Urenco

CONTENTS
1. The Treaty of Almelo
2. The history of uranium enrichment in Urenco countries
3. Urenco: company, contracts and prospects           
4. The Urenco enrichment plants
5. Depleted uranium: storage and dumping in Russia
6. HALEU, Tritium and the bomb
7. A.Q. Khan and other scandals       
Annex I: Enrichment: Feed, Product and Tails
Annex II: History of uranium enrichment and market

CHAPTER 1: THE TREATY OF ALMELO

On March 4, 1970, the Treaty of Almelo is signed by West Germany, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands in the Dutch city Almelo. With this, a company is set up that will make uranium suitable for use in nuclear power stations by means of centrifuges, and a company that will produce and further develop these centrifuges.

1.1 Pre-signing

A declaration of principles was already drawn up between the three countries at the end of November 1968 on international cooperation in the enrichment of uranium.¹ On 11 March 1969 British, Dutch and West German ministers reached an agreement in London "on the basis of the favorable preliminary technical investigation" a joint uranium enrichment company: URanium ENrichment COmpany; Urenco.

The three countries each agree to build their own pilot enrichment plant: the British opt for the Capenhurst site where gas diffusion enrichment is already being applied and the German pilot plant will be built in the Netherlands for political reasons. Already a day after the agreement in London (on March 12, 1969) a piece of land was purchased in Almelo for the Dutch (and German) pilot plant. The Dutch partner in Urenco, Ultra Centrifuge Nederland NV (UCN), was established on November 4, 1969.²

Uranit was founded in West Germany on 6 August 1969 and will become the German partner in Urenco. In the UK, the UK Atomic Energy Agency ‒ which is responsible for both the civilian and military nuclear program ‒ will act as a partner until British Nuclear Fuel Limited (BNFL), its 100% subsidiary, is founded in 1971.

1.2 Signing and entry into force

The signing of the Convention takes place on 4 March 1970 in Almelo by the Foreign Ministers of the Netherlands (Joseph Luns), of the United Kingdom (Lord Chalfont) and of West Germany (Walter Scheel). Two companies were founded by signing the Treaty of Almelo: Urenco Ltd and Centec GmbH. Urenco Ltd, (with UCN, BNFL and Uranit shareholders as one-third each) acts as a marketing company representing the interests of the various enrichment plants and Centec (with the same proportion as BNFL, UCN and the German Gesellschaft für Nuklearverfahrestechnik mbh (GnV)) coordinates technological developments (R&D).

The United Kingdom ratifies the Convention on 26 March 1971; the Netherlands does this on 18 June 1971 and due to the ratification of West Germany on 19 July 1971 the Convention will automatically enter into force on that date. The Treaty includes the provision that, after it has been in force for 10 years, any contracting party, with a notice period of one year, can terminate the Treaty in writing (Art. XV). The "contracting parties" may also decide together to terminate the Convention (Art. XVI). Termination by one of the signatories would, according to the prevailing opinion, mean the end of the Treaty and thus the end of the attempts to curb the spread of secret ultracentrifuge enrichment technology. Threatening with cancellation therefore becomes a means of forcing decisions.³

1.3 Protest

Five days after the signing of the Treaty, a small demonstration is held in Almelo with about 50 people participating. On Pentecost, 16‒18 May, there are 2500 people at the traditional annual tent camp of the Algemene Nederlands Jeugd Verbond (General Dutch Youth Association)⁴ coincidentally that year in Almelo, where one of the spearheads is the demonstration against the "UC project" under the motto: "No A-bomb via Almelo".⁵

References:

1 "London, Bonn en Den Haag gaan samenwerken bij produktie verrijkt uranium" ("London, Bonn and The Hague to collaborate on production enriched uranium"), Leeuwarder Courant, November 26, 1968

2 De geschiedenis van het Nederlandse Centrifuge Project" ("The History of the Dutch Centrifuge Project"), J. Kistemaker, 1991

3 See for example the Brazil affair in Chapter 7

4 The ANVJ was a communist political youth organization, founded in 1945, with the aim of establishing one socialist youth movement. From an organizational point of view, the ANJV was independent, but politically it was affiliated with the Communist Party of the Netherlands. Within the ANVJ (and CPN) much attention was paid to West German "revanchism and atomic armament".

5 Jongeren manifestatie in Almelo" ("Youth manifestation in Almelo") in: De Waarheid, 19 May 1970, p1

CHAPTER 2: THE HISTORY OF URANIUM ENRICHMENT IN URENCO COUNTRIES

The origin and history of Urenco is closely linked to decades of research into uranium enrichment technology; and especially the development of ultracentrifuge technology. In this chapter we briefly describe that developmental history in what will eventually become the three Urenco countries: the Netherlands, Great Britain and West Germany.

2.1 Manhattan project

In 1919, shortly after the existence of isotopes was experimentally confirmed, British scientists Lindeman and Aston suggested using centrifuges for the separation of isotopes. A number of tests with primitive centrifuges followed, but without success. After the American scientist Beams decided to isolate the centrifuge rotor in a thermal vacuum, isotopes of chlorine were successfully separated. In the Manhattan project¹, centrifuge was initially preferred as an enrichment technology, but in December 1943, after a number of centrifuges had exploded, they switched to gas diffusion technology.²

2.2 Smyth report

In the Smyth report³ published in July 1945, Henry DeWolf Smyth described the two ways in which the Manhattan project obtained the material for the nuclear bomb: the production of plutonium by the bombardment of uranium-238 in a nuclear reactor and the enrichment of uranium by means of gas diffusion and gas centrifuge. For scientists who had not been involved in the Manhattan project, this was an 'eye opener'.

Several countries started enrichment research based on this report, sometimes focused on diffusion and sometimes on gas centrifuges. Here we briefly summarize developments in the three Urenco countries.

2.3 The Netherlands⁴

In 1947, the recently established FOM (Fundamental Research on Matter) began the development of an electromagnetic mass separator in the Zeeman laboratory of the Municipal University of Amsterdam. This makes it possible to separate small amounts of isotopes. Already in November 1953, a small amount (10 milligrams) of uranium was enriched to 8%.

In December 1954, Jaap Kistemaker started research into the development of uranium enrichment centrifuges in December 1954, after ‒ he says ‒ 'accidentally' attending a colloquium in Hamburg on the latest developments in the field of ultracentrifuge (about separating argon isotopes).

On March 10, 1961, the Dutch government, like the United States, the United Kingdom and West Germany, declared all work on the ultracentrifuge project "state secret." As a result, FOM stopped doing this: they did not want to conduct a secret investigation. FOM was also of the opinion that it became less fundamental research and more applied research. Meanwhile, the centrifuge investigation was under fire from the (at that time still large) Dutch Communist party CPN and its daily newspaper De Waarheid. Kistemaker was accused of having worked for the German Cellastic during the war and still collaborating with German (former) Nazis on research into the German A-bomb "desired by the German revanchists".⁵

The centrifuge investigation continued, but during the first half of the 1960s there was much doubt about progress and feasibility. Eventually in 1968 a test set-up of 70 'tollen' (centrifuges) was put into use in Duivendrecht; due to lack of money, half the planned number. A few weeks later, most likely on December 17, 1968, all 70 centrifuges imploded in one go due to a gas breach. This accident was kept secret by the Netherlands during the negotiations with West Germany and the United Kingdom on the establishment of Urenco.

2.4 (West) Germany

In (West) Germany, research into uranium enrichment began in and actually before the Second World War mainly at the universities of Hamburg and Kiel. The chemist Groth had already developed a prototype centrifuge (together with Harteck and Beyerle) in Hamburg in the spring of 1941, which was further developed together with an arms company. Already in early 1943 it had succeeded in producing 100 grams of up to 7% enriched uranium.⁶
After the end of the Second World War, a number of restrictions were imposed on West Germany: much "natural science" research was prohibited and applied nuclear physics was at the top of that list. The Allied Kontrollrat (29 April 29 1946) introduced a complete ban on "Angewandte Atom-physik". After the founding of the Federal Republic, this prohibition was taken over in Gesetz 22 of the Alliierten Hohen Kommission of 2 March 1950.⁷

As a result of the negotiations on the sovereignty of the Federal Republic, and due to the accession to NATO and the WEU (the Western European Union), the Paris Agreements were signed on 23 October 23 1954 and included in West German legislation in May 1955.⁸ It prohibited the production of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons (Annex II), but also the possession of more than 2.1% enriched uranium.⁹

In practice, the handling of that prohibition in the different occupation zones in which Germany was subdivided developed very differently. In the British zone there was a very remarkable "interpretation" of the ban: as early as 1946, Beyerle was instructed to complete two uranium enrichment centrifuges that he had started during the war.¹⁰

Groth's research also continued virtually uninterrupted after the end of the Second World War; he was briefly interviewed in England, but was then allowed to continue his research, from 1950 at the University of Bonn and from 1955 again with Beyerle.

Parallel to this, German research took place in Russia, where a number of scientists (including Steenbeck and the Austrian Zippe) as prisoners of war made great progress with centrifuge development.

They developed a centrifuge that was more powerful but at the same time much smaller than the one that Groth developed in Bonn. From 1957 the Soviet Union invested in centrifuges for uranium enrichment, although the enormous gas diffusion enrichment plants remained in operation for decades. When the scientists returned to Germany in the late 1950s, research into the Zippe centrifuge continued in collaboration with industry in Germany. After the decision to declare centrifuge technology secret in 1961, the government decided to transfer the investigation to the Gesellschaft für Kernverfahrenstechnik, which later became one of the partners in Uranit, founded in 1969.¹¹

2.5 United Kingdom

The United Kingdom was at the start of isotope separation by centrifuges: after all, it was the British scientists Lindeman and Aston who already suggested it in 1919. The internment in Great Britain of, among others, Hartbeck, who had done centrifuge research with Groth in Hamburg during the war, made people well aware of the scientific development of uranium enrichment by centrifuges.

The development of centrifuges, inter alia, through research in the German occupation zone, offered the British a first opportunity to become more independent of cooperation with the US. After all, the United Kingdom was also involved in the Manhattan project, and as a result uranium enrichment focused primarily on gas diffusion: as early as 1946 the construction of an enrichment plant based on that diffusion technology was commissioned. In 1950, a military site in Capenhurst was chosen as the location and in 1953 the production of first low enriched uranium started, and a year later already high enriched uranium was produced. Capacity increased considerably to 1,600 kg of highly enriched uranium in 1959. At the end of 1961, the company switched to the production of low enriched uranium for nuclear power plants and the gas diffusion plant was closed and dismantled in 1982.¹²

In addition to enrichment research through gas diffusion, British research into uranium enrichment by centrifuges was intensified from the 1960s. By 1966, centrifuge development had reached the point "where an efficient design had evolved" and started testing with a series of centrifuges. After two years, the centrifugation process proved to be viable and more economical than diffusion. The development of diffusion was then stopped and all British enrichment studies were concentrated on further improvement of the centrifugation process.¹³

References:

1 The secret project, led by the United States, with the help of Canada and the United Kingdom that was to lead to the development of the atomic bomb during the Second World War.

2 R. Scott Kemp: "Gas Centrifuge Theory and Development": A Review of U.S. Programs, Science and Global Security, 2009, 17: 1, 1-19, DOI: 10.1080 / 08929880802335816

3 Officially titled: "Atomic Energy for Military Purposes: The Official Report on the Development of the Atomic Bomb Under the Auspices of the United States Government, 1940-1945)" http://www.atomicarchive.com/Docs/SmythReport/index .shtml

4 Unless stated otherwise, the source for this part is: J. Kistemaker: "De geschiedenis van het Nederlandse Ultracentrifuge Project. Hoe een nieuwe industrie ontstond" ("The history of the Dutch Ultracentrifuge Project. How a new industry came about"), FOM Institute for Atomic and Molecular Physics, 1991

5 CPN: Kistemaker en de Duitse A-bom (CPN: Kistemaker and the German A-bomb), November 1960

6 Bernd-A Rusinek; Urananreicherung in Nordrhein-West-falen" ("Uraniumenrichment in North Rhine-Westphalia"), 2012 p4: http://www.rusinek.eu/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Urananreicherung-in-Nor...

7 Paul Laufs; Reaktorsicherheit für Leistungskernkraftwerke 1: Die Entwicklung im politischen und technischen Umfeld der Bundesrepublik Deutschland" ("Reaction of the Leistungskernkraftwerke 1: The Entwicklung im politischen und technicalen Umfeld der Bundesrepublik Deutschland"); Springer Verlag, 2013 p32

8 See among others: Stephan Geier; Schwellenmacht: Bonns heimliche Atomdiplomatie von Adenauer bis Schmidt" ("Schwellenmacht: Bonn's secret Nuclear diplomacy from Adenauer bis Schmidt"), 2013 p17-21

9 Annex II at: http://www.fransamaltingvongeusau.com/documents/dl2/h2/2.2.5.pdf

10 Stephan Geier; "Schwellenmacht. Bonn's nostalgic Atom diplomacy from Adenauer to Schmidt"; 2013

11 Bernd-A Rusinek; "Urananreicherung in Nordrhein Westfalen", 2012 p4: http://www.rusinek.eu/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Urananreicherung-in-Nor...

12 Britain's Nuclear Weapons, http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Uk/UKFacility.html visited 19-01-2010

13 Urenco UK Centrifuge Enrichtment Plant Capenhurst, Corporate Brochure undated (1977)

CHAPTER 3: URENCO: COMPANY, CONTRACTS AND OUTLOOK

The main activity of the Urenco Enrichment Company is enriching uranium for energy companies to make uranium suitable for use in nuclear power plants. That enrichment is expressed in enrichment work or SWU (Separative Work Units); 1 SWU is equivalent to 1 kg of separation labor. An enrichment installation with a capacity of 1,000 tons of SWU per year can enrich uranium for around eight 1000 MW nuclear power plants annually. Urenco provides enrichment work at the four enrichment plants: Eunice (US), Capenhurst (UK), Gronau (D) and Almelo (NL).

3.1 Company structure

As we saw in Chapter 1, two companies were established with the signing of the Treaty of Almelo in 1970: Urenco Ltd and Centec GmbH. Urenco Ltd was a marketing company ‒ the joint sales organization of UCN, Uranit and BNFL ‒ that represented the interests of the various enrichment plants. Centec coordinated technological developments (R&D).

A major reorganization followed in August 1993 whereby Urenco Ltd became a holding company of Urenco NL, Urenco Deutschland, Urenco UK and later also Urenco USA. Centec ends its existence and merges with the holding company. With this reorganization, Urenco Ltd becomes more than just a sales organization; it becomes the owner of the three (later four) enrichment plants. And the countries of the Almelo Treaty: the Netherlands (via UCN), Germany (RWE and E.On via Uranit), United Kingdom (via BNFL) then become the owner of Urenco Ltd. Until 1993, the individual Urenco enrichment plants were more or less "national" plants with Urenco Ltd as a joint sales organization. After the reorganization, the enrichment factories became part of the international consortium that the Contracting Parties own: with the result that the enrichment factory in Almelo became equally shared by the Netherlands, Germany and the UK, like those in Gronau and Capenhurst (and later Eunice).

Further legal restructuring is carried out in 2003, after which Urenco Ltd consists of two parts: Urenco Enrichment Company (UEC ‒ which focuses on enrichment) and Enrichment Technology Company (ETC ‒ which focuses on the manufacture of enrichment installations).¹

The shares of Urenco Ltd are, as stated, one-third in the hands of the Dutch State through the Ultra Centrifuge Nederland NV² based in Groningen; one-third owned by the UK government through Enrichment Investment Limited³ and one-third owned by Uranit UK Ltd,⁴ in turn 100% subsidiary of Uranit GmbH based in Jülich. Uranit is in turn owned by the German energy companies E.On (50%) and RWE (50%).

Urenco Enrichment Company has four enrichment plants: Capenhurst (UK), Gronau (Germany), Almelo (the Netherlands) and Eunice, New Mexico (USA). A total of 1,500 people work in the four enrichment facilities.⁵

3.2 Enrichment Technology Company

ETC (Enrichment Technology Company Ltd.) could be seen as the "successor" of Centec. ETC was established in October 2003 and in 2006 ETC became a joint venture between the French Areva (nowadays Orano) and Urenco Ltd (or actually 50% Orano, 22% Urenco Ltd and 28% Urenco Deutschland). This was laid down in the July 2005 Treaty of Cardiff⁶ on cooperation in the field of centrifuge technology between the three Urenco countries and France.

ETC has the exclusive responsibility to develop, produce, supply and install gas centrifuges on behalf of Urenco. In principle, all centrifuge enrichment plants that work with ETC technology in Europe and the United States are so-called black boxes; that is, the technology in the factories is not available to the enrichment companies that operate the factories. In practice, there are a few 'grey' areas where the ETC has shared a limited amount of compartmentalized classified information with the nuclear regulatory authorities that want assurance that the plants are safe.⁷ ETC has plants in Almelo, Capenhurst and Jülich.

The stagnation in the capacity of the Urenco enrichment plants naturally also has consequences for ETC. Mass redundancies were announced in October 2012: about two-thirds of ETC jobs worldwide were lost: 1,400 out of 2000. For the Almelo plant, this means a loss of 240 out of a total of 800 jobs.⁸ The price of enrichment work is currently too low to add or even replace production capacity.⁹

3.3 Reason for founding Urenco

The origin and history of Urenco is closely linked to the research and development of ultracentrifuge technology, now the most used method for uranium enrichment. During the 1960s and 1970s, there were high growth expectations of nuclear energy for energy production, with a consequent need for uranium enrichment capacity.

The history of Urenco is also closely linked to the desire of Western Europe to be independent of the US with regard to nuclear reactors and enriched uranium. The US did not authorize the reprocessing of nuclear fuel with US-enriched uranium; and that was almost everything at the time. However, Germany, the United Kingdom and France wanted to reprocess used nuclear fuel in order to remove the plutonium. Officially, they wanted to use plutonium in fast breeder reactors, such as Kalkar in Germany or Phenix in France. Breeder reactors were considered necessary because a shortage of uranium was expected, mainly due to the (apparently unrealistic) expected growth in (nuclear) energy consumption. By enriching the required uranium themselves, Western European countries were able to reprocess the spent fuel and thus develop their own industrial plutonium infrastructure. The two nuclear weapon options also remained open through an own enrichment industry, which could, after all, be obtained either by highly enriched uranium or by reprocessed plutonium.

3.4 Growth of Urenco

But by the time Urenco opened its first commercial enrichment plants, Capenhurst on 15 September 1977 and Almelo on 25 October 1977, it was clear that far fewer nuclear power plants would be built than was expected years earlier.¹⁰ Instead of a shortage of enriched uranium, demand was then only half of global production capacity. Owing to the overcapacity and the large stocks of enriched uranium resulting in the low prices that the US and Russia demanded for enrichment work, it took until 1983 for Urenco to make a profit.¹¹ The money needed for research, development, construction and operation of uranium enrichment, centrifuges and enrichment plants have been largely paid for by the three governments involved.

Nevertheless, Urenco succeeds in conquering a place in a market that is already plagued by overcapacity and since the mid-80s, the company makes a profit every year.¹²

The growth of Urenco (from newcomer to global player) in those decades is due to two factors: enriching with ultracentrifuge technology is much cheaper due to the much lower energy consumption: "However, because Urenco has been able to offer competitive prices, its market share grew", the Dutch Minister of Economic Affairs explains in 1987.¹³

In addition, the large enrichment plants in Russia and the US were from the Second World War or just after and in the 1980s, therefore, they were old and in need of replacement. But especially Urenco grew due to failures in the US. There, the policy was aimed at laser enrichment replacing the old diffusion plants. But the failure of that technology ‒ along with the failure to realize replacement centrifuge enrichment capacity¹⁴ ‒ caused the US market share to fall dramatically and eventually evaporate completely. Urenco was able to take over that market almost entirely. The big competitor, the Russian Tenex, had much less access to the western market.

3.5 Privatization

Four years after the Dutch State had become 100% owner of UCN,¹⁵ the Dutch government announced in May 2013 that it wanted to sell its shares.¹⁶ The main reason given by the then Finance Minister Dijsselbloem is that the United Kingdom wants to privatize its shares, The German share is already owned by companies, so it makes no sense to hold a minority share.

Three years later, in November 2016, it is clear that the sales plans are stuck and have actually failed. The British government and the German shareholders also apparently abandoned the intention. The stumbling block seems be "safeguarding public interests": the shareholders do want to sell but because of the sensitivity of the enrichment technology they also want to keep commitments from buyers and control over a number of aspects.¹⁷

It could be that the sale of Urenco will be high on the agenda again in the coming years, and then with a surprising buyer: the United States. The US government could be interested in Urenco because, in the absence of its own enrichment plant, it could get a shortage of enriched uranium that is not covered by international treaties and can therefore be used for its military program. The purchase of Urenco would be one of the options to get that "unobligated uranium". (See chapters on tritium and HALEU).

References:

1 Rosatom, via Bellona, 11-2019 «Росатом» воросовововововов опасных материалов (https://bellona.ru/2019/11/14/rosatom-vpervye-dal-konkretnye-obyasneniya-
vvoza-v-rossiyu-opasnyh-materialov /

2 https://web.evs.anl.gov/uranium/mgmtuses/overview/mgmtover5.cfm

3 "Vragen en antwoorden over verarmd uranium" ("Questions and answers about depleted uranium"), Laka Foundation: https://www.laka.org/info/publicaties/vu/2003-vu-vragen.html

4 "Russia Is Arming Its Tanks with a Controversial New" Bullet ",
December 24, 2018; https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/russia-arming-its-tanks-controver...

5 "Rampbestrijdingsplan voor URENCO Nederland B.V" ("Disaster relief plan for URENCO Nederland B.V"), Veiligheidsregio Twente. https://www.vrtwente.nl/media/36667/rampenbestrijdingsplan-urenco.pdf

6 "Cost of nuclear facility near Ellesmere Port spirals to almost £ 1bn," 25 May 2019, https://www.cheshire-live.co.uk/news/chester-cheshire-news/cost-nuclear-... ellesmere-16328444

7 "Tails Management Facility", website Urenco, visited 18 Feb 2020: https://www.urenco.com/global-operations/urenco-chemplants

8 "Completing the TMF", Nuclear Engineering International, 23 October 2019; https://www.neimagazine.com/features/featurecompleting-the-tmf-7470598/

9 "Hintergrundinfos zur Uranmülllagerung in Gronau" ("Background information Uraniumstorage at Gronau"), SOFA Münster https://sofa-ms.de/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Hintergrund-Uranm%C3%BClll...

10 https://www.laka.org/docu/catalogus/publica­tie/1.01.8.36/16_beschikkin...

11 Jaarrapport 2004 ("Annual report 2004"), Covra, 2005 p13

12 "Management of depleted uranium", OECD / NEA, 2001 https://www.oecd-nea.org/ndd/pubs/2001/3035-management-depleted-uranium.pdf

13 Jaarrapport 2018 ("Annual Report 2018"), Covra, 2019 p94

14 Email exchange with Covra, 5 February 2020

15 Telephone conversation Covra, 27 February 2020

16 "Opera Safety Case", Covra, December 20, 2017 p34: https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/binaries/rijksoverheid/documenten/rapporten.... pdf

17 "Completing the TMF", Nuclear Engineering International, 23 October 2019; https://www.neimagazine.com/features/featurecompleting-the-tmf-7470598/

18 Calculation by Laka Foundation, a total of more than 100,000 tonnes, Germany 27,000, the Netherlands 54,000 tonnes

19 "Urenco (Capenhurst) Ltd's strategy for its nuclear licensed site," HM Nuclear Installations Inspectorate, November 2004, p13

20 WDR Westpol report, 10 November 2019: https://www1.wdr.de/mediathek/video/sendungen/westpol/video-westpol-612....

21 https://mariannewildart.wordpress.com/2017/10/01/putting-a-hex-on-you/

22 "Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride at Capenhurst", Office for Nuclear Regulation, 18 August 2016: http://www.onr.org.uk/foi/2016/201604254.htm

23 Atommüllreport, https://www.atommuellreport.de/daten/uaa-gronau.html

24 Bundesumweltminiteries (Ministry of Environment"), September 2019, via: https://www.bi-luechow-dannenberg.de/2019/10/24/neue-uranmuellexporte-vo...

25 "Hintergrundinfos zur Uranmülllagerung in Gronau" ("Background information Uraniumstorage at Gronau"),, SOFA Münster https://sofa-ms.de/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Hintergrund-Uranm%C3%BClll...

26 Deutscher Bundestag ‒ 19. Wahl period ‒ 117. Sitzung; answer to question 24 from Die Linke: http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/19/19117.pdf#page=65

27 idem, page 64

28 idem

29 ANVS-2019/4681: https://www.rvo.nl/sites/default/files/2019/06/ANVS-2019-4681.pdf

30 Urenco general announcement 64, 16 June 1995: https://kernenergieinnederland.nl/files/19950616-urenco.pdf

31 Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal, Vergaderjaar 2007-2008 (House of Representatives of the States General, Meeting year 2007-2008), 1107: Questions from Poppe (SP) December 11, 2007

32 "Rosatom says uranium tail contracts, will not be renewed", Bellona 31 May 2009: https://bellona.org/news/nuclear-issues/radioactive-waste-and-spent-nucl... -says-uranium-tail-contracts-will-not-be-renewed-citing-economic-infeasibility

33 https://bellona.org/news/nuclear-issues/radioactive-waste-and-spent-nucl... -sent-to-russia-are-repatriated

34 Minister Cramer (VROM) replies to Poppe (SP) questions, 23 January 2008: https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/ah-tk-20072008-1107.html#IDAWEUYB

35 Minister Cramer (VROM) replies to questions Poppe (SP), 27 November 2007: https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/ah-tk-20072008-755.html#IDAYKCFB

36 https://www.raadvanstate.nl/@29763/200704127-1/

37 https://sofa-ms.de/?p=1641

38 https://act.greenpeace.org/page/50805/action/1

39 https://sofa-ms.de/?p=1672

40 "Urenco (Capenhurst) Ltd's strategy for its nuclear licensed site," HM Nuclear Installations Inspectorate, November 2004, p13

41 "Rosatom issues a public response to Bellona's concern", Bellona, ​​November 13, 2019; https://bellona.org/news/nuclear-issues/2019-11-rosatom-issues-a-public-...

42 http://www.wise-uranium.org/rup.html#UF6DEP

CHAPTER 6: HALEU, TRITIUM AND THE BOMB

Uranium enrichment is one of the ways to the atomic bomb. It is not for nothing that the non-proliferation policy is aimed at having as few countries as possible possess enrichment technology. Therefor the International Atomic Energy Agency has set up a "fuel bank", where countries can get their enriched uranium so that future enrichment can be limited to a few countries. And so it becomes increasingly clear that nuclear energy is a technology that has military aspects. And uranium enrichment too.

6.1 Tritium and American nuclear weapons

In May 2017, it is announced that Urenco has concluded a contract for the supply of low enriched uranium (LEU) to the American TVA. TVA is the owner of nuclear power plants that are commissioned by the US Department of Defense to produce ‒ with specially developed fuel rods ‒ tritium for the US nuclear weapons program. Although uncertainty remains as to whether Urenco enriched uranium is actually used in those nuclear power stations, the fact is that Urenco has agreed to supply LEU even if it is used to produce tritium for nuclear weapons. In a 2014 report from the US GAO "Interagency Review Needed to Update U.S. Position on Enriched Uranium That Can Be Used for Tritium Production", it is stated that the Urenco Joint Commission agreed to deliver enriched uranium, while the possible production of tritium in those reactors was known.¹

Radioactive tritium arises from nuclear fission and has a half-life of approximately 12 years. The American nuclear weapons program is in need of tritium because the tritium in the nuclear weapons must be regularly replaced. The problem for the USA at the moment is that it (since 2013 and for the first time since WWII) no longer has its own uranium enrichment facility and is therefore forced to purchase enriched uranium from foreign producers.

The US does assess tritium production in civilian reactors as military production and therefore the US-policy for the production of tritium is based on "Unobligated LEU". This means that uranium used for tritium production cannot be covered by treaties that limit its use to peaceful use. That has been the policy of the American government for decades, precisely to separate the peaceful and military use as clearly as possible. That is the problem for the US right now: America no longer has its own uranium enrichment capacity, and depends on the commercial market for LEU. And commercial LEU from outside the US ‒ and also LEU enriched at the Urenco plant in the US itself ‒ always falls under agreements with obligations, such as those in the Washington Treaty. For the US government it is crystal clear: the production of tritium for nuclear weapons in civil nuclear power plants is military.

According to the American General Accounting Office, Urenco and the owner-states (the Netherlands, United Kingdom and Germany) see that very differently. They think that the low enriched uranium is mainly used for the production of electricity and that the tritium is only a "by-product". Literally: "According to URENCO's legal memorandum, it was further discussed that URENCO LES's LEU will be used by TVA principally to produce electricity and that, if used in TVA's tritium producing reactor, the resulting tritium produced in that reactor is a by-product material and not a special nuclear material."

That is highly debatable when it comes to contractually mandatory delivery with specially developed fuel rods.

In the meantime, it seems that the US government has been able to push back the need to use uranium enriched by Urenco considerably, because a stock of enriched uranium has been found somewhere. But the fact remains that the Urenco countries did not mind cooperating with the American nuclear weapons program.
Another possibility for the US to no longer be dependent on "obligated" uranium is to set up its own enrichment industry (which has once again been initiated) or to buy Urenco in its entirety (see Chapter 3.5: Privatization). And that is now being thought out loud.²

6.2 HALEU and military applications

From the foregoing it seems clear that Urenco is not so keen on the widely professed separation between civilian and military use of nuclear energy.

In February 2019, Urenco announces that it will enrich uranium in its American enrichment plant to 19.75%. That is the maximum enrichment rate to fall into the low-enriched uranium category. The Dutch site in Almelo has a permit to enrich uranium up to 6%. Nuclear power stations use uranium with a percentage of approximately 3.5‒5% fissile uranium-235. According to Urenco³, the higher enrichment rate of 19.75% is necessary for use in research reactors, but also for the development of new reactor types and for the production of medical isotopes. Because this is only half the story, Urenco's intention raises a lot of eyebrows.
The other half of the story is military: according to members of the Science, Space and Technology subcommittees of the US congress, the HALEU (High Assay Low Enriched Uranium) program is "a program that will ultimately be greater benefit to defense applications"^.4

And one wonders why in October 2019 the Department of Energy and not the Department of Defense made $115 million available to the Centrus company to set up a test plant to produce HALEU. Because Centrus is owned and operated by a US entity and will use enrichment centrifuge technology developed in the US, the Department of Energy emphasizes that it is the only company that can enrich uranium for use in the US military sector. As explained above, US policy prohibits the military use of uranium that falls under international non-proliferation treaties: "obligated uranium". The policy is that for military applications only uranium is used that is enriched in American factories with American technology, and therefore not covered by international treaties: "unobligated uranium".

But Urenco also wants to get involved in the production of HALEU and has no objection whatsoever to the military use of uranium enriched by them. So it appears again. That is because the new civilian reactor types that would require the HALEU are certainly not available in the "time-frame" for HALEU production in the Centrus program; the only (civil) advanced reactor type that fits into that timetable, the NuScale design, does not need HALEU!⁵

The US Department of Defense does need HALEU because it wants nuclear mini-reactors for remote military bases and for example reactors in military submarines and aircraft carriers. Up to 19.75% (20% popularly) enriched uranium falls under the category of low enriched uranium, above 20% it is called highly enriched and from about 85% it is called "weapons-grade". The latter is somewhat misleading, because even lower enriched uranium ‒ in theory even 20% or less ‒ can be used for a nuclear weapons, you only need more of it.

A higher enrichment rate is therefore controversial: the danger of further enrichment up to a percentage that is usable in nuclear weapons is high. The number of SWU is very large for the first 4‒5 percent enrichment, but is then virtually nil for higher enrichment. In other words, it is fairly effortless and quickly realizable to get from 20% to 80% enriched uranium. (See image "Uranium Enrichment and Uses")

The Urenco enrichment plant in Almelo may enrich uranium to 10% U-235, but must request permission from the nuclear regulator if the enrichment rate exceeds 6%. By way of comparison, according to the (now canceled) nuclear agreement,⁶ Iran can enrich uranium to only 3.67% and must 'dilute' HALEU stocks to that percentage.

Unlike the American congress, the Netherlands believes that the military application of HALEU is not an obstacle on the basis of the Treaty of Almelo (jointly) responsible for Urenco. Physics Today: "The Urenco partner states have said their 1995 agreement with the US does not prohibit the company from providing HALEU for military reactors or LEU for tritium production".

It remains remarkable that Urenco thinks it is fine to be part of the American nuclear weapons program, while the US itself really does wants to uphold the separation between 'civil' and 'military' use of nuclear technology and materials. And even more the Dutch government agrees with Urenco's military ambitions, because otherwise the Netherlands would have used its veto in the Joint Committee. Or is this being pre-sorted by the respective authorities for the suggested upcoming sale of Urenco to the US, so that this nuclear weapon state will be able to use enriched uranium for military purposes without any problems?

Perpetual secrecy

Following the decision of the Joint Committee, and the position of the Dutch cabinet represented thereon, on the supply of tritium, the Laka Foundation tried to disclose documents from the Joint Committee. However, the Court of Amsterdam judges that the international Treaty of Almelo, which regulates secrecy, is more important than any national legislation.¹ Where secret documents are normally evaluated after a few years as to whether secrecy is still useful, such as minutes of the Council of Ministers on Srebrenica, it follows from the judgment of the court that all documents from the Netherlands concerning the supervision of Urenco since the establishment of the Treaty of Almelo in 1970 will remain secret into eternity, with no prospect of public access.

1 Laka Foundation, May 3, 2019: https://www.laka.org/nieuws/2019/rechtbank-amsterdam- gemengde-commissie-mag-alles-over-urenco-geheim-houden-10628

6.3 Nuclear energy necessity for nuclear weapons program

The separation between military and civilian use of nuclear energy has always been artificial. For example, it is quite possible to make nuclear weapons from plutonium from nuclear reactor fuel⁷ and uranium enrichment has undeniable military potential.

In recent years, something else has become clear: the official nuclear weapon states (US, UK, Russia, France and China ‒ together accounting for more than 60% of the number of nuclear power reactors, 255 out of 415) have a major interest in maintaining the civil nuclear program. And there is less and less disguised talk about it.

Without a "robust" civilian nuclear industry and associated nuclear infrastructure, nuclear weapons programs would not be sustainable due to high costs, risks and the need for trained personnel:

• In all nuclear-weapon states, the military apparatus uses the civilian nuclear industry through hidden subsidies for human resources, research funds and investment in dual-use nuclear infrastructure.
• The modernization of nuclear arsenals in Nuclear Weapon States encourages the development of new small modular reactors (Small Modular Reactors)
• Although reportedly intended for civilian use, small reactors are mainly used for military purposes, in particular for the propulsion of nuclear submarines, which have become the most important part of the nuclear weapons doctrines of the major nuclear powers.
• If submarine nuclear propulsion units can be used with HALEU (enrichment level of 5‒20%) instead of HEU (enrichment level of more than 20%), the civilian nuclear industry can produce relatively inexpensive and uncomplicated nuclear fuel for nuclear submarines.

U-battery

Urenco has been developing a mini-reactor since 2008: the U-battery, with the U from Urenco. The project was started in collaboration with the Technical University in Delft (NL) and the Dalton Nuclear Institute of the University of Manchester (UK). Urenco has entered into a partnership with a number of companies in the U-Battery consortium.¹

The U-battery uses so-called Triso fuel, which consists of higher-enriched low-enriched uranium (or HALEU). It is therefore remarkable that uranium enricher Urenco is designing a reactor for which enriched uranium is necessary that it cannot itself enrich. But that one day will undoubtedly be the main reason for the call to be allowed to enrich higher. In this way you create foolish facts that you can put pressure on politicians with.

Mini reactors (SMRs: Small Modular Reactors) are the new hope of the nuclear industry. According to the U-Battery² prospectus there is a lot of interest in it; especially in Canada, where it would be used to supply power to remote areas where it is not profitable to draw power cables. Power in remote areas is the most important selling point, but research shows that they are mainly developed to extract oil, tar sands and gas from hard-to-reach locations. The Akademik Lomonosov, the Russian floating nuclear reactor, is intended, for example, to be able to explore and exploit fossil fuels at the North Pole. The U-Battery that Urenco is developing in collaboration with Canada could allow the extraction of tar sands in inhospitable areas. And there are more examples. It therefore appears that the mini-nuclear reactors currently being developed are only going to aggravate the climate crisis.³

1 https://www.u-battery.com/
2 https://www.u-battery.com/_/uploads/U-Battery_Prospectus_2019.pdf
3 https://reneweconomy.com.au/the-advanced-nuclear-power-sector-is-fuellin...
 

References:

1 General Accounting Office, GAO-15-123, October 2014: https://www.gao.gov/assets/670/666505.pdf

2 "Controversy continues to swirl around uranium enrichment contract," Physics Today, January 1, 2020 p22; https://physicstoday.scitation.org/doi/10.1063/PT.3.4385

3 "Urenco USA Inc. announces next-step HALEU activities ", 5 February 2019; https://urenco.com/news/articles/urenco-usa-inc-announces-next-step-hale...

4 "Controversy continues to swirl around uranium enrichment contract," Physics Today, January 1, 2020 p22; https://physicstoday.scitation.org/doi/10.1063/PT.3.4385

5 Same as Physics Today

6 "What's in the Iran nuclear deal?" CNN, 2 April 2015; https://edition.cnn.com/2015/04/02/politics/iran-nuclear-deal-main-point...

7 "Reactor-grade plutonium and nuclear weapons: ending the debate," Gregory S. Jones. In: The Nonproliferation Review, Volume 26, 2019, Issue 1-2 p61; https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2019.1603497

8 See: "Interdependencies between civil and military nuclear infrastructures": World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2018; https://www.worldnuclearreport.org/The-World-Nuclear-Industry-Status-Rep...

CHAPTER 7: A.Q. KHAN AND OTHER SCANDALS

The Urenco plant at Almelo has been ‒ certainly for the first 15 years ‒ at the center of attention: it seemed as if one scandal had not yet finished before the next appeared. In Germany that was much less during that period, but the discussion has been flaring up considerably in the past 10 years. In Great Britain it is relatively quiet around Urenco Capenhurst, but that was also different in the past. The fact that there are fewer scandals does not mean that everything is now much better.

7.1 Theft of enrichment technology

Because enrichment technology is a proliferation-sensitive technology that gives countries the opportunity to develop nuclear weapons, the policy is aimed at preventing the spread of that technology. In the past this has not been possible and with digitization it has become a lot more difficult ‒ a cubic meter of documents fits on a simple USB stick.

7.1.1 Abdul Qadeer Khan¹

After the broadcast on German channel ZDF on 29 March 1979, of a documentary about Dutch enrichment technology that had ended up in Pakistan through espionage, Dutch politics also became interested and parliamentary questions were asked. On May 3, the Minister of Economic Affairs downplayed the affair: "It is not correct that knowledge about enrichment technology was obtained directly from Urenco Nederland by Pakistan."

Through a broadcast by Walter Cronkite on the American news channel CBS, the spy also got a name: Abdul Qadeer Khan.² In February 1980, the Dutch government had to come back to previous statements, it is "likely that Pakistan through Khan is in possession of sensitive knowledge in the field of enrichment technology" and that Pakistan has "gained considerable time" in setting up a trial enrichment plant.

It gradually became clear to everyone that A.Q. Khan stole secret blueprints of modern ultra-centrifuges at the Urenco plant in Almelo and took them to Pakistan. Although the Netherlands should have been aware of the theft for years, the government remained in the denial phase for a long time.

7.1.1.1 Concealing espionage from partners

It was not until 16 June 1979 that the Netherlands first officially notified Britain and West Germany of Khan and the theft of classified information. That happened in the secret Joint Committee only after almost every newspaper reported about the theft. The Urenco partners were certainly not happy with the late notification. For example, Norman Lamont, UK undersecretary of state for energy, could not hide his irritation. After a question from Labor Member Tam Dalyell, during a debate in the UK Parliament on 18 December 1979, he replied: "The Hon. Member asked, quite rightly, "Why was the United Kingdom not informed?" It is a question that we have been asking the Netherlands authorities. To date, we have received no satisfactory explanation."³

According to Khan's' colleague and whistleblower Dutchman Frits Veerman, he ‒ Veerman ‒ had informed colleagues (in personal conversations and sometimes covertly) from 1974 onwards of his suspicions after seeing secret blueprints of centrifuges at Khan's home.⁴ But if that was not enough, everything should have been clear in December 1975 when Khan did not return to the Netherlands from his vacation in Pakistan.

From the very beginning of the Urenco cooperation, the prevention of proliferation was mentioned as one of the main arguments and there are "rules [are] designed to ensure that access to sensitive information is tightly controlled".⁵ But even in the regular meetings of Urenco's Joint Commission, the Netherlands apparently did not mention that secrets had been leaked to Pakistan. It was not until 16 June 1979 that Britain and West Germany were informed of this important non-proliferation breach by a Dutch report in the Joint Committee.

According to the British state secretary in the December 1979 debate, people from "fourth countries" should be able to access confidential information "only with the express agreement of the joint committee." And the British minister left no doubt that such permission was not requested by the Netherlands. "No such clearance was sought in the case of Dr. Khan, nor was his departure to Pakistan notified to the joint committee in 1975." And the minister went on to state that "Nor, as required by the Treaty of Almelo, was the apparent breach of security reported to the joint committee until long after it occurred."

That even the Joint Committee was not informed does makes clear the intention of the Netherlands. The government wanted to keep the whole affair secret at all costs and not only to the general public, but also to the governments of the partner countries. Because everything that is discussed in the Joint Commission is secret and remains secret anyway; the parliament has no possibility to steer the policy and has no control over it. A serious democratic deficit that has not been corrected up to now.⁶

The question is to what extent the concealment of the Khan affair for the Urenco partners has made it possible that British and West German companies could continue to supply Pakistan. For example, some 20 high-frequency inverters were ordered in December 1977 by Pakistan from the British company Emerson Industrial Control and were shipped in August 1978. The inverters have to control the high-speed rotations of the centrifuges.

Employees of Emerson assumed the inverters would be used for uranium enrichment, but thought that "[T]he Pakistani would never know how to operate such sophisticated equipment, and that the inverters would all sit in their packing cases until they rusted away." That turned out not to be the case. Unrest arose over a larger follow-up order and, probably after a tip from an employee of the company, Labour asked for on inquiry in British parliament; eventually an investigation followed, exports to Pakistan were frozen and export conditions were tightened.⁷

The refusal of the Netherlands to inform the Urenco partners as soon as possible about Khan's nuclear espionage was the second time the Netherlands had kept important matters secret from its partners: previously in 1969, during the negotiations for the establishment of Urenco, the Netherlands had kept secret from German and British partners that a number of centrifuges had imploded.⁸

Many years later, in 2005, in a broadcast of the Dutch radio program Argos, Ruud Lubbers, in 1975 Minister of Economic Affairs, revealed that the Netherlands had "let go" Khan twice after pressure from the American intelligence agency CIA.⁹ The same CIA, which later described Khan as "at least as dangerous as Osama bin Laden".¹⁰

7.1.1.2 The Khan network

After graduating in metal science from Delft university, Khan became an employee of the Dutch company FDO in 1972. FDO, based in Amsterdam, did research for Urenco on certain parts of centrifuge technology. Khan also worked in Almelo, where he copied the then very advanced Dutch M4 centrifuge-technology.

In 1975, Khan did not return to the Netherlands from a holiday in Pakistan. After he was initially sentenced in absentia to four years in prison by the Amsterdam District Court in 1983, he was acquitted on appeal in March 1985 for a formal error: it was unclear whether he had received the summons.

In January 2009, a Dutch study friend of Khan, Henk Slebos, was sentenced to 18 months in prison for the illegal export of proliferation-sensitive technology to Pakistan.¹¹ Slebos is just one of the many "associates" of Khan: in Deception, a list of "Principle Characters" in the Khan network has been included as an attachment, including a list of 11 European contacts, the majority of whom have been convicted of smuggling.¹² From the beginning of this century it became increasingly clear that Khan was the hub in a network that sold nuclear enrichment technology to other countries. The centrifuges found in Iran and Libya where based on the 4M copied by Khan and therefore have a "Dutch fingerprint."

Khan, meanwhile, became a national hero in Pakistan; the "Father of the Atomic Bomb". In 2004 he admitted selling nuclear technology to North Korea, Libya and Iran between 1986 and 1993. In a revealing article by proliferation experts Albright and Hinderstein¹³ they mention that Khan offered his 'assistance' to Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Al Qaida in addition to the three countries mentioned above. Furthermore, they argue, the fact that Khan visited 18 countries between 1997 and 2003 has fueled further speculation about his potential clientele.

In addition to the nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan and the nuclear weapons program of North Korea, Iran's nuclear program, which in recent years has regularly led to tensions and armed actions, can also be traced back to Urenco Almelo. It is almost impossible to overestimate the importance of the lax attitude of both Urenco and the successive Dutch governments in enabling Khan to take off with the crown jewels. And the consequences of the technology stolen from Urenco in Almelo in the early 1970s have largely determined the global proliferation agenda of recent decades. Up to the present day.

7.1.2 Urenco technology in Iraq

Khan is not the only one who stole Urenco technology, others did so too, but undoubtedly with less impact. Between 1985 and 1990, secret blueprints with specifications of the then most modern ultracentrifuge, the TC11, were stolen by former employees of the company MAN. The company was at that time the main shareholder of the German Urenco partner Uranit.¹⁴ The highly secret blueprints were copied at Uranit's office by Stemmler and Schaab and sold to Iraq.¹⁵ The International Atomic Energy Agency discovered the advanced carbon-fiber reinforced TC11 ultracentrifuges in Iraq, after a top Iraqi official with some sensitive documents had fled to Jordan.¹⁶

7.2 Enriched uranium to Brazil¹⁷

In June 1975 Urenco partner West Germany signed a huge contract with Brazil for the supply of a complete nuclear energy cycle consisting of enrichment, nuclear power stations and reprocessing plants. Brazil had not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (which is intended to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons) and was also a military dictatorship. At the same time, Germany sold nuclear technology to arch-enemy Argentina. The regime in Brazil was not secretive about its nuclear intentions: it had a nuclear weapons program, but that nuclear weapons would be developed for "peaceful purposes."

In March 1976, the Netherlands agreed in the Urenco Joint Commission to supply enriched uranium to Brazil. This contract made it necessary to considerably expand the enrichment capacity of the plant in Almelo. Brazil is Urenco's first major export customer. The discussion within the Social Democrats led Cabinet Den Uyl ‒ where the smallest coalition partner PPR is threatening with a cabinet crisis ‒ focuses on Brazil's nuclear safeguards.

But the German and British partners are not in favor of a revision of the already-agreed safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Brazil also refuses to cooperate on strict security conditions which are perceived discriminatory. What follows are a few years of ambiguity, blackmail and mystery. For example, both West Germany and the United Kingdom threaten not to renew the Treaty of Almelo in 1981 (a possibility laid down in the Treaty) and West Germany makes it clear that if a (positive) decision about expansion of the Almelo plant is not made rapidly, the Germans are forced to build an enrichment factory on their own territory. At the end of 1977 the new Christian Democrats-Liberals cabinet agreed to the expansion of the Urenco plant in Almelo and thus to the supply of enriched uranium to Brazil.

The largest anti-nuclear energy demonstration in Dutch history takes place in March 1978. With the central slogan "No expansion of UCN" (the name under which Urenco Almelo is known in that period) around 45,000 to 50,000 people demonstrate in Almelo, especially against the supply of enriched uranium to the military dictatorship of Brazil. Out of disappointment that the massive opposition did not lead to concrete results, the first direct actions against Urenco took place later that year by BAN: Break the Nuclear Chain Netherlands.

A few months later, at the end of June 1978, the Dutch Parliament approved the supply of enriched uranium to Brazil. Urenco Almelo had already started work on expansion in May. In December 1978, the government also agreed to the construction of the Urenco plant in Gronau, Germany.

In April 1981 it was announced that not Almelo but Capenhurst would enrich the uranium for Brazil staring in the beginning of 1982.¹⁸ But due to financial problems and the great delay in the Brazilian nuclear program the contract was not nearly as large as originally discussed.¹⁹ In 1985 the military dictatorship came to an end but Brazil did not sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty until September 1998. A new enrichment contract was being discussed at the end of the 1980s and Brazil is still one of the Urenco customers to this day.

Germany ultimately sold a nuclear reactor, but not an enrichment plant or a reprocessing plant.

7.3 Enrichment of uranium from occupied Namibia

At the start of commercial enrichment in the factories in Almelo and Capenhurst (Autumn 1977) it became clear that in Capenhurst and Almelo uranium from Namibia is being enriched. With this, Urenco violates Decree Nr. 1 of the Namibia Council of the United Nations. That decree prohibits the exploitation, trade, transport, processing and use of raw materials from this country which is occupied by South Africa.

The Dutch involvement in uranium trading from Namibia is of an indirect nature; The Netherlands itself does not purchase uranium from Namibia or South Africa. Dutch involvement is crucial, however, because the Netherlands is an equal partner in Urenco and the enrichment of Namibian uranium is taking place at the enrichment plants in Capenhurst and Almelo. The contractual involvement of Urenco Almelo raises an interesting point. While the British and West Germans do not recognize the legal authority of the UN Council for Namibia, the Dutch government does. It recognizes both the 1971 ruling of the International Court of Justice that the South African government in Namibia is illegal and the legal basis of Decree No. 1 of 1974 by the UN Council for Namibia.²⁰

7.3.1 Namibian uranium and the UN process²¹

In 1978, the Dutch Anti-Apartheid movement brought the matter to the attention and reproached the Dutch government for taking no action whatsoever to give practical substance to the position it adopted; not via transport restrictions, not via (the Joint Committee of) Urenco and not via Euratom (which also has the right to determine the "geographical origin" of the goods to be supplied).

At a UN hearing on the case, the Netherlands stated that it did not see it as its task to "implement" the decree. The Netherlands defended itself with the statement that it cannot know where the uranium originated from: Urenco is not the owner of the uranium and only enriches it. The UN then calls this "healing", because of course it is possible to make demands on customers about the origin of uranium. In May 1985, the UN announced a trial against Urenco and the Dutch state, which it is hoped can still start "before the end of the year".

On 14 July 1987, the summons of the UN Council for Namibia is finally published and on September 1 that year, during the first session, the trial is immediately adjourned to December 1 to give the defendants time to prepare their defense. On December 1 it is subsequently further adjourned to 3 May 1988. The essence of the (written) defense of the Dutch State is that it cannot be demonstrated that the uranium at Urenco Almelo originates from Namibia and that therefore the Netherlands cannot be accused of unlawful processing raw materials from occupied Namibia. At the hearing on 6 June 1989, the Namibia Council's reply is that the Dutch State can derive from agreements where the uranium comes from and that a bank that receives stolen money cannot defend itself with the argument that the money doesn't show it has been stolen.

But that is it: at the beginning of 1990, South Africa withdrew from Namibia, which became independent on 21 March 1990. The trial is stopped without judgment.

7.3.2 Namibian uranium in Great Britain

The contract for the supply of Namibian uranium to Great Britain is concluded with UKAEA²² in 1968 (i.e. before the establishment of Urenco) and is taken over by this Urenco partner after the establishment of BNFL²³ in 1971. Most of the uranium from the Namibian Rössing mine goes to Great Britain, but also to a number of other Urenco customers.

The Labor Party promised to cancel the 1968 contract, but when the party after winning the 1974 general elections came back to that promise, protest increased sharply.²⁴ Between 1977 and 1985 half of the uranium for the British civilian nuclear program came from the Rössing mine in Namibia. In addition, all the uranium for the British military program came from Namibia and South Africa.²⁵ A campaign was being set up by Anti-Apartheid organizations, students, environmental movements together with trade unions to stop the import of uranium from Namibia. This collaboration CANUC (the Campaign Against the Namibian Uranium Contracts) ensured a constant flow of information and the campaign focused to a large extent on the processing of the uranium in Capenhurst.

In addition to the boycotts of workers on ships carrying uranium from Namibia in the port of Liverpool, one of the highlights of the protest is the National Day of Action on 14 March 1981, when demonstrations are taking place on 30 locations, including Capenhurst.²⁶

7.4 And today's scandals?

It seems as if scandals are something of "the past"; as if there are no more scandalous things happening around Urenco. But scandals do not occur automatically. If not many people find something that is outrageous, there will be no public scandal. And that has been the case in the Netherlands (and the UK) for a long time.

In Germany it is different. This is where scandal after scandal concerning Urenco Gronau has arisen in the past couple of years. There were numerous topics about which the media reported critically, triggering discussion in parliament; in short, scandals. About the involvement in the American nuclear weapons program, the supply of enriched uranium for the fuel for the 'crack reactors' in Tihange and Doel and even about the parliamentary debate on the Ausstieg van Lingen and Gronau where strange things happened with official documents and speakers.²⁷ But especially the scandal of dumping depleted uranium in Russia.

What became a scandal nowhere is the contract for the supply of enriched uranium to the United Arab Emirates.²⁸ And that is strange. A dictatorship, a country where homosexuality is punishable, where a non-Jewish declaration is requested, in a region where nuclear technology and nuclear ambitions raise a lot of eyebrows.

References:

1 Unless otherwise indicated, this part is based on: http://www.kernenergieinnederland.nl/faceted_search/results/khan

2 'Pakistan kreeg kerntechnologie uit Nederland'('Pakistan got nuclear technology from the Netherlands'); Volkskrant (NL), June 13, 1979)

3 Quotes from the debate on December 18, 1979 in the UK Parliament from: https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1979/dec/18/joint-cen...

4 Veerman writes extensively about his suspicions in the book Atoom spionage' ('Atom Espionage'), Centerboek, 1988 written by him and Jacques Ros

5 British Secretary of State for Energy Lamont in the debate in the British parliament, 18 December 1979

6 See: Perpetual secrecy, box chapter 6)

7 "Deception. Pakistan, the United States, and the Secret Trade in Nuclear Weapons", Adrian Levy & Catherine Scott-Clark, 2007; page 54

8 J. Kistemaker: "The history of the Dutch Ultracentrifuge Project. How a new industry was born", FOM Institute for Atomic and Molecular Physics, 1991

9 Argos, VPRO, broadcast August 19, 2005: https://www.vpro.nl/lees/nieuws-vpro/2015/atoomspion-khan-.htm]

10 George Tenet director of CIA in "CIA Says Pakistanis Gift Iran Nuclear Aid", New York Times, November 24, 2004

11 More about Slebos in "Project Butter factory", Frank Slijper, 2007: https://www.laka.org/docu/catalogus/publicatie/4.02.7.10/06_project-butt...

12 Deception, pp. 454-458

13 "Unraveling the A.Q. Khan and Future Proliferation Networks", David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, The Washington Quarterly, Spring 2005

14 "A.Q.Khan, Urenco and the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology", commissioned by Greenpeace, 2004 p26

15 "Report says centrifuge know-how may have been transferred to Iraq," Nuclear Fuel, October 29, 1990 p10

16 "Iraq bought ‒ and still has ‒ design for advanced Urenco gas centrifuge", Nucleonics Week Extra, January 22, 1996

17 Unless stated otherwise, use for this part has been made of: "Uraniumverrijking in Nederland, Protest en Beleid 1969-1981" ("Uranium enrichment in the Netherlands, Protest and Policy 1969-1981"); RU Groningen, Thesis Contemporary History, P. G.M. Ettes, March 1986. https://www.laka.org/docu/cata­logus/publicatie/1.01.8.30/39_uraniumver...

18 "Eerst een kerncentrale, dan een kernbom" ("First a nuclear reactor, then a nuclear bomb"), Milieudefensie, October 1983 p7

19 "Brazilië wil meer uranium van Urenco", ("Brazil wants more uranium from Urenco"), Twentsche Courant, March 14, 1989

20 de Beer D. (1988) "The Netherlands and Namibia: the Political Campaign to End Dutch Involvement in the Namibian Uranium Trade." In: Cooper A.D. (eds) Allies in Apartheid. Palgrave Macmillan, London

21 Unless stated otherwise, this part uses: http://www.kernenergieinnederland.nl/faceted_search/results/namibie

22 The United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority is the state organization that is responsible for both the civilian and military nuclear programs at that time

23 British Nuclear Fuels Limited, full subsidiary of UKAEA

24 "Namibia: A contract to kill. The Story of Stolen Uranium and the British Nuclear Program", CANUC, 1986

25 "Blockade Namibian Uranium, BNFL Springfields November 14th" (1986), flyer: see https://www.aamarchives.org/archive/history/namibia/nam22-blockade-namib...

26 "Forward to freedom. The history of the British Anti-Apartheid Movement 1959-1994 ": https://www.aamarchives.org/

27 "Atomausstieg mit einer Ausnahme" ("Nuclear phase out with exceptions'), die tageszeitung, March 21, 2019: https://taz.de/Urananreicherung-in-Gronau/!5579430/

28 https://www.laka.org/nieuws/2014/geen-israelische-vitesse-voetballer-maa...

ANNEX I: ENRICHMENT: FEED, PRODUCT AND TAILS

Enrichment means increasing the concentration of a particular isotope of interest in an element. Although not limited to uranium, the term is usually used to enrich the U-235 isotope in uranium.

Natural uranium consists for the most part of the isotope U-238, while the fissile isotope U-235 makes up only 0.72% of all uranium atoms (or 0.711% of the mass). To maintain a nuclear chain reaction, the fissionable U-235 percentage must be increased to approximately 3‒5%. The process of increasing the U-235 fraction in uranium is called uranium enrichment.

Commercial enrichment technology is now almost exclusively based on gas centrifuges. In these centrifuges, a gaseous uranium compound (uranium hexafluoride ‒ UF6 ‒ which is also gaseous at relatively low temperatures) is exposed to strong centrifugal forces, separating the lighter (U-235) from the heavier isotopes (U-238). Because the enrichment obtained in a single centrifuge is not sufficient, many centrifuges are linked to each other in so-called cascades. These cascades are again used in parallel formations to achieve the desired degree of enrichment.

The labor required for enrichment is measured in SWU: Separative Work Units. 1 SWU is equivalent to 1 kg of separation labor. Capacity of an enrichment installation is stated in tonnes (1000 kg) of SWU per year (tSWU / y). Enriching from 0.7 to 4‒5% U-235 requires more SWU than from 5% to 100%.

A nuclear power plant with a capacity of 1,000 MW requires approximately 25 tonnes of 3.5% enriched uranium annually. The production of this enriched uranium from natural uranium requires around 120 tSWU. An enrichment installation with a capacity of 1,000 tSWU / y can therefore enrich the uranium annually for around eight nuclear power plants.

Uranium with a U-235 content to be increased ("feed") is loaded in centrifuges. Enrichment results in two streams: a stream with a percentage of U-235 higher than the natural 0.72% (enriched uranium or 'product') and a stream with a percentage of U-235 lower than 0.72% (depleted uranium or 'tails'). The depleted uranium represents more than 85% of the mass output of the enrichment plant, in other words: the production of 1 kilo of enriched uranium yields ‒ as a by-product or waste ‒ more than 7 kilos of depleted uranium!

Theoretically, it is possible to extract even more fissionable uranium from the depleted uranium, which on average still contains 0.2-0.3% U-235. The usefulness of this "re-enrichment" depends on a number of economic factors: the price of "fresh" natural uranium, the price of a SWU and, nowadays, an excess of enrichment capacity (overcapacity). Re-enrichment is not effective to reduce the volume of depleted uranium, but can be used (and is used) to move those volumes: e.g. from Western Europe to Siberia (see Chapter 6: Export of depleted uranium to Russia).

ANNEX II: HISTORY OF URANIUM ENRICHMENT AND MARKET

In the beginning all uranium enrichment took place for the production of nuclear weapons. Within the Manhattan project, enrichment was one of the two routes to the atomic bomb: the other was obtaining plutonium by reprocessing. At the time, research into uranium enrichment was mainly based on ultracentrifuge technology to separate uranium isotopes, but after a number of centrifuges had exploded, they switched to gas diffusion technology in December 1943.¹

1950s: military enrichment capacity

In the 1950s, the US expanded its enrichment capacity built during the Second World War with three enormous diffusion installations with a total capacity of 17,000 tSWU / y.² The British also built diffusion installations for their nuclear weapons programs and in 1953 opened a factory in Capenhurst with a small capacity (400 tSWU / y) .³ Also the Soviet Union started a large military uranium enrichment program. Tenex was established in 1953 for the export of enriched uranium (initially exclusively to countries within the Soviet bloc).⁴ China also started producing highly enriched uranium for the nuclear weapons program in two enrichment plants (Lanzhou and Heping) in the late 1950s, both through gas diffusion.⁵

When the various European Communities were set up in the mid-1950s, France proposed that the European Community started its own enrichment project: which would have to be within Euratom: the European Community's partnership and lobby organization for atomic energy. But the US responded to those plans with an offer that Europe "could not refuse": cheap, subsidized by the American government, uranium, enriched by the major American diffusion plants. By accepting the American offer, the discussion and implementation of enrichment technology in Western Europe was postponed considerably.⁶ France in 1960 started its own national enrichment industry with the construction of the (military) enrichment plant in Pierrelatte, which began to produce in 1964.⁷

Breaking the US monopoly

From a virtual monopoly on uranium enrichment ‒ outside the Soviet bloc ‒ in the 1950s and 1960s, the US share of the world market fell during the 1970s to less than 60% at the end of 1982.⁸

France was the first country to break the US monopoly and signed an agreement in March 1971 for the supply of enriched uranium with Russian Tenex.⁹ In 1975 already 8.8% of enriched uranium in the Euro-9¹⁰ came from the Soviet Union.¹¹ In the following 10 years, the position of the US as the dominant world supplier was quickly eroded for two reasons:¹²

‒ In the first place, the US was increasingly seen as an unreliable supplier of enriched uranium; because the order book was larger than the production capacity, no new orders were concluded between 1974 and 1978.

‒ Secondly, US policy to prevent even more countries from possessing nuclear weapons evolved to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, imposing more restrictions on foreign buyers of enriched uranium.

These factors increased the interest of countries to develop their own enrichment facilities.

1970s: Multinational cooperation

The Urenco company was founded by the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands in the early 1970s and started building their own enrichment capacity. The first commercial delivery of enriched uranium by Urenco took place in September 1975. Although these deliveries were relatively small and came from pilot plants, Urenco did gain in importance.¹³ In 1977 the first commercial factories were officially put into operation: on 15 September in Capenhurst and on 25 October in Almelo,¹⁴ while in August 1985 production started at the German Gronau plant.¹⁵

Eurodif was established by France in 1973 as a joint venture with four participating partners: Belgium, Italy, Spain and Sweden (in 1975 Iran would take over Sweden's 10% share). However, unlike Urenco, the partners did not have access to the technology, only ‒ and only to a certain extent ‒ to the product.¹⁶ Eurodif opted for gas diffusion technology and in 1979 production started in Tricastin, France. Capacity quickly expanded to 10,800 tSWU / y in the mid-1980s, making Eurodif one of the world's largest producers of enriched uranium.¹⁷

Small number of producers

In 1976, only five countries had uranium enrichment facilities larger than a pilot plant. These were the five official nuclear weapon states: the US, the United Kingdom, France, Soviet Union and China. All their existing factories were initially built for military purposes. Of the five, only the US and Russia had sufficient capacity to also enrich for export.¹⁸ That changed with the arrival of Urenco and Eurodif.

Years '10: end of US position and of diffusion technology

Currently, the situation is more or less the same as 50 years ago: a small number of producers dominate the enrichment market. But important changes have taken place with regard to those producers and the technology. Instead of being a market leader, the US actually no longer has its own enrichment capacity.

In 2013, the last diffusion enrichment plant (the Paducah Gas Diffusion Plant)¹⁹ closed while the American Centrifuge Plant, which was intended to replace Paducah, suffered enormous delays and failed. The government stopped financing at the end of 2015.²⁰

Urenco opened a new enrichment plant in the US in 2010 in Eunice,²¹ but it appears that the lack of an American enrichment capacity with American technology has serious consequences in some areas. There are attempts to rebuild the American enrichment industry. Last year, the Department of Energy (DoE) announced that it would make US $115 million available to the company Centrus.²²

In June 2012, a year before the closure of the Paducah diffusion plant, the diffusion plant in Tricastin, France,²³ closed: after 70 years the curtains fell definitively to the application of gas diffusion technology for the enrichment of uranium.²⁴ The French state-owned nuclear company Aréva (now renamed Orano) proceeded with this closure when the capacity of the replacement centrifuge factory Georges Besse II reached 1,500 tSWU / y.²⁵

Cost advantage of centrifuge technology

One of the main reasons for the rapid rise of centrifuge enrichment is the cost factor: and especially the high-power consumption of diffusion compared to centrifuge enrichment. The diffusion technology consumes around 2,500 kWh per SWU, while modern centrifuge plants only need around 50 kWh per SWU.²⁶

An enrichment installation with a capacity of 1,000 tSWU / y can annually enrich the uranium for around eight nuclear power plants of 1000 Mwe to 3.5%.²⁷

Enrichment (over) capacity, price SWU

Due to the continuing optimistic growth scenarios for nuclear energy, the enrichment market is in fact struggling with overcapacity. Due to less expansion of the planned enrichment capacity (and due to failed projects ‒ especially in the US), overcapacity has decreased somewhat in the last decade. Urenco Almelo, for example, has had a permit for 6,200 tSWU / y since 2011, but the actual production capacity is 5,200 tSWU / y. And Urenco USA may expand to 10,000 tSWU / y, but remains stuck at 4,900 for the time being. The global enrichment capacity expected in 2013 for the year 2020 was still around 80,000 tSWU / y.²⁸

Long-term global overcapacity has consequences for the price of enrichment, which is currently historically low.

SWU production (in tonnes of SWU per year):

Country/Company	1978	1998	2019
US (without Urenco)	27.300	19.400	-
Russia (Soviet Union)	20.000	20.000	23.600
France (Eurodif)	600	10.800	7.500
Urenco	400	3.900	18.600
China	400	800	7.100
Other			600
Total	48.700	55.800	57.400

* 1 Figures 1978 and 1998: https://www.wiseinternational.org/nuclear-monitor/499-500/uranium-enrich... (France adjusted, Laka 2020)
* 2 SWU-mergence: Reawakening of the Enrichment Market, presentation by Jonathan Hinze, President UxC, LLC, on NEI IUFS, October 29, 2019
* 3 In a presentation also at the NEI IUFS, Kirk Schnoebelen, President Urenco USA, the capacity of Russia is estimated at 28,000 tSWU / y

In its latest Annual Report²⁹ Urenco writes about the low SWU price: "[C] urrent price levels would not support reinvestment in our enrichment facilities", although they foresee an increase in price. Also the Dutch government, as a shareholder of Urenco, is not at ease: "The global demand for enriched uranium and therefore the potential earning capacity for Urenco has fallen." ³⁰

Laser enrichment

For more than 40 years, laser enrichment has been called a promising technique and the next step in isotope separation. Science News wrote in the mid-1970s that "plants producing enriched uranium by laser could be in operation by the early 1980s."

Despite much research, especially from the Nuclear Weapon States, there appears to be little progress. But the promise remained; also according to Urenco. The Dutch paper Twentsche Courant, for example, reports in 1990³² that it will be decided in 1993 in which Urenco country the Urenco trial laser enrichment plant will be built. Almelo is said to be a promising contender because Urenco commissioned 'experiments in this area' at the nearby University of Twente.

The US started research into Atomic Vapor Laser Isotope Separation (AVLIS) in the 1970s as a replacement for diffusion enrichment plants. Expectations were high: in Science magazine,³³ AVLIS was described as "a clear winner". But after more than $2 billion was spent on research and development, the AVLIS development was stopped.³⁴

In 1996, the US purchased the rights to further develop the SILEX process and to use it commercially.³⁵ The SILEX process (Separation of Isotopes by Laser EXcitation) was developed in Australia in the 1990s. In 2006, a collaboration between SILEX and the American technology and electronics company General Electric came into existence, and a few years later the Canadian company Cameco (the largest uranium mining company in the world listed on the stock exchange) joined. Apart from technological developments, the economic outlook for new enrichment capacity remained (and remains) poor, so General Electric left the cooperation in early 2019.³⁶

Forty years after the first commercial laser enrichment plants were planned, commercial laser enrichment still does not exist.

References:

1 "Gas Centrifuge Theory and Development: A Review of U.S. Programs ", R. Scott Kemp in Science and Global Security, 2009 17: 1, 1-19, DOI: 10.1080 / 08929880802335816

2 "The nature of the uranium enrichment industry & Its Implications for Australia", Ed Kaptein, submission to Select Committee on Uranium Resources, Parliament for South-Australia, March 1980

3 idem Ed Kaptein, p1

4 https://tbcarchives.org/wp-content/uploads/TENEX_50_EN.pdf, visited 10 January 2020

5 "China's Uranium Enrichment Capacity: Rapid Expansion to Meet Commercial Needs"; Hui Zhang, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 2015 p13

6 "Enrichment clubs come on stream", Financial Times, July 19, 1979

7 "Uranium Enrichment and Nuclear Weapon Proliferation"; Krass, Boskma, Elzen, Smit; SIPRI, 1983 p28: https://www.laka.org/docu/catalogus/publicatie/6.03.0.50/08_uranium

8 "Uranium Enrichment: Investment Options for the Long Term", United States Congress; October 1983, p15

9 De Tijd, NL, March 16, 1971

10 Euro-9 = Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Ireland, UK and Denmark

11 "Supply of the community countries with enriched uranium", Eurostat BP 1907, August 1976

12 "Uranium Enrichment: Investment Options for the Long Term", October 1983, Congress of the United States; p16 / 17

13 Nuclear Engineering International, November 1976, p52-54

14 Urenco Centec News, n4, November 1977

15 atomwirtschaft, January 1986

16 https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/Nuclear-Fuel-Cycle/Convers... Fabrication / Uranium-Enrichment.aspx

17 http://www.areva.com/EN /operations-800/eurodif-production-natural-uranium-enrichment.html

18 "Enrichment Supply and Technology Outside The United States", SA Levin & S. Blumkin, Union Carbide Corporation, Nuclear Division, January 1977

19 https://www.centrusenergy.com/news/centrus-subsidiary-completes-return-of- paducah-gaseous-diffusion-plant-to-do /

20 http://fissilematerials.org/blog/2016/02/american_centrifuge_plant.html

21 "Building and operating URENCO USA", http://www.urenco.com/page/33/URENCO-USA.aspx

22 http: / /thequadreport.com/doe-115m-no-bid-u-enrichment-contract-causes-sparks/

23 "Eurodifs Uranium Enrichment Plant Ceases Production Permanently", http://ndreport.com/eurodifs-uranium-enrichment-plant-ceases-production-...

24 Russia soon had centrifuge technology at its disposal, but the huge diffusion plants remained in use for decades: in the 1970s / 80s, all production switched to centrifuge technology; China switched to centrifuge enrichment at the start of this century

25 http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-AF/France/

26 http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Nuclear-Fuel-Cycle/Conversion-Enrichme...

27 Company brochure Urenco US, http://docplayer.net/54984667-Introducing-urenco-usa-here-we-provide-inf... -we-do-business.html

28 "Uranium mining and (in) transparency: Urenco's role in the nuclear fuel chain", Peter Diehl, Dirk Bannink, May 2014: https://www.laka.org/docu/catalogus/publicatie/1.01.8.30/56_urencos

29 Urenco Annual Report and Accounts 2018, p6

30 https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/kamerstukken/2017/01/18/bijlage- antwoorden-op-kamervragen-over-jaarverslag-beheer-staatsdeelnemingen-2015, answer to questions 57 and 58

31 "Laser uranium separation: A leap forward", Science News, 14 February 1976

32 "In 1993 beslissing over fabriek voor verrijking van uranium door lasers" ("In 1993 decision about the uranium laser enrichment plant"), Twentsche Courant, 28 May 1990

33 Science, vol 228 p1408, June 21, 1985

34 "US Laser project abandoned after 26 years and US $ 2 billion", WISE News Communiquee, June 18, 1999

35 "Profile of World Uranium Enrichment Programs — 2009"; https://info.ornl.gov/sites/publications/files/Pub15166.pdf

36 https://world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/Silex-and-Cameco-agree-terms-for..., 7 February 2019

Dounreay area never cleaned up completely.
Radioactive contamination that leaked for more than two decades from the Dounreay nuclear plant on the north coast of Scotland will never be completely cleaned up, the Scottish Environment Protection Agency (Sepa) (a Scottish government agency) has admitted. At a September 20, board meeting the Scottish government's environmental watchdog opted to encourage remediation "as far as is practically achievable" but to abandon any hope of removing all the radioactive pollution from the seabed and to give up on its aim of returning the seabed near the plant to a "pristine condition" (a recommendation it made in 1998).

Tens of thousands of radioactive fuel fragments (socalled 'particles') escaped from the Dounreay plant between 1963 and 1984, polluting local beaches, the coastline and the seabed. Fishing has been banned within a two-kilometer radius of the plant since 1997.

The most radioactive of the particles are regarded by experts as potentially lethal if ingested. Similar in size to grains of sand, they contain caesium-137, which has a half-life of 30 years, but they can also incorporate traces of plutonium-239, which has a half-life of over 24,000 years. The particles are milled shards from the reprocessing of irradiated uranium and plutonium fuel from two long-defunct reactors. They are thought to have drained into the sea with discharges from cooling ponds.

In 2007, Dounreay, which is now being decommissioned, pleaded guilty at Wick sheriff court to a "failure to prevent fragments of irradiated nuclear fuel being discharged into the environment". The plant's operator at the time, the UK Atomic Energy Authority, was fined £140,000 (US$220,000 or 160,000 euro).
The Guardian, 21 September 2011

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Urenco: "No impact from Fukushima"; shareholders want to sell.
Urenco, the uranium enrichment company has dismissed concerns about the impact on its business from the Fukushima nuclear disaster. The chief financial officer of Urenco said that less than 10 per cent of its forecast orders for the next two years were with Japan, and that the group "had not detected any sign that customers in other countries, other than Germany, would scale back their nuclear plans." The CFO declined to give precise figures or comment on the UK Government's planned sale of its stake. The British government has been looking into a sale of their stake since 2009. It is thought that the UK Treasury, which hopes to raise BP1 billion (US$ 1.57 bn or 1.15 bn euro) from the sale, will appoint an investment bank in September to handle the disposal.

The remainder of Urenco is split between the Dutch Government and E.ON and RWE, two German utility companies. German energy giant RWE has appointed advisers for a 'strategic review' selling its Urenco part. RWE is increasing its sell- off program from 8bn (7bn) to 11bn in the next three years. The company, which has about 27.5bn of net debt, was put under further pressure by the German government's decision to phase out nuclear energy. RWE is also in final negotiations with Gazprom over a potential split of its assets and operations, including Npower in the UK. The deadline for any agreement with Gazprom runs out on October 15. The UK energy company could be split up and sold to other buyers, such as Centrica, if no deal is agreed with Gazprom. E.ON, too, is planning to sell its stake in Urenco, German daily Handelsblatt reported on Sept. 7, citing unnamed sources.

Divestment by any party would require the approval of Urenco's other owners, and the newspaper indicated the Dutch government may try to stop the potential sales. In the past (1999-2000) the Netherlands had plans to sell (part of) its stake in Urenco but decided not to. Areva wanted to buy parts of the Dutch and RWE shares, but later it was decided to sign an agreement to cooperate in Enrichment Technology Company (ETC; 50 % Areva, 50 % Urenco).
The Times (UK) 27 August 2011 /  www.kernenergieinnederland.nl / WISE Uranium / Reuters, 7 September 2011)

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Areva suspend U-production due to Fukushima.
French nuclear company Areva is suspending uranium production at two plants because of low demand from Japanese power stations in the wake of the Fukushima disaster, a spokeswoman of the company said September 15. Production at subsidiary Comhurex's Malvesi and Tricastin sites will be suspended for two months. "This decision is based on the events in Japan, which today has led to a drop in deliveries to Japanese power producers and short term downward pressure on prices in this market," Areva said in a statement.

Comurhex, which is 100 percent owned by Areva, uses a two-stage process to transform mined uranium into uranium hexafluoride, the raw material for the enrichment process that eventually produces reactor-grade fuel.

Areva said there were no plans to suspend or lay off the less than 600 workers from the plants, who will be asked to attend training sessions or use up holiday allowances while their plants are taken off-line. A number of other plants were shut down following the Fukushima accident and currently only 11 of 54 Japanese reactors are in operation.
AFP, 16 September 2011

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Call for Nominations for the "2012 Public Eye Awards".
The Berne Declaration and Greenpeace Switzerland are once again searching far and wide for corporations that pursue profits without regard for social and/or environmental harm. To succeed, we need your support and the critical eye of civil society!

Whether inhumane working conditions, reckless environmental sins, deliberate disinformation, or the disregard for human rights by corporations: In the run-up to the World Economic Forum (WEF) in late January 2012 in Davos, Switzerland, the worst corporate sins will appear on the 2012 Public Eye Awards short list. We thereby place corporate offenses in the international spotlight and help NGO campaigns succeed. A number of firms have already felt the considerable pressure from the unwelcome exposure in the media

and the social Web! Over 50,000 people worldwide took part in the online voting for

the People’s Award last year.

In 2008 Areva won the Award. It won't be bad if the nuclear industry gets some extra attention this year.... Please act quickly as the deadline for nominations is September 30!

Go to http://www.publiceye.ch/en/ and vote.

U.K. wants to sell Urenco stake.
The U.K. Government’s stake in Urenco, which owns nuclear enrichment plants in Britain, Germany and the Netherlands, will be sold off to help to repay the country’s escalating debt mountain, the Prime Minister announced on October 12. The plan to sell off the Government’s one-third stake in Urenco could be the most controversial. The stake is controlled by the Shareholder Executive, which was created in 2003 to better manage the Government’s performance as a shareholder in businesses. The other two thirds are owned by the Dutch Ultra-Centrifuge Nederland and German Uranit. Downing Street sources said that the sale would be subject to national security considerations, which could lead to the Government maintaining a small interest in the company or other restrictions placed on the sale.

Meanwhile, the Dutch state took over the last 1.1% of the stakes in Ultra-Centrifuge Nederland, the Dutch part of Urenco, from private companies. Now, The Netherlands, owns the full 100% of the company. The Netherlands is not in favor of selling the uranium enrichment company to private parties.

The Times (U.K.) 12 October 2009 / Letter Dutch Finance Minister, 12 October 2009

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Belarus: EIA Hearing new NPP.
On October 9, a public hearing took place in Ostrovets, in the Grodno Region, on the question of construction of a nuclear power plant in Belarus. All the entrances to the cinema where the hearings were held got blocked by riot police and streets were filled with plainclothes police. Documents and leaflets critical of the EIA (Environmental Impact Assessment) were confiscated illegally, because of their 'doubtful' contents. Employees of state institutions were brought to the hearings by busses. Forcedly assembled audience was registered in advance, in violation of regulations. Many registered participants were however not let inside the building. Speaking was allowed only to state employees in favor of nuclear power plant construction, others were denied to speak. The denial was motivated by the fact that they supposedly have been registered too late. It is clear that the procedure of these hearings didn't meet the standards and therefore the results can't be recognized as independent. Russian expert in nuclear physics Andrey Ozharovskiy was arrested in the morning on a charge of disorderly conduct when he wanted to enter the building and handing out a critical response to the EIA. He was released only after 7 days in jail. Thus, the authorities showed their true face again - they are not going to let the dissident speak openly on the matters important to those in power.

Belarus Anti-Nuclear Resistance, 10 October 2009

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Sellafield: Dramatic rise to discharge limit.
Sellafield Ltd is expected to ask the U.K. Environment Agency (EA) for an almost 5-fold increase in gas discharge limit for Antimony 125 (Sb-125) so that the Magnox reprocessing plant can continue to operate. Sb-125 has a radioactive half-life of 2.75 years and emits beta radiation.

Disclosed in its Quarterly Report to the local West Cumbria Sites Stakeholder Group meeting scheduled for 1^st October, the EA confirms that Sellafield wants the limit to be raised from its current level of 6.9 to Gigabequerels (GBq) to 30GBq. The bulk of Sellafield’s Sb-125 gas discharges arise during the de-canning  (removal of the fuel’s outer casing) of spent Magnox fuel, particularly the higher burn-up fuel, in the site’s Fuel Handling Plant prior to its transfer to the reprocessing plant.

In early 2008 the Sb-125 discharge limit stood at just 2.3GBq but later had to be raised to its current level of 6.9GBq when the discharge chimney sampling equipment was found to be under-reporting. In October 2008 Sellafield Ltd indicated to the EA that, as part of its Periodic Review submission, it would be seeking to increase the limit from 6.9GBq to 11.6 GBq. In a spectacular misjudgment of its discharge requirements, Sellafield now needs to raise the limit to 30GBq to allow the de-canning and subsequent reprocessing of the larger volumes of higher burn-up fuel being received in the Fuel Handling Plant from UK’s Magnox power stations.

Since 2007, processing higher burn-up fuel in the Fuel Handling Plant has lead to Sellafield breaching its discharge Quarterly Notification Level on a number of occasions, and in late 2008 exceeding the site’s internal trigger level. Subsequently, in April this year, as releases of Sb-125 from the Fuel Handling Plant threatened to breach the Sellafield site limit itself, Magnox reprocessing had to be abandoned for several weeks. Currently, the EA expects the current discharge limit to be breached again but is permitting Magnox reprocessing to continue – as the lesser of two evils.

The proposed increase in site discharge limit to 30GBq is unlikely to be authorized until April next year when approval from the European Commission, under Euratom Article 37, is expected to be given. Whilst the current limit of 6.9GBq is likely to be breached between now and then, it is understood that discharges of other fission products released during the de-canning of Magnox fuel in the Fuel Handling Plant, whilst also on the increase, will remain within their respective site discharge limits

CORE Press release, 30 September 2009

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Ratings NEK downrated due to Belene.
On 5 October, according to the Platts News Flashes, the rating agency Standard & Poor's Rating Services down rated the credit ratings for Bulgaria's dominant state power utility NEK from BB to BB- partly because of its involvement in Belene. The down rating "reflects our view of a weakening of NEK's financial profile and liquidity on the back of large investments and in the context of a deteriorating domestic economy," said S&P credit analyst Tania Tsoneva. The spending that NEK did "prior to the project's financing, coupled with large regular investments, have significantly weakened NEK's financial metrics". In November there will be an update of S&P's CreditWatch.

Email: Greenpeace, 6 October 2009

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U.A.E. Passes Nuclear-Energy Law.
On October 4, the United Arab Emirates issued the Federal Law Regarding the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy. The law provides for "the development of a robust system for the licensing and control of nuclear material." Federal Law No. 6, which was issued by U.A.E. President Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan, establishes the independent Federal Authority of Nuclear Regulation to oversee the country's nuclear energy sector, and appoints the regulator's board. It also reiterates the U.A.E.'s pledge not to domestically enrich uranium as part of its plans to build nuclear power plants, the first of which is slated for commercial operation in 2017. The law makes it illegal to develop, construct or operate uranium enrichment or spent fuel processing facilities within the country's borders.

The bilateral agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation between the U.A.E. and the U.S., or the 123 Agreement, could come into force at the end of October, when a mandatory 90-day period of Congressional review is expected to end.

Wall Street Journal, 5 October 2009

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Uranium waste: Urenco transports to Russia stopped.
A TV-report by the German/French-TV-station ARTE brought a new wave of media coverage concerning uranium waste transports from France and Germany to Russia. One of the positive results of the media interest: Urenco has confirmed that the UF6-transport from Gronau to Russia on 26 August was indeed the last one!

This is a major success for the joint campaign involving Russian, Dutch, French, Finnish, Swedish and German activists and organizations for the last three-four years. Thanks to this hard campaign the anti-nuclear groups have finally stopped this part of the dirty export of nuclear waste to Russia. Considering that they were up against several of the biggest nuclear players in Europe and various governments they have done very well!

But the same documentary, aired on October 13, made clear that France’s energy giant EDF is still sending its uranium hexafluoride to the Seversk facility in Siberia, Russia. According to the ‘Liberation’ newspaper, 13 percent of French radioactive waste produced by EDF could be found in the open air in the town in Siberia to which access is forbidden. An EDF spokeswoman declined to confirm the 13 percent figure, or that waste was stored in the open air, but confirmed EDF sends nuclear waste to Russia. Because a small part (10-20 %) of the depleted uranium is send back after being enriched to natural levels U-235, authorities claim it is not waste but raw material.

Reuters, 12 October 2009 / Email: SOFA Muenster (Germany) , 16 October 2009

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Bad news for American Centrifuge Plant.
On October 15, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) announced it could not support a program to prove USEC’s centrifuge technology. The loss of US$30 million (Euro 20 million) for the next financial year comes after the DOE's July decision to refuse USEC a loan guarantee to help it secure finance for the American Centrifuge facility at Piketon, Ohio. At the time the company said it would have to 'demobilize' the project, on which it had already spent US$1.5 billion (see Nuclear Monitor 691, 16 July 2009, In Brief). The DOE placed USEC's application on hold and gave the company a chance to improve its application by proving the commercial viability of its technology. The DOE was to financially support a proving program with US$30-45 million per year, starting in the financial year 2010.

However, the US$30 million for the first financial year was recently denied by Congress during the appropriations process. And in another piece of bad news for USEC it has emerged that a manufacturing fault in its centrifuges will mean several months' delay while replacement parts are made and the units rebuilt. In a statement, the DOE noted that the deal with USEC still stands to postpone review of its loan guarantee application until certain "technical and financial milestones are met," which would probably take six months even without the delay of rebuilding. The department noted that it had "worked closely" with USEC this year on its loan guarantee application, and had put an extra $150-200 million per year into Cold War clean-up at an adjacent site managed by the company. This boost should lead to 800-1000 new jobs, the DOE said, which would offset the 750 jobs at risk on the American Centrifuge.

World Nuclear News, 16 October 2009

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Jordan: site studies begin for Aqaba nuclear plant.
On October 13, the Jordan Atomic Energy Commission (JAEC) launched environmental and feasibility studies for the location of the countries’ first nuclear power plant. It marked the first gathering of the implementing parties of the site-selection and characterization study, a two-year process that will examine the proposed site, located in the southern strip of Aqaba, nine kilometers inland and 450 meters above sea level.

Over the next three months, nuclear engineering and consultant bureau’s, will determine whether the site, some 20km outside Aqaba city, will be suitable for the construction.

The JAEC selected Aqaba due to the abundant water sources of the nearby Red Sea and the proximity to infrastructure such as the Port of Aqaba and the electrical grid, the chairman said, noting that there are plans in place to establish up to six reactors at the site.

During the meeting on October 13, JAEC Chairman Khaled Toukan indicated that the JAEC is also considering a proposal to establish two power plants at the site simultaneously. The measure would decrease costs by 20 per cent through utilizing economies of scale, he added.

A week later Toukan announced that Jordan is coming up with 'strong results' indicating the country would emerge as a key exporter of uranium by the end of 2011. He made the remarks during a tour of the uranium exploration operations, which are being carried out in central Jordan by the French atomic energy conglomerate, Areva.

Jordan Times, 14 October 2009 / Deutsche Presse Agentur, 20 October 2009

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French Polynesia: nuclear compensation very restricted.
There was much praise in July when the French National Assembly approved a bill for compensating the victims of tests carried out in French Polynesia and Algeria over more than three decades. About 150,000 civilian and military personnel took part and many later developed serious health problems. (see Nuclear Monitor 686, 2 April 2009; In Brief) But now activists fighting for victims of French nuclear testing in the Pacific are stunned by conditions imposed in the compensation bill by France's upper house.

Roland Oldham, president of Mororua e Tatou Association, representing French Pacific nuclear test workers, said the actions of the upper house Senate reflected arrogance in metropolitan France towards its territories. He said the Senate has imposed strict requirements on applicants to prove their case on various grounds. The geographic zone from which claims would be considered had been greatly limited. The Senate had further rejected a bid by his organization - fighting for years for compensation - to be part of a compensation committee, which would now be only made of people nominated by the French Ministry of Defence. "It's the same people that have done the nuclear testing in our place, in our island," Mr Oldham said. "And finally, there's only one person decides if the case is going to be taken into account, (if a victim) is going to have compensation or not - and that's the Ministry of Defence. "For our Polynesian people it's going to be hard. A lot of our people won't be part of compensation."

Radio Australia News, 15 October 2009

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Taiwan: life-time extension of oldest plants.
State-owned Taiwan Power Company has asked to keep using the oldest nuclear power plant, Chinshan, operational since 1978 in a coastal area of north Taiwan, after the licenses of its two reactors expire in 2018 and 2019, the Atomic Energy Council said. The application is for extending the life of the plant's two generators from 40 to 60 years. Environmental activists voiced severe concerns about what they called a risky plan, also citing a shortage of space to store the nuclear waste. “We strongly oppose the measure. We cannot afford taking such as risk," Gloria Hsu, a National Taiwan University professor, told AFP.

Taiwan Power operates three nuclear power plants, while a fourth is being constructed.

AFP, 21 October 2009