(March 7, 2003) An International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) delegation has recently visited a uranium enrichment facility under construction in Iran. The visit has highlighted Iran's nuclear program: a program that began with U.S. support under the Shah and continued after the revolution under the Islamic fundamentalists.
(584.5496) WISE Amsterdam - Back in 1967, when a US-supplied 5-megawatt research reactor was started up at Tehran University (1), the U.S. was only too happy to provide Iran with nuclear technology. After all, at that time the Shah was in charge, and despite concerns over human rights abuses and lack of democracy, Iran was considered a "friendly" state.
Iran has always insisted its nuclear program is peaceful, ratifying the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1970 and allowing IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities. Back in the 1970s, this was enough to give the green light for the nuclear industry to seek business in Iran. The obvious question of why a country with vast reserves of oil and natural gas was so keen to use nuclear power to generate electricity was not asked. It was as if Iran's vast petroleum reserves caused dollar signs to appear in the eyes of the nuclear salesmen, blinding them to such concerns.
The first contracts came in 1974. West Germany's Kraftwerk Union (a subsidiary of Siemens) won a contract to build two 1200MW reactors at Bushehr on the Persian Gulf. Construction of the two reactors began in 1975 and 1976 (2).
France also agreed in 1974 to supply nuclear reactors to Iran, although the deal did not go so smoothly, and the formal contract for Framatome to build two 900 MW reactors at Karun was not agreed until 1977 (3).
Both the French and German contracts were notorious for corruption - it is estimated that the Shah's cronies received 20% of the total reactor contracts, "several hundred million dollars per reactor", in the form of kickbacks and "commissions" (4).
The Shah's plans went further, and included four more German reactors (to be paid for with oil) and eight U.S. reactors under a deal agreed with President Carter in 1978 (5). However, these extra reactors remained no more than plans.
French enrichment, German waste
The Shah's nuclear exploits extended beyond reactors. He made a loan of US$1 billion to France in 1975 in return for a 10% share in the Eurodif uranium enrichment plant - a share still owned by the Iranian government, despite disputes and international court cases.
Yet perhaps the most appalling plans were to dump other countries' nuclear waste in the Iranian desert. First the Shah offered the desert as a dump for West Germany's nuclear waste (6). Later, Austria negotiated on dumping the waste from its soon-to-be-completed Zwentendorf nuclear power station (7) - this came to nothing after the Austrian people voted in a referendum against the opening of Zwentendorf.
Islamic revolution
The 1979 Islamic revolution put a stop to Iran's nuclear program, at least initially. At first, the Shah's nuclear program was rejected as "satanic", and was halted. Yet, after a few years, the ayatollahs changed their minds, and decided that nuclear power might be useful for supplying energy.
At the time of the revolution, one of the Bushehr reactors was 80% complete and the other 50%, and work focused on these two reactors. Yet, for the "Islamic Republic", re-starting the nuclear program was anything but straightforward.
Iran faced allegations that the real purpose of the program was the development of an "Islamic bomb". This is supposed to be prevented by IAEA inspections carried out under the NPT. However, Iran has never joined the Additional Protocol to the NPT, which would give the IAEA the right to take and analyze samples from around the plants.
Reactors bombed
Another alarming development was that the nuclear installations became targets in the Iran-Iraq war. Iran became the first country in history to attack a nuclear installation in another country when, on 30 September 1980, it bombed the Iraqi nuclear research facility near Baghdad. One of the reactors, Tammuz II, was in operation at the time (8).
The raid caused little damage, but the Iraqis shut the reactor down and removed the fuel, which was probably just as well, since on 7 June 1981, Israeli warplanes destroyed another of the reactors, Tammuz I (also known as Osiraq).
However, Iraq got its revenge for the Iranian attack when on 17 November 1987, ten Iranians and a West German were killed in an attack on the incomplete Bushehr reactors. Iran claimed that nuclear material was present at the time, though West German technicians said that this was not the case (9). Further Iraqi attacks followed.
New partners for Bushehr
The attacks wrecked the incomplete Bushehr reactors, but Iran soon tried to find partners to re-build them. Various companies were reportedly involved in talks: Argentina's INVAP (10) and Spain's ENSA and ENUSA (11), as well as the original builders Kraftwerk Union (until the West German government forbade further nuclear aid to Iran).
Finally the choice fell on the Russians, who were contracted in January 1995 to complete Unit 1 by installing one VVER-1000 reactor in pace of the wrecked Siemens reactor. This required modification of the containment building, since the Russian steam generators are too large to fit into the German-designed containment (12).
The arrangement with Russia includes supplying nuclear fuel for the reactor and taking back the nuclear waste. This means that Iran does not need fuel cycle facilities for Bushehr.
Uranium mining and fuel cycle facilities
Nevertheless, Iranian President Mohammad Khatami announced on 9 February that Iran has started mining uranium near the city of Yazd and is developing the facilities needed to operate a complete uranium fuel cycle (13). Khatami mentioned a yellow-cake production facility, a uranium conversion facility, a uranium enrichment facility and a fuel fabrication plant.
The Saghand uranium deposit near Yazd is estimated to produce uranium at prices at 3 to 5 times current world prices (14). Mining such an uneconomic uranium deposit gives rise to concerns that Iran wants to produce uranium for nuclear weapons, particularly since Russia has already agreed to supply nuclear fuel to Iran.
Most worrying of all are the uranium enrichment facilities, since they could be used for a uranium-based nuclear bomb program. So, when the IAEA's Director-General, Mohamed ElBaradei, made a scheduled visit to Iran on 21-22 February, the recently-revealed uranium enrichment plant at Natanz was included in the visit.
Enrichment plant
The Natanz plant hosts about 200 operational gas centrifuges, according to officials who accompanied ElBaradei on his visit (15). Iranian officials have since said that they intend to bring the plant onstream within the next few weeks (16).
While the plant's construction does not violate Iran's safeguards agreement, Iran is required to notify the IAEA before enrichment begins. This means that if Iran has already carried out any uranium enrichment, this would constitute violation of the safeguards agreement. Establishing this could however be difficult, since no environmental samples were apparently taken.
The new fuel cycle developments in Iran increase the pressure on Russia to drop its assistance with the construction of Bushehr for two reasons. Firstly, they provide additional evidence of nuclear proliferation; secondly, they may eventually threaten Russia's planned exports of nuclear fuel to Iran by providing an indigenous alternative.
Developments continue as this WISE/NIRS Nuclear Monitor goes to press.
References:
- The Risk Report, July-August 2000 (see www.wisconsinproject.org/counties/iran/nuke-miles.htm)
- World Nuclear Industry Handbook, 2000
- NRC Handelsblad, 16 June 1977
- Nucleonics Week, 16 October 1980
- The Nuclear Fix, WISE Amsterdam, 1982.
- Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,13 June 1977
- NRC Handelsblad, 21 October 1977
- The Nuclear Fix, WISE Amsterdam, 1982.
- AFP article in Utrechts Nieuwsblad, 21 November 1987
- De Gelderlander, 20 May 1989
- Independiente, 5 February 1990
- www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/iran/bushehr-reactor.htm
- Arms Control Today, March 2003
- www.wise-uranium.org/uproj.html#SAGHAND
- NuclearFuel, 3 March 2003
- Reuters, 4 March 2003
Contact: WISE Amsterdam