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'Agenda 2000' and nuclear power in Eastern Europe

Nuclear Monitor Issue: 
#478
26/09/1997
Article

(September 26, 1997) 'Agenda 2000', the EU's position paper on the inclusion of Eastern European countries could become an important opportunity to close dangerous reactors. But it could also force those countries to first conduct expensive Western upgrades and then force them to buy electricity from cheaper sources within the EU. Part two from Electricity Price Liberalization and EU Expansion = the end of nuclear power?

(478.4751) WISE Bratislava -In July the European Union (EU) released its first major position paper on the inclusion of Eastern European countries into the Union, while there is virtually no chance that these countries would be included in the next three years, the paper is ambitiously called "Agenda 2000". It represents perhaps the most significant opportunity for closing dangerous reactors in Eastern Europe since the Berlin Wall fell. Currently this "accession process" requires the unanimous consent of the member states to include a new country, thus a single country concerned about dangerous reactors near its borders could, theoretically at least, make strict conditions and potentially even require the closure of reactors be a condition for entry. Further, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) has had great trouble keeping Eastern European countries to keep to their promises to close older Soviet-design reactors in exchange for emergency safety grants (through the Nuclear Safety Account - NSA). 'Agenda 2000' will be a powerful lever in advancing this policy in some countries(specifically Bulgaria and Lithuania).

The EU's position is that entry of new countries from the east should be processed in two waves. The nuclear states in the first wave would be the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia. Second wave nuclear states would be Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria and Lithuania. It should be noted that some EU member states (notably Denmark) are opposed to the two-wave approach, and the issue is not completely settled.

The draft 'Agenda 2000' plan from the EU outlines the following improvements needed in these countries' nuclear programs:

  • Czech Republic: A modernization program, needed to bring the nuclear plants at Dukovny and Temelin up to internationally accepted safety standards, must be completed within seven to 10 years.
  • Hungary: Paks needs to modernize reactors in the medium term in order to bring these up to internationally accepted safety standards. Hungary would also need to find a solution for nuclear waste.
  • Slovenia: Krsko is a Western design (Westinghouse) and thus safety upgrades are not recommended, though the storage of nuclear waste currently has not been solved.
  • Slovakia must in the medium term modernize two of the units at Bohunice to bring them up to internationally accepted safety standards, and must take the appropriate measures to close the units which cannot be modernized. A long-term solution needs to be found for nuclear waste. [We must assume that the two Bohunice blocks undergoing upgrading by Siemens are ironically the "units which cannot be modernized" and Bohunice blocks 3 and 4 (which are the newer design and are not currently being upgraded) are the targets of this recommendation.] There is no mention of the need to provide safety upgrades at the Russian-designed reactors at Mochovce, which are currently under construction, with the instrumentation and control system being upgraded by Siemens -- a small but critical part of the reactor.
  • Romania: Like Slovenia, Cernavoda is a Western-designed reactor (in this case, a Canadian CANDU) and thus is not targeted for upgrading. The nuclear waste problem remains unsolved.
  • Bulgaria: Must, in the medium term, modernize the units at Kozloduy for which this is possible, so that they meet internationally accepted standards, and keep its understanding to close those which cannot be modernized according to the conditions set in the 1993 Agreement. [The 1993 agreement is a NSA agreement to close blocks 1 through 4 of Kozloduy (of older Russian design); blocks 5 and 6 are currently planned for upgrading by the EU/EurAtom.]
  • Lithuania: Has committed itself to closing down the nuclear plant at Ignalina, and must maintain the agreed timetable for this. In the meantime, it must make the necessary short-term adjustments to bring safety procedures to internationally accepted standards. [The NSA timetable for closure of block 1 of Ignalina is mid-1998 and the EU has been pushing hard for this date. While replacement power options exist, the Lithuanian utility has done basically nothing to prepare for closure of this 1500-MW "stretch" Chernobyl design reactor.]

In fact, in none of the Eastern European nuclear states mentioned is there a functioning intermediate-term high-level waste storage solution available (ignoring the unsolved permanent radwaste storage problem). The 'Agenda 2000' paper also indicates that the cost of these upgrades would not be handled exclusively by EurAtom, the assumption likely being that member states with companies providing these upgrades (likely Germany and France) would have to provide funds through their Ex-Im banks or commercial banks.

Even if EurAtom plays less than a majority role in these proposed safety upgrades, the above proposal would represent a major shift in EU nuclear lending in the region. Funds would be shifting away from reactors in Russia and the Ukraine, where the TACIS program has already spent over 400 million ECU in the 1992-1995 period. Instead, even larger amounts would have to be spent in these accession countries, if all these recommended upgrading were to take place.

The counter- argument for these upgrades is that with entry into the EU, these countries would be forced to liberalize their electricity markets and these nuclear investments would not be cost-competitive with other sources. It appears that the EU is attempting to create something of a third world debt crisis in Eastern Europe by forcing these countries to buy expensive Western upgrades to their reactors before they are allowed into the Union (or at least the contracts would likely have to be signed before they are permitted in) and then forcing them to buy electricity from cheaper sources within the EU, which would almost certainly be cheaper than these nuclear units.

It should be stressed that this position paper on EU expansion is the beginning of what would likely be a long process. Member states are now developing their own position papers and for some nuclear issues would be an important consideration (especially Germany, Austria, France and perhaps Greece and others). The European Parliament is reviewing its own various committees' work and would produce recommendations in the fall.

Eastern European and international nuclear campaigners recognize that this process is critical in determining the future of reactors in the region and are already working together and working with cooperative governments on designing policy recommendations.

Contact: Non-profit groups working on nuclear issues which are interested in 'Agenda 2000' should contact
Antony Froggatt from Greenpeace International:
Tel: +44-171-865-8282
or E-mail: Antony.Froggatt@uk.greenpeace.org