Uranium Mining in Africa part 2

19 December 2024

Nuclear Monitor #922

Gunter Wippel, uranium-network.org with information from WISE Uranium Project

The situation in other African countries (in alphabetic order)

Central African Republic (CAR / RCA)
In 2008, Areva’s CEO Anne Lauvergeon signed a uranium mining deal with the CAR government in regard to mining uranium near Bakouma in the east of the Republic. The project was ‘temporarily suspended’ in the wake of the Fukushima-Daiichi disaster. In 2012, gunmen attacked the site of the future mine. The operation has since been closed.

Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
In 2009, Areva’s CEO Anne Lauvergeon, traveling with then President Sarkozy, signed an agreement with Congolese Minister of Mines on uranium prospecting and mining.
Given bad experiences with uranium mining in Niger, the Association Africanize de Défense des Droits de l’Homme (ASADHO), a human rights organization, opposed the deal; they published a booklet “MINE URANIFERE DE SHINKOLOBWE: D’une exploitation artisanale illicite à l’accord entre la RD Congo et le groupe nucléaire français AREVA”. ASADHO’s outspoken leader in Katanga region, Golden Misabiko, was arrested and later set free following interventions from human rights organization. He was honored with the Nuclear Free Future Award in 2014^[1]. The Ecumenical Network on Central Africa (Germany: ÖNZ) released a study critical of uranium mining in 2011.
Illicit mining at the Shinkolobwe mine continued for many years; it is not clear whether uranium was also extracted and exported.

In 2011, two years after the signing of the agreement, AREVA stated that they are unlikely to develop activities in DR Congo due to the persisting instability^[2].

Mali
In 2007/8, Canadian company Rockgate Capital planned a mine for uranium, including also silver and copper, in Falea, a 21 village municipality in the far southwest of Mali. The plans were met with decisive resistance from local people who got international support from Members of the European Parliament as well as through a conference by IPPNW and others (www.falea.info/) and ongoing support from European NGOs. The project stalled, also due to the falling price of uranium.
In 2016, the deposit was sold to Denison Mines. Later on, GoviEx acquired the project. In 2023, GoviEx intended to sell the Falea project to African Energy Minerals, but the sale was not implemented.

In face of the difficult political situation in Mali since 2023, the project is on hold.

Botswana
In 2013, A-Cap Resources Ltd, an Australian company, announced “favourable economics” for Letlhakane uranium project. The company expected the uranium price to rise significantly in view of an anticipated supply shortage. In 2016, the company obtained a mining license. Villagers of the area should be resettled. By 2017, A-Cap deferred the project for two years. In 2020, a Chinese tycoon offered US$ 5 Mio to obtain a majority share in A-Cap, the offer was not accepted.
In October 2023, Australian Lotus Resources (which had bought Kayelekera in adjacent Malawi in 2020) acquired A-cap Resources Ltd.^[3]
In September 2024, Lotus released a scoping study on Letlhakane.
On 24 October 2024, in a rare step, Lotus “ … retracts all production targets and forecast financial information included in the Scoping Study Announcement.” No details were given but, most probably, the statement has serious mistakes.

Malawi
Besides Kayelekera mine (see Part 1), a deposit containing uranium, niobium and tantalum was discovered in Malawi, Kanyika project. The project is owned by Globe Metals & Mining, Perth, Australia and a Chinese state-owned survey company of which Chinese Globe and East China Mineral Exploration and Development Bureau holds a controlling share.

The project ran into difficulties with plans to resettle local people, due to delays of the start of the mining operation; people are kept waiting for compensations, and engaged lawyers (2014 / 2017).

In a 2024 presentation, the presence of uranium is still mentioned, but uranium is not mentioned anymore as an element to be exploited.
Should the mine go ahead, there is a risk that uranium – if not extracted – will end up in the tailings and thus pose a risk for the environment.
In September 2024, the company was allowed to delay the start of the project until 2025^[4].

Mauretania
In 2013, AURA Energy Ltd., an Australian company, identified a uranium deposit in the north of Mauretania, close to the border to West Sahara, in Sahara desert. It was named Regubiat, later renamed Tiris Project. The uraniferous layers are close to the surface and can, according to company reports, be mined by excavators and caterpillars.
In 2018, the company reported that the deposit also holds vanadium which shall be extracted, thus improving the economics of the project. The company located a major water body, part of the transboundary Taoudeni basin, which is needed to process the ore / sand.
Using water for mining is questionable since water is the most important means of life in Sahara desert. The area is used periodically by Sahaouri people from adjacent Western Sahara for grazing animals.
In 2019, AURA announced that the company has secured an offtake agreement with Curzon Uranium Trading Limited, UK (and Cyprus).
In December 2018, the company obtained a mining license, and on July 15, 2024, Aura Energy Ltd. received the last outstanding permit to allow the construction and operation of the Tiris Uranium Project.

Senegal

Haranga Resources Ltd., Perth, Australia, is exploring a uranium deposit at Saraya, in the south-east corner of the country, close to the border of Mali and Guinea; formerly, French COGEMA had explored for uranium in the area, but had not started mining, Haranga also explores for gold.

Zambia
A 2008 article^[5] reported ‘high-grade uranium’ (without giving numbers) and of major quantities of uranium ore stored at Lumwana copper mine site, for later processing. Apparently, processing did not happen so far, probably due to the slumping price of uranium after the 2007 spike of the price of uranium.
Plans to exploit uranium were encountered with opposition from the public and church organisations. A booklet ‘Prosperity unto death: Is Zambia ready for uranium mining? – Review of the uranium mining policy in Zambia’^[6] (2010) by the Council of Churches in Zambia (CCZ) pointed out the dangers of uranium mining and the lack of adequate regulations.
In January 2011, the company said that it had 4.6 million tons of uranium ore stockpiled containing 0.09% uranium^[7].

GoviEx holds a mining license for the Muntanga uranium project; the license had been suspended in 2020, but was reinstalled in May 2021^[8]. As of now, there is no indication of actual mining going at Muntanga.
GoviEx’ only other project in Niger had the license withdrawn in 2024 (see Part 1).

LATEST NEWS: On 9 Dec. 2024, GoviEx announced that they “ … commenced arbitration proceedings against the Republic of the Niger under the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States.” ^[9]

Geo-political impact
Within the past decade, France (with state-owned AREVA / ORANO) and England (with Rio Tinto) lost control over uranium mines in Africa. In Namibia, Chinese state-owned companies took over, in Niger, a Chinese company is reviving an idle mine, and Russia’s ROSATOM eyes a major uranium deposit. The geo-strategic aspect of this development can hardly be ignored.
In addition, Russia’s ROSATOM is eager to sell nuclear power plants to African countries^[10] and invests into attracting young people to nuclear power^[11].

The Impacts of Uranium Exploration and Mining
For detailed information on the impacts of uranium exploitation, please consult the booklet ‘Uranium Mining – What are we talking about?’ ^[12] and informational film, same title, at www.uranium-network.org, frontpage.

Here only a short summary of the impacts of uranium exploration and mining is given.

In regard to laws and regulations, in many countries in the Global South, uranium exploration and mining are either not very well regulated or – if regulations exist – they are not very well monitored, if at all.
Sometimes it is left to the companies to monitor themselves, as the state authorities do not have the equipment and/or knowledge to monitor the companies’ environmental performance.

> Exploration activities may disturb agriculture, wildlife, contaminate watersheds and / or surface waters (Booklet: Chapter 7, page 41ff).

In several cases, uranium projects are located in protected areas (e.g. in Namibia in the Namib-Naukluft Park, protection is subordinate to mining), or in areas removed from their protected status to allow mining (e.g. Mkuju River Project in UNESCO World Heritage Site Selous Game Reserve, Tanzania^[13]).

> Mining has more implications:

Mining methods

There are three main mining methods: open-pit mining (for ex. Rössing and Husab in Namibia, SOMAIR mine in Niger), underground mining (Akouta mine, Dasa project, both Niger) and in-situ leaching (ISL) also referred to as in-situ recovery (ISR) (Booklet, Chapter 8, page 49ff).

Whereas by 2022 56% of the uranium mined worldwide is extracted via ISL^[14], ISL is not applied in Africa so far. However, ROSATOM considers ISL for the Mkuju River^[15] deposit in Tanzania and for Namibia’s Omaheke region^[16].

Whereas companies advertise the method as “environmentally friendly”, it is in fact the lower capital expenses (CAPEX) and operational expenses (OPEX) that motivate them to use this method.
Moreover, projects are referred to as ISL, but the companies intend to use methods much more perilous than what is normally referred to as ISL (e.g. Wings Project, Namibia).

Uranium deposits in Africa typically hold very low percentages of uranium in the ore: In Niger around 0.07% (Arlit, Imouraren), in Namibia 0.033% (Rössing) down to 0.029% (Langer-Heinrich).

Thus, in Niger 1428 t of ore have to be mined and processed to get 1 t of U on average; 1427 t will become tailings. In Namibia, at Rössing, around 3030 t ore must be dug out to get 1 t of uranium (and 3448 t at Langer-Heinrich).
(These figures do not include the ‘overburden’, i.e. the layers of rock and soil covering a deposit which also need to be removed for open-pit mines.)

The tailings still contain some uranium (it’s impossible to extract 100% of the uranium) plus its decay products; the remaining uranium will continue to produce decay products, in addition to the already existing ones. Tailings will remain radioactive for hundreds of thousands of years, in human terms forever (Booklet page 12f).
Thus, tailings should be safely isolated from the environment, protected against seepage, wind, and other disturbances (including human activities) for very long time. Given the enormous quantity of tailings^[17] and the long period to store them safely, makes it extremely difficult to achieve this goal – and very expensive (Booklet, Chapter 10, p. 67).

Environmental impacts

WATER
Extraction of uranium from the ore requires lots of water; thus, mines are concurring with other water uses, especially in arid areas, for example in Niger or Namibia^[18].
In Namibia, the existing water shortage made it necessary to build a seawater desalination plant (at Wlotzkasbaken) to provide enough water for the mines; currently, construction of a second desalination plant is considered; Husab mine alone consumes 1000 cubic meters per hour^[19].

In Niger, uranium mines in Arlit area deplete a so–called ‘fossil aquifer’ whose last recharge – in this case – happened 3000 years ago, and which will not renew itself within a human timescale^[20].
“ … COMINAK and SOMAÏR in the towns of Akokan and Arlit respectively have already depleted 70% of the fossil aquifer further north of Tarat, at a rate of 22,000 cubic meters per day for 38 years.” [11]
Unlike Namibia, Niger has no nearby ocean from which drinking water could be produced via desalination. An exhaustion of the aquifers will be a major danger for people in the area and also for the pastoralists’ way of life (Booklet Chapter 9.2, p. 61).
To make things worse, parts of the aquifers are radioactively contaminated by tailings.

ENERGY
The extraction of uranium from the ore requires lots of energy (Booklet Chapter 6.2, p. 65). African countries often already lack electricity.
In Niger, the lack of electricity supply urged Cogema, predecessor of ORANO, to build a coal-fired power plant near Tchirozerine, using local high sulphur coal, leading to serious pollution as well as to health problems for people in the area.

In Namibia, due to the already stressed electricity supply, construction of a coal powered plant had been considered, but was dropped since the mining projects did not go ahead as previously thought.
In some cases, mines use diesel generators to secure electricity supply. At Dasa project, Niger, the company plans to use solar energy to provide some of the electricity needed.

RESETTLEMENTS … and Human Rights
Often, people living and making their living from agriculture and / or cattle raising in the area of future mining projects, are relocated, more or less forcible; human rights standards are often not complied with. In several cases (Tanzania, Mkuju River area, Botswana, Letlhakane project etc.), people were told they would be resettled, and compensations were promised – but projects were delayed, and people were kept in limbo over extended periods of time.

WORKERS’ SAFETY
… is not always the highest interest at mining operations: Kayelekera mine in Malawi has a bad safety record, with workers being killed in accidents even before the mine started operating (see Part 1, and WISE Uranium Project’s “Hall of Infamy”^[21]).

At Husab mine (Namibia) workers went on strike repeatedly due to safety issues and unfair employment conditions; several fatal accidents occurred^[22].
At Langer-Heinrich mine, workers went on strike complaining about unfair treatment at work and unsafe working conditions (2013, 2015), there were also fatal accidents^[23].

TAILINGS and their IMPACTS
Tailings, solid as well as liquid, often contaminate the vicinity of mines, including watersheds or surface waters radioactive, toxic or sulphuric seepage; they impact the health of people in the area; radioactive dust from mine tailings and radioactive seepage from tailings ponds; radioactive elements can get into humans via a variety of pathways (Booklet Chapter 10, p. 67ff).

In Niger, millions of tons of tailings were generated during the 40 years of uranium extraction – with no precautions taken. GREENPEACE and CRIIRAD found radiation levels exceeding WHO standard in water, dust, scrap metal, etc. NGO Aghirin Man and the Societe Civile d’Arlit advocated strongly for clean-up measures by ORANO.

In Namibia, research identified a radioactive plume emanating downstream from Rössing mine^[24].

HEALTH of MINERS

In addition to the typical health risks of miners, miners in underground uranium mines are also exposed to radioactive – and sometimes toxic – dust as well as to radon gas, the main cause for lung cancer. In open-pit mines, the main problem is dust, radioactive or not.
Whereas dust may lead to silicosis, inhalation of radioactive elements can lead to lung cancer and other forms of cancer as well as diseases (Booklet Chapter 11, p. 81ff).

In Niger, miners realized in the early 2000s that some of their colleagues got sick and passed away prematurely from ‘unexplained’ diseases; this led to the founding of NGO Aghirin man which reached out to French independent radiation laboratory CRIIRAD. CRIIRAD started research in Arlit, finding levels of radioactive exposure of miners and town people over WHO limits^[25].

In 2010, GREENPEACE, in cooperation with CRIIRAD, researched more details, published in the booklet ‘Left in the Dust – AREVA’s radioactive legacy in the desert towns of Niger’^[26].

In 2009, AREVA started an ‘Observatoire de la Sante’ (‘Health Observatory’) together with CRIIRAD and a lawyers’ association, Sherpa^[27]. In 2012, Sherpa left the ‘Observatoire’; Sherpa found it inacceptable that compensation was paid only to the families of just two miners of French nationality, while local miners did not receive any compensation at all. CRIIRAD, also disappointed, left shortly after.
A summary on the “Observatoire de la Sante” is on the Business-and-Human-Rights-website^[28].

In Namibia, miners had similar complaints in regard to their health situation; in the early years, miners would take their dirty clothes home, thus bringing radioactive dust to their families (the women were washing their clothes); this was later abandoned.

On January 1^st, 1992, PARTIZANS‘ network and Roger Moody published “The Gulliver file: Mines, People, and Land – a Global Battleground”- dedicating a chapter to Rössing uranium Mine in Namibia, highlighting working conditions and health situation of miners^[29].
One miner and another miner’s widow took cases of health damage to court at Rio Tinto’s seat, London^[30], unfortunately to no avail.
In 1992, Greg Dropkin and David Clark published their findings in ‘Past Exposure: Revealing Health and Environmental Risks of Rössing Uranium’^[31], describing the negative health impacts on miners.

In 2009, Labour Resource and Research Institute (LaRRI) undertook a study in regard to the health and social situation of miners ‘URANIUM MINING IN NAMIBIA – The mystery behind ‘low level radiation’’, addressing Rössing’s narrative that radiation exposure for mine workers was too low to cause negative health effects^[32].

Rössing then issued a health study (2010) with the University of Manchester; results were not published until 2020; it concludes that “ …that total radiation exposure in the Rössing mine was not associated with a higher risk of any of the cancers that we studied.”

The study has multiple issues, especially the fact that it is based on a data set provided by Rössing, not collected by independent scientists, hampers its validity seriously.
Rio Tinto finally got rid of the problem of miners suing the company by selling Rössing mine to Chinese CNNC; while it was difficult, but possible to sue Rio Tinto in London, UK, it will be next to impossible to sue CNNC in Beijing, China.

COMPENSATIONS for health damages
In the US, uranium miners fought a long struggle for compensation of health impacts. In 1990, the Radiation Exposure Compensation Act (RECA)^[33] was established. Until November 2023, approx. 9300 miners and mill workers received compensation for health damages, US$ 100,000 per person, altogether approx. 9,300,000 US$. Although RECA procedure is seen as ‘not satisfying’ by many of the persons affected (only about 50% of the applications are accepted), there is at least SOME compensation (by June 2024, RECA is ending; currently, there is a struggle to extend it for two years).
When East Germany’s closed down uranium mines (Wismut) became a part of (reunified) Germany, a similar amount of compensations (1.1 billion € by 2021^[34]) has been paid to former miners for health damages.

In Africa, no compensations for health damages have been paid by mining companies or the state.
It may be argued that radiation exposure of miners in Niger or Namibia in the 1970s and later on was – on average – lower than exposure of US or East German miners shortly after WWII; however – as the above-mentioned GREENPEACE Report shows – it is highly improbable that there are no health impacts at all in Niger, Namibia or Gabon. A 2010 article suggests that ‘Lack of Data on Causes of Death Buffers French Company’^[35]. (Booklet Chapter 12.3, p. 96)

MINE CLOSURE and tailings management

Uranium mine and mill tailings pose a serious hazard to the environment, human health and future generations. (Booklet, Chapter 10, p. 67ff and Chapter 14, p. 107)
Reclamation of mines, tailings and tailings ponds is very costly. In many cases, mining companies go bankrupt once a deposit is mined out – and no funds are left for reclamation; reclamation thus is either (a) not happening, or (b) is done by the state authorities with taxpayers’ money. Only in rare cases, reclamation was paid for by the respective mining company. For estimates of reclamation costs see: ‘Uranium Mining – Impact on Health and Environment’ ^[36].

Governments realized the problem to some extent – and sometimes urge companies to set aside funds in trust accounts (which cannot be touched by the company) to pay for rehabilitation of mines and tailings.

In Niger, COMINAK, the subsidiary of AREVA / ORANO which operated (now closed) Akouta mine, started reclamation activities: 20 million tons of tailings, covering some 120 hectares, and in places 35m high, must be dealt with; the operation will cost an estimated 150 Million €, and will last for 10 years^[37].
Under the current circumstances with the Niger government wanting to get rid of ORANO, it is not clear whether and how this reclamation process will go forward.

In Namibia, in 2004 information surfaced that Rössing used money from the decommissioning fund to keep the struggling mine operating. By 2019, it turned out that the decommissioning fund held only 54% of the amount required (estimated at US$ 108 million in 2018). Rössing promised to ” … make additional payments to the fund each year to provide for the eventual total cost of closure by 2025″ (Namibia Economist May 7, 2019).

In Malawi, Paladin had to put money into a trust account (it couldn’t touch) for reclamation of its mine, equivalent of 5 Mio US$ in two banks. When the mine was sold in 2020, these funds were returned to Paladin^[38]; Paladin used the 10 Mio US$ to keep its Langer-Heinrich mine in Namibia. Lotus, the new owner, will have to start establishing a new fund for reclamation from scratch.

Yvonne Margarula, an Aboriginal woman from Australia, remarked:
“The promises never last – but the problems always do.”

[1] https://nuclearfreefutureaward.org/golden-misabiko-dr-congo/

[2] for more details: www.wise-uranium.org/udafr.html#SHINKOLOBWE

[3] www.minenportal.de/minen/740–A-Cap-Energy-Ltd, www.solactive.com/acquisition-a-cap-energy-ltd-30th-october-2023/

[4] www.argusmedia.com/en/news-and-insights/latest-market-news/2610300-malawi-kanyika-nb-mine-development-granted-extension

[5] www.reuters.com/article/markets/oil/zambias-lumwana-plans-10-mln-tonnes-uranium-output-idUSLE304663/

[6] https://de.scribd.com/document/38650866/Prosperity-Unto-Death-Is-Zambia-Ready-for-Uranium-Mining

[7] WNA, https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/others/uranium-in-africa

[8] www.wise-uranium.org/upzm.html#KARIBA

[9] https://goviex.com/news/2024/

[10] www.intellinews.com/russia-s-rosatom-to-support-nuclear-projects-across-africa-at-aew2024-348542/

[11] https://theenergyintelligence.com/tag/african-young-generation-in-nuclear/