Nuclear Monitor #937
Susan O’Donnell and M. V. Ramana
Canada has emerged as a major proponent of small modular nuclear reactors (SMRs). Canadian energy policy makers position SMRs as necessary to meet climate action targets. For example, the net zero by 2050 scenario in the energy regulator’s recently released Canada’s Energy Future 2026 report involves SMRs operating in three provinces currently without nuclear reactors. Nuclear proponents also envision Canada exporting SMRs to many other countries. But are Canada’s decarbonization and export goals for SMRs realistic?
Our new report assessing SMR development in Canada found that such reactors are unlikely to either be built domestically or exported. Canada’s federal government and various provincial governments have so far provided around $4.5 billion for SMR activities, with underwhelming results.
A key official document, the 2018 SMR roadmap, “expected” that “one or more SMR demonstration [projects would be] constructed and in operation by 2026.” In this milestone year, we followed up on SMR designs expected to be operating.
The “Micro Modular Reactor” (MMR) was to be the first SMR demonstration project, at the Chalk River nuclear site in Ontario. Back in 2019, the project proponents applied to the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) to prepare the site for construction. In 2024, however, the CNSC “paused all work” on the MMR project. Later that year, the lead company, Ultra Safe Nuclear Corporation, filed for bankruptcy protection in the United States, leaving unpaid debts of more than $16 million, including $641,307 to the CNSC and lesser amounts to dozens of Canadian small businesses.
In a different province, New Brunswick, the federal government gave more than $97 million to develop two SMR designs planned for the Point Lepreau nuclear site; the provincial government added another $31 million. Yet in late 2025, New Brunswick’s Energy Minister said the government would no longer wait for the two SMR designs because the province cannot take on the risk of first-of-a-kind reactors. The millions in public money were effectively funnelled into highly paid positions at two start-up SMR companies.
Of the 10 SMR designs in Canada reviewed in our independent report, only one is in development. Most of the public funding for SMRs – $4.025 billion – has been spent on this reactor design, the BWRX-300, at the Darlington nuclear site on Lake Ontario. In September 2025, the federal government designated the Darlington New Nuclear project as a potential project of national interest.
Four billion dollars is a lot of money, but nowhere near enough to pay for the four BWRX-300 reactors planned for the site. Even the first BWRX-300 reactor is expected to cost more–$6.1 billion—and the whole project will cost at least $20.9 billion. It could cost far more—the vast majority of nuclear power projects have historically overrun initial cost estimates. Perhaps for these reasons, banks and other sources of private capital have shown little interest in SMRs.
In addition, the high costs for the Darlington SMR means that any electricity it produces would be expensive. Estimates by Australia’s Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation show that each unit of electrical energy from SMRs would be far more expensive than a corresponding unit from solar and wind power plants, even when the cost of measures to deal with the variability of renewables are included. Their high cost, expensive electricity, and need for public funding suggests that future SMR development in Canada will be limited.
What about exports? The World Nuclear Industry Status Report estimates that the global investment into all nuclear power projects remains small—below US$35 billion per year (including major refurbishment). Yet Canada’s 2018 SMR Roadmap estimated the “total global export potential of SMRs” to be “approximately CDN$150 billion per year for 2030 to 2040,” adding the caveat that the estimate was “based on conservative assumptions.” Clearly not conservative enough.
The Canadian government appears intent on exploring export possibilities. Global Affairs Canada, for example, funded two researchers to examine the potential market for SMRs in ten Indo-Pacific countries and economies, as part of its “Regional Connectivity Envelope.”
Ignored in this effort is that SMRs have very unfavourable characteristics for potential customer countries. An analysis of what developing countries are expecting from SMRs found that SMRs will not meet these expectations. SMRs produce costly electricity and there are no proven models. Finally, many developing countries want to use the acquisition of nuclear reactors to build up their technical and engineering capabilities—but the economic model for SMRs involves building these in centralized factories. As a result, developing countries are unlikely to purchase SMRs in large numbers, whether from Canada or other countries.
All told, the Canadian roadmap for SMRs appears to be more of a dead end.
