The decline of nuclear power

(October 16, 1998) After 40 years of continuing growth there will be a decrease of installed nuclear capacity in 1998 for the first time in the history of nuclear power. In 1997, less nuclear electricity was already produced then the year before. A historic turning point! This is the beginning of a trend and it will lead inevitably to the end of nuclear power in a few decades. So, something to celebrate....?

(499/500.4926) WISE Amsterdam - It all began with so much optimism; nuclear energy would be too cheap to meter. Nuclear fission would be used for the propulsion of gigantic ships, airplanes and trains. Nuclear energy would be abundant and therefore everything should be converted to use electricity: electric cooking, electric heating, electric cars, etc.; the idea for an "all electric society" was born. But it didn't live up to its expectations.

Since the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki the public became aware of the dangers of nuclear energy. US President Dwight Eisenhower tried to reverse this bad image in 1953 with his slogan, "Atoms for Peace". But atmospheric nuclear tests made the public even more aware of the dangers of radioactivity. The "accident"; with the US Bravo test, which contaminated several inhabited islands and the Japanese fishingship, the Lucky Dragon, in 1954, was another clear sign that the consequences of radiation were gruesome.
The general public in Western Europe, however, first met the unpleasant risks of radiation and contamination after the Windscale fire in October 1957 when more than 80kg of irridiated uranium fuel was burned: all milk in an area of 500 square kilometers was collected and destroyed.

However, real problems for the nuclear industry started in the sixties when concerns about safety of nuclear energy were first heard in the US. And while many engineers from abroad were encouraged to work in the US nuclear industry, to export the technology and thus increasing the market, concerns were exported, too, and travelled to Western Europe very rapidly. In the late 1960s, all European countries had on the one hand an active nuclear power program, but on the other hand the first dissident voices about the dangers and risks were heard.

In the mid-1970s, those single voices had become movements. Public belief in nuclear power was already decreasing and the accident in Three Miles Island in March 1979, further fed fears and opposition. No matter how much the industry was trying to make us believe the accident had no health consequences, and that actually the accident showed how safe nuclear power plants were (such a large accident and still no on-site consequences), not many people any longer were giving them the benefit of the doubt.
By that time each country with a nuclear program had a massive anti-nuclear power movement. This, on its turn, had an enormous influence on the opinions of churches, labor unions, etc., and ultimately political parties, regarding nuclear energy.
In retrospect, one could say that the nuclear industry never recovered from TMI. More than 110 orders for nuclear reactors were cancelled alone in the US. The last order for a nuclear reactor which was actually built in the US was placed in 1974!
But still there was good hope that people would forget TMI (and all the other accidents, especially the ones which were kept secret from the public for years, sometimes even for tens of years.) No more talk about "too cheap to meter" and things like that, but a more rational approach, no more "believers", but "rational and balanced" decisions based on "unbiased information".
And, who knows, that might have worked out if there had been no Chernobyl, that small village in the Ukraine; or if the CIA and the KGB had been as successful as with the Kysthtym disaster in the late 1950s in surpressing information on a large nuclear accident in the Soviet Union.
But that was no longer possible because the Swedes measured higher radioactivity levels. And monitoring radioactivity levels is a direct result of the anxiety for it and enough political pressure to install it. A victory for the movement, as the disclosure of many other incidents and accidents.

But the nuclear industry is still showing hope; they have no other option; If `they lose hope, everything is lost'. They say nuclear energy is good for the environment, it is free of CO² and other greenhouse gases. They claim we need it for the development of a large part of the world (which is poor because of the West in the first place, but they don't add that). They even say the West should not be so egoistic and deny other people the same level of development we have. They try to make us believe that nuclear energy is in our best interest. That we have to be patient, that problems will be solved, reactors will be safe, waste will be transmutated and safely stored, and that we "need to learn to understand each other".
The nuclear industry nowadays, and that is a very visible difference with the past (let's say 20 years ago), has learned form its past and is dominated by managers, by PR people, not showing openly they are believers. But they are and they want nuclear energy to survive these hard times. Consolidating, lobbying and hoping for better times.
But it will not happen.

The decline of nuclear power has begun!
In the past decade the growth of installed nuclear power capacity fell significantly, from more than 25,000 MegaWatts (MW) growth in 1987 down to only 2,000 MW increase in 1997. The average annual growth in the past decade was about 4,100 MW and has been declining since 1993.
However, the nuclear industry was hit by ever more unforeseen reactor closures in the years 1996, 1997 and in the first nine months of 1998. They don't like it and don't publicize it, but the fact is there!

1996/1997: nuclear growth comes to a standstill
Although small, there was still growth in installed net nuclear capacity in 1996: 1628 MW. The IAEA announced grid-connection of five reactors during that year, two in Japan and one each in France, Romania and US. The Australian Uranium Information Center even claimed seven reactors began operation in 1996. In reality, only three reactors started commercial operation: Kashiwazaki-6 in Japan, Wolsung-2 in South Korea, and in the US, Watts Bar-1. The difference in these numbers can be explained because very often planned startup dates given by the utilities are not checked after- wards, and also by different criteria. As criteria we take the beginning of commercial operation, which is the date on which the utility accepts the nuclear power plant from the builder.
Two plants were closed in 1996. There was still an increase in installed capacity, because the three new reactors where larger then the two which were closed. (See Table I) The number of nuclear reactors in operation worldwide grew by one to 440 (corrected IAEA number).

Last year, 1997, was a difficult year because of criteria reasons. The Canadian utility Ontario Hydro decided on the closure of four Pickering units, but announced at the same time they would be reopened in a few (up to 10!) years. According to our own criteria, these reactors are not definitely shut, because there is no decision not to reopen them. However, even in the nuclear industry there is a wide belief that some of them will never be reopened: the 1998 World Nuclear Industry Handbook list them as "shut down". But for the sake of clear criteria, we list them as still in operation.
With this in mind: 1997 saw a 2,110-MW rise in installed nuclear capacity: two reactors in Japan and one in Romania went into commercial operation and three were closed: one in the Netherlands and two in the US. (See Table II) At 1997 year-end the number of reactors was still 440.
However, total worldwide generated nuclear electricity dropped in 1997 for the first time in history. It is not yet much, but the change is there: by about 1 percent: 20 million MegaWattthours nuclear electricity less produced than the year before. According to Nucleonics Week (February 12, 1998), the production of nuclear electricity in the US in 1997 dropped by 7% compared to 1996!

1998: First drop in installed nuclear capacity
In 1998 we will see the first big net decline in installed nuclear capacity: minus 3,260 MW at least.
1998 will also be the first year ever with a decrease in the number of nuclear power plants in commercial operation. This is the result of six nuclear power plants closed in the first nine months and three reactors which began commercial operation by September.
The first month of 1998 started with the closure of two large plants in the United States: Zion 1 and 2, each 1,040 MW.
January brought another surprise: the long hoped-for decision of a German court not to renew the license of the 1,219 (1,300) MW Muelheim-Kaerlich plant, which had already been shut down for 10 years, but now could be accounted for as "indefinitely shut down". In February it was announced that the French fast-breeder Superphenix was closed indefinitely. Up to September, Tokai-1 and Millstone-1 have been closed, bringing the total to six reactors closed in the first nine months. Only three reactors are expected to start commercial operation in 1998. (See Table III)

Nuclear developments during 1999-2008
The decline in 1998 is a very remarkable, historical event.
As more and more nuclear power plants reach their expected and planned lifetime, more and more of them will be closed. And planned nuclear capacity is constantly decreasing; less reactors will actually be completed in the next years. Therefore one could easily argue this is the beginning of a new trend.
But is this really the case? Will the year 1998 later, in retrospective, be seen as the turning point for nuclear energy?

To be able to answer the question if this is incidental or will be structural, we have to look at the annual balance of nuclear plants taken into operation and those that will close. Decisive for this balance are the following factors:
A. the number and capacity of nuclear power plants currently under active construction
B. the number and capacity of nuclear power reactors to be closed annually

A.: Reactors under construction: According to the IAEA Bulletin of summer 1998, 36 nuclear power plants were under construction, with about a 28,600-MW capacity. But if we take a closer look, not all of these plants are actually under active construction. We consider plants under active construction as long as money is allocated for and spent on construction and some activity on site is taking place. The IAEA stated that five nuclear power plants in the Ukraine were under construction in 1997. In fact, according to sources in the Ukraine, only Khmelnitsky 2 and Rovno 4 (known as K2/R4) can be considered as under active construction. So it is important to look carefully at the IAEA data: they tend to be too optimistic. From those 36 plants listed under construction by the IAEA, only 28 were under active construction (by September 1998).
In the next decade, from 1999-2008, our estimation is that on average two nuclear power plants with two GigaWatt (GW = 1000 MW) capacity will start annually. But as it happens to work out almost half of the new capacity could start operating next year. (See Table IV)
B.: Reactors which will be shut down: It is of course much more difficult to estimate the number of nuclear power plants that will close over the next decade. Nevertheless, taking into account the planned lifetime and keeping in mind the fact that the bulk of reactors were build between 1970-1980 it is likely that many reactors will be closed between 2000 and 2010. Lifetime extension will only delay that for a (small) number of units. It is not a big risk to prophesy the closure of substantial numbers of nuclear power plants in the first decade of the new millennium. How much exactly, isn't that important: it will be more than the number of reactors starting commercial operation. Due to other reasons even more reactors could be closed: economical crises, policy shifts due to general elections in Germany and Sweden, deregulation of the electricity market, etc.

Power uprates and life extension
Two developments are able to slow down or even halt a continuing nuclear decline: power uprating and life extension of existing nuclear reactors, but then still only temporarily, because there is no foreseable net increase in new nuclear capacity, due to the limited number of reactors under construction.
Many Western reactors already underwent power uprates, mostly by replacing old turbines with new ones, or with more efficient turbines. Power uprates vary by 5% to 15% of original power. For example, the Swiss nuclear reactor Leibstadt is being uprated by 12%, from 1030 MW to 1145 MW. In Finland, permission has been given for a life extension and a 15% power uprate of the Olkiluoto nuclear plant.
As getting licenses for new nuclear reactors has become incre- asingly difficult, life extension is a way to circumvent this. Almost all parts of old reactors are replaced by new parts. Nowadays, at most reactors, steam generators and turbines have already been replaced. According to an article in Nucleonics Week (December 21, 1995), Siemens even studied reactor pressure vessel replacement; Japanese and Finnish utilities said they did not exclude the replacement of vessels. In general it is believed that the lifetime depends on the reactor vessel. It is, however, not likely that the industry would succeed in calling the replacement of a reactor vessel "lifetime extension" instead of "decommissioning and building" a new reactor.

Many utilities plan to expand the lifetime of their reactors from 25-30 years to even 50-60 years. It is questionable if they will succeed. Licensing proceedings are necessary and this proves to be difficult. So far only in Finland and in the UK have the old Magnox reactors got official approval for lifetime extension.
Nuclear utilities see this, however, still as a possibility to survive hard times, meanwhile waiting for better times to come. They hope that presenting a solution for the radwaste and the fear for climate change would eventually lead governments to support a revival of nuclear power. Up to now, nothing substantial has come out of this last hope.

So it looks as if the trend of decreasing nuclear power is here to stay. This is in contradiction with all official prognoses. This structural decline will only accelerate after 2005, because of increasing numbers of aging reactors, nearing their life-end.
There will just be one exception: 1999. Due to construction delays and delays in beginning of commercial operation of the French N4 reactors, it just happens that a large percentage of reactors currently under construction worldwide will be taken into commerci- al operation next year: 12 out of the 28. (see Table IV)

Consequences of decline
Another development which affects the nuclear power sector nega- tively is the higher efficiency of fossil-fueled electricity plants through the use of combined heat and power plants, with an overall efficiency of 80%-90%, compared with about 35% efficiency for nuclear plants and 40%-60% for conventional fossil fuel plants.

The consequences of a decline will be negative for the "profitability (if there is something like that) of nuclear power and the competitivenes of the nuclear industry: less turnover, higher costs, falling profits, less money for research and development and for maintenance and safety. Especially the expectation that less money could be invested in safety, as a result of the decreasing economic competitiveness, is something to be afraid of. Zack Pate, chair of the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO), not excactly known for criticizing the nuclear industry often, said in early May 1998, and quoted in Nucleonics Week: "If we stress economics, we will get an accident."

As demand for uranium and nuclear fuel slows and the already existing oversupply and overcapacity of the nuclear industry increases further, prices of nuclear fuel will drop. This in turn will make uranium production less profitable. One could argue that lower nuclear fuel costs would make nuclear power cheaper, but it does not make much difference: fuel costs are only a small part (±20%) of nuclear production costs. This trend of lower nuclear fuel costs is more than compensated by lower prices for fossil fuels. Due to the Asian crisis, demand for oil and gas have decreased sharply with lower prices of oil and gas as a result. The severe financial-economic crisis in Asia is another recent problem for the nuclear industry. That area was seen by them as the last growth market for nuclear power, especially China. Although it is not entirely clear yet what the crisis will mean for the nuclear programs in that region, first signs are not exactly encouraging for the nuclear industry. Construction of several reactors have already been delayed. Other countries, such as Russia and Ukraine, have also been hit by severe financial and economic crisis. By now it is clear that overall world economic growth is negatively affec- ted by the Asian crisis. All these combined make the outlook for the nuclear industry very bleak.

Prognoses assume continued growth.
In 1974 the IAEA predicted in its annual report a nuclear capacity of 4,450,000 MW by the year 2000. It will be something like 345,000-350,000 MW, more than 12 times less.
Recent IAEA prognoses are more realistic, but likely sitll too optimistic. According to an Uranium Information Center Briefing Paper (February 19, 1998), the IAEA expects that installed capacity in 2015 will be on the level of 2000 (370 GW). But because worldwide use of electricity will continue to grow, the relative importance of nuclear power will decrease rapidly. Currently, the share of nuclear energy in world electricity production is 17% in 1995 to 13% in 2015.

Source and Contact: WISE Amsterdam

TABLES:
 

TABLE I: 1996 NET BALANCE
Net Balance of 1996: plus 1,628 MW
(new: 3,135; closed: 1,507)

Reactors starting commercial operation during 1996