, 'Report of the Plutonium Disposition Working Group: Analysis of Surplus  Weapon‐Grade Plutonium Disposition Options',
See also 'Generation IV reactor R&D',
12. UK Nuclear Decommissioning Authority, January 2014, 'Progress on approaches to the management of separated plutonium – Position Paper',
See also: 'Will PRISM solve the UK's plutonium problem?',
13. International Panel on Fissile Materials, 2010, 'Fast Breeder Reactor Programs: History and Status',
17. David Roberts, 10 May 2006, 'An interview with accidental movie star Al Gore',
18. Blees T. 2008. 'Prescription for the planet: the painless remedy for our energy & environmental crises'. BookSurge, Charleston, South Carolina.
22. Fissile Materials Working Group, 6 May 2013, 'How do you solve a problem like plutonium?',