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'Hot Water' documentary

Nuclear Monitor Issue: 
#770
24/10/2013
Article

(Abridged from YourGv.com, 8 July 2013.)

Hot Water is an 80-minute documentary exposing the long-term devastation wrought by uranium mining and the nuclear industry. It follows the investigative journey of Liz Rogers, the 'Erin Brockovich of Uranium', as she travels around the US exploring the impact of uranium mining, atomic testing and nuclear plants on the drinking water of 38 million people.

The documentary is described as a "powerful film that exposes the truths behind how the ground water, air and soil of the American Southwest came to be contaminated with some of the most toxic substances and heavy metals known to man due to the mining of uranium and the health and environmental impacts that followed."

Film-makers Liz Rogers and Kevin Flint begin in South Dakota witnessing communities exposed to uranium from local mining interests. They take samples showing that radioactive material is seeping toward the nation's breadbasket.

Rogers and Flint follow the story to Oklahoma to explain the economic model of the industry. Private companies mine the uranium for a massive profit. Local workers and residents are made promises, but when finally forced to admit the environmental and health impact of the mining, the companies take their profits, declare bankruptcy and saddle the American taxpayer with hundreds of billions of dollars in clean-up costs, according to the documentary.

"I don't know who started calling me the Erin Brockovich of uranium. Maybe I am the old and fat Erin Brockovich with a trucker mouth," said Rogers. "I took this journey because I was pissed off. I felt like an idiot because I believed the lies. I believed we were safe. I made this film because people need to know the truth."

The producers of Hot Water are completing a distribution agreement and will soon have the film on NetFlix and other VOD streams.

Youtube trailer: http://tinyurl.com/water-hot
Web: www.zerohotwater.com
Email: Liz Rogers liz[at]regroupfilms.com
Twitter: @ZeroHotWater

Licensed to Kill

Nuclear Monitor Issue: 
#770
24/10/2013
Article

Water outflows from nuclear plants expel relatively warm water which can have adverse local impacts in bays and gulfs, as can heavy metal and salt pollutants. The US Environmental Protection Agency states: "Nuclear power plants use large quantities of water for steam production and for cooling. Some nuclear power plants remove large quantities of water from a lake or river, which could affect fish and other aquatic life. Heavy metals and salts build up in the water used in all power plant systems, including nuclear ones. These water pollutants, as well as the higher temperature of the water discharged from the power plant, can negatively affect water quality and aquatic life. Nuclear power plants sometimes discharge small amounts of tritium and other radioactive elements as allowed by their individual wastewater permits."[1]

A report by the by the US Nuclear Information and Resource Service (NIRS), US Humane Society and other groups, 'Licensed to Kill: How the Nuclear Power Industry Destroys Endangered Marine Wildlife and Ocean Habitat to Save Money', details the nuclear industry's destruction of delicate marine ecosystems and large numbers of animals, including endangered species. Most of the damage is done by water inflow pipes, while there are further adverse impacts from the expulsion of warm water. Another problem is 'cold stunning' – fish acclimatise to warm water but die when the reactor is taken off-line and warm water is no longer expelled. For example, in New Jersey, local fishers estimated that 4,000 fish died from cold stunning when a reactor was shut down. (See the report and 6-minute video at www.nirs.org/reactorwatch/licensedtokill and the video is also posted at www.youtube.com/watch?v=VVsw3rmCnnU)

Case Study: Close to one million fish and 62 million fish eggs and larvae died each year when sucked into the water intake channel in Lake Ontario, which the Pickering nuclear plant uses to cool steam condensers. Fish are killed when trapped on intake screens or suffer cold water shock after leaving warmer water that is discharged into the lake. The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission told Ontario Power Generation to reduce fish mortality by 80% and asked for annual public reports on fish mortality.[2]

Case Study: The Oyster Creek nuclear plant in New Jersey, US, has killed 80 million pounds (36,300 tonnes) of aquatic organisms in the Barnegat Bay over the past 40 years, according to the US Fish and Wildlife Service.[3]

References:
[1] US Environmental Protection Agency, 'Nuclear Energy', www.epa.gov/cleanenergy/energy-and-you/affect/nuclear.html
[2] Carola Vyhnak, 6 July 2010, 'Pickering nuclear plant ordered to quit killing fish', 'Millions of adults, eggs and larvae perish when sucked into intakes or shocked by cold water', www.thestar.com/news/gta/article/832748--pickering-nuclear-plant-ordered...
[3] Todd Bates, 22 March 2012, 'Oyster Creek nuclear plant kills 1,000 tons of sea life a year, agency says', http://blogs.app.com/enviroguy/2010/03/22/oyster-creek-nuclear-plant-kil...

About: 
NIRSPickering-1Pickering-2Pickering-3Pickering-4Pickering-5Pickering-6Pickering-7Pickering-8Oyster Creek

US reactors vulnerable to terrorist attack

Nuclear Monitor Issue: 
#769
10/10/2013
Article

US commercial and research nuclear facilities remain inadequately protected against two credible terrorist threats – the theft of weapon grade material to make a nuclear weapon, and sabotage attacks intended to cause a reactor meltdown – according to a report by the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Project (NPPP) of the LBJ School of Public Affairs at Texas University.[1]

The report, released on August 15, finds that none of the 104 commercial nuclear power reactors in the US States is protected against a maximum credible terrorist attack, such as the one perpetrated on September 11, 2001. Operators of existing nuclear facilities are not required to defend against the number of terrorist teams or attackers associated with 9/11, nor against airplane attacks, nor even against readily available weapons such as high-power sniper rifles.

The report finds that some US nuclear power plants are vulnerable to terrorist attack from the sea, but they are not required to protect against such ship-borne attacks. Another terrorism danger is posed by three civilian research reactors that are fueled with bomb-grade uranium, which is vulnerable to theft to make nuclear weapons. These facilities are not defended against a posited terrorist threat, unlike military facilities that hold the same material. The facilities are supposed to convert to non-weapons-grade, low-enriched uranium fuel. But they will continue to use bomb-grade uranium for at least another decade according to the latest schedule.

The US government does not require nuclear power plants to be protected from rocket-propelled grenades or .50 caliber rifles with armour piercing shells — weapons that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) initially proposed that plants guard against, but that were removed from requirements after pressure from the nuclear industry to keep costs down.

Coastal nuclear facilities in at least eight states are vulnerable to nautical attacks but are not required to protect against them because the NRC deems airborne and seaborne attacks beyond the design-basis threat.

Report co-author Prof. Alan Kuperman said: "More than 10 years have come and gone since the events of September 2001, and America's civilian nuclear facilities remain unprotected against a terrorist attack of that scale. Instead, our civilian reactors prepare only against a much smaller-scale attack, known as the "design basis threat," while the government fails to provide supplementary protection against a realistic 9/11-type attack. It would be a tragedy if the United States had to look back after such an attack on a nuclear reactor and say that we could have and should have done more to prevent the catastrophe."

The report also notes that some US government nuclear facilities – operated by the Pentagon and Department of Energy – are protected against most or all of the above threats. But other US government nuclear sites remain unprotected against such credible threats because security officials claim that terrorists do not value the sites or that the consequences would not be catastrophic. However the NPPP report argues it is impossible to know which high-value nuclear targets are preferred by terrorists, or which attacks would have the gravest consequences.

The report recommends that Washington require a level of protection at all potentially high-consequence US nuclear targets – including both nuclear power reactors and civilian research facilities with bomb-grade material – sufficient to defend against a maximum credible terrorist attack. To meet this standard at commercial facilities, the NRC should upgrade its "design basis threat," and the US government should provide the requisite additional security that is not supplied by private-sector licensees.

Edwin Lyman, a senior scientist with the Union of Concerned Scientists, said that civilian research centres are subject to even fewer security requirements than the nuclear power plants, such as having a trained, armed response force with semi-automatic weapons. If facilities housing the research reactors cannot boost their security, he said, "there is a good case for shutting down research reactors in densely populated areas. It's something the country has ignored for a long time." Since 9/11, Lyman said, seven nuclear research reactors using highly enriched uranium have converted to low enriched uranium but the larger, higher-powered reactors have yet to make the transition.[2]

The NPPP report attracted widespread mainstream media reporting, prompting some unhappy responses from nuclear apologists − one complaining about "gullible reporters" promoting a "student paper".[3] The NRC also responded, challenging some of the claims made in the NPPP report and noting that 'Design Basis Threats' set by the NRC are not made public.[4] That lack of transparency is itself a problem.

Air Force fails drill

Meanwhile, an Air Force unit that oversees one-third of the United States' land-based nuclear missiles has failed a safety and security inspection. Lt. General James Kowalski, commander of Air Force Global Strike Command, said a team of "relatively low-ranking" airmen stationed at Malmstrom Air Force Base, Montana, "did not demonstrate the right procedures" in a single exercise.[5]

A statement posted on the command's website said the 341st Missile Wing received an unsatisfactory rating after making "tactical level errors − not related to command and control of nuclear weapons − during one of several exercises conducted during the inspection. This failure resulted in the entire inspection being rated 'unsatisfactory.'" The Air Force is "looking into" the possibility of disciplinary action against the 341st, Kowalski said. The wing did well overall, he said, scoring excellent or outstanding in most of the 13 areas being tested.[6]

In March, the deputy commander of the 91st Missile Wing complained of "rot" in the group after an inspection gave its missile crews the equivalent of a "D" grade on Minuteman 3 launch operations. Although the 91st passed that inspection, the failed simulation of ICBM launch operations resulted in the temporary removal and retraining of 19 personnel. In 2008, the 5th Bomb Wing at Minot failed the nuclear security component of an inspection. The Air Force nuclear mission has hit a number of bumps since 2008, including a B-52 bomber flight over several US states during which the crew was unaware that actual weapons were onboard.[5]

On August 19, a US Air Force crew ejected from a B-1 bomber that ran violently aground during a training flight. The four crew members all sustained "some injuries,".[7]

In January 2013, Energy Department personnel pretending to be terrorists reached a substance representing nuclear-weapon fuel after they fought through defenses in an exercise at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina, the Project on Government Oversight reported.[8]

In July 2012, three Plowshares peace activists successfully broke into the Y-12 National Security complex in Tennessee (transformnowplowshares.wordpress.com). The activists − aged 83, 64 and 56 − are in jail in Georgia and face up to 30 years in prison after losing their plea for the most serious charge to be dropped. Sentencing hearings are scheduled in January 2014.[9]

Security review after mass shooting at naval base

Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel announced a review of physical security and access at all global US military installations following the mass shootings in Washington on September 17. A government contractor and former Navy reservist is accused of killing 12 civilian workers at the Washington Navy Yard prior to his own shooting death. The security review was ordered following the disclosure that an unpublished Defense Department inspector general's report had concluded that "potentially numerous felons may have been able to gain unrestricted access to several military installations across the country due to the insufficient background checks, increasing the risk to our military personnel and civilian employees."[12]

NRC failing on employee security checks

An audit by the US NRC's Office of the Inspector General, released on September 12, cites concerns with an NRC policy that does not call for punishing personnel who fail to disclose personal circumstances that could raise doubts about whether they can be trusted with access to sensitive nuclear materials.[13,14] NRC employees "rarely comply with personnel reporting responsibilities" that require them to disclose if they are alcoholics or dealers of illegal drugs, the audit states. The Inspector General's audit examined materials from 35 re-investigations of NRC employees, and found over two dozen files with evidence of incidents that "should have been reported" to NRC security officials.

Unaccompanied access to ORNL buildings

As many as 6,400 foreign visitors from China, India, Egypt, Pakistan, and other countries were allowed "unaccompanied access to numerous buildings" at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) according to an Office of Inspector General report released last month.[15,16] ORNL is the nation's central repository for bomb-grade uranium.

Each visiting foreigner is given a plan that lays out in detail where they may go accompanied by their host. But "7 of the 16 hosts we interviewed did not maintain contact with foreign nationals during their entire stay," the report warns, and "these issues have the potential to increase Oak Ridge's security risk that sensitive information and national security assets could potentially be lost or compromised."

Some who were given free rein in the nuclear facility had not even been checked against the Department of Energy's Foreign Access Central Tracking System prior to their arrival in the US. Previous audits highlighted similar issues with unaccompanied foreign nationals that have still not been resolved.

British nuclear police drunk, stoned

In June, documents released under a Freedom of Information Act application revealed that that Police officers with the elite force that guards Britain's nuclear power stations have been caught drunk, using drugs, misusing firearms and also accused of sexual harassment and assault.[10]

In June, UK bomb disposal experts were called to the radioactive waste repository at Drigg, south of Sellafield, after more than 100 unexploded shells were found washed up, creating a mile-wide exclusion zone along the shore. Experts from the Northern Diving Group gathered the shells and pieces together and carried out controlled explosions. The majority of the material was comprised of 12- and 18-inch shells, apparently having been dumped there after World War II.[11]

References:
[1] Lara Kirkham with Alan J. Kuperman, August 2013, "Protecting U.S. Nuclear Facilities from Terrorist Attack: Re-assessing the Current 'Design Basis Threat' Approach", www.nppp.org, http://blogs.utexas.edu/nppp/files/2013/08/NPPP-working-paper-1-2013-Aug...
[2] Rebecca LaFlure, 21 August 2013, 'Are civilian nuclear plants vulnerable to terror attacks?' www.publicintegrity.org/2013/08/21/13190/are-civilian-nuclear-plants-vul...
[3] Rod Adams · August 21, 2013, http://atomicinsights.com/why-did-gullible-reporters-promote-student-pap...
[4] Robert Lewis, 23 August 2013, 'Security and Nuclear Power Plants: Robust and Significant', http://public-blog.nrc-gateway.gov/2013/08/23/security-and-nuclear-power...
[5] 'In New Setback, Air Force Missile Team Fails Security Drill', 14 August 2013, www.nti.rsvp1.com/gsn/article/safety-and-security-inspection-failed-air-...
[6] www.afgsc.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123359516
[7] 'Crew Escapes U.S. Bomber in Training Crash', 20 August 2013, www.nti.org/gsn/article/crew-escapes-us-bomber-training-crash
[8] 'Mock Terrorists Reach Nuclear Bomb Material in U.S. Facility Drill', 2 August 2013, www.nti.rsvp1.com/gsn/article/mock-terrorists-reach-nuclear-bomb-materia...
[9] 'Nuclear Plant Protesters Denied Request for New Trial', 4 Oct. 2013, www.nti.org/gsn/article/judge-refuses-permit-new-trial-y-12-activists, ...
[10] 'Safety fears over elite police officers drunk on duty at UK's nuclear sites', The Independent, 27 June 2013, www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/safety-fears-over-elite-police-offic...
[11] "Bomb find ends with a big bang", Whitehaven News, 6 June 2013, www.nwemail.co.uk/bomb-find-ends-with-a-big-bang-1.1060905
[12] Nuclear Threat Initiative, 18 September 2013, 'Hagel Orders Review of Security at All Military Installations', www.nti.org/gsn/article/navy-head-wants-review-base-security-oct-1/?mgs1...
[13] http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1325/ML13255A431.pdf
[14] www.nti.org/gsn/article/auditors-urge-nrc-tighten-personnel-security-che...
[15] Office of Inspector General, Sept 2013, 'Unclassified Foreign National Visits and Assignments at Oak Ridge National Laboratory', http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2013/09/f2/INS-O-13-05.pdf
[16] Alissa Tabirian, 7 Oct 2013, 'OIG: 6,400 Foreigners Had Access to Nuclear Lab's Restricted Areas', http://cnsnews.com/news/article/alissa-tabirian/oig-6400-foreigners-had-...

(Written by Nuclear Monitor editor Jim Green.)

 

Illicit Nuclear Trade
The Institute for Science and International Security has released a report, 'Future World of Illicit Nuclear Trade: Mitigating the Threat'. Of the roughly two dozen countries that have pursued or obtained nuclear weapons during the past 50 years, almost all of them depended importantly on foreign supplies. The ISIS report assesses that the scourge of illicit nuclear trade appears to be worsening and if left unchecked, it could emerge as one of the most significant global challenges to combating the future spread of nuclear weapons.

Yet, this future world of illicit nuclear trade is not inevitable; the expected trends can be prevented and new threats headed off. The report presents over 100 specific recommendations in the following 15 broad policy areas
1) Build greater awareness against illicit trade
2) Make export controls universal and more effective
3) Promote better enforcement and use of UN, unilateral, and regional sanctions
4) Improve controls over sensitive nuclear information and assets
5) Stop the money flows related to illicit trade
6) Better coordinate prosecutions and more vigorously prosecute smugglers
7) Enhance early detection methods
8) Emphasise interdictions
9) Create a universal standard against illicit nuclear trade
10) Prevent additional developed/industrialised market nations from developing nuclear weapons
11) Reinvigorate a US policy to discourage uranium enrichment and plutonium separation capabilities in regions of tension
12) Gain and verify pledges to renounce illicit nuclear trade
13) Obtain additional state commitments not to proliferate
14) Prevent non-state actors from obtaining nuclear weapons via illicit trade
15) Implement relevant arms control agreements and extend security assurances.

The report is posted at isis-online.org or use this shortcut: tinyurl.com/illicitnukentrade

Vermont Yankee and the collapse of the US nuclear power industry

Nuclear Monitor Issue: 
#767
06/09/2013
Michael Mariotte - Executive Director of the Nuclear Information and Resource Service.
Article

Only eight months through, 2013 is already a remarkable year for the anti-nuclear power movement in the US. Where Germany is following a deliberate government-mandated path to phase out nuclear power entirely, in the US the atomic industry is simply collapsing on its own − aided by concerted and strategic grassroots organising campaigns and legal actions.

Entergy Corporation's August 27 announcement of the pending shutdown of the Vermont Yankee reactor at the end of its current fuel cycle was just the latest blow to the industry, which already has seen four other reactor shutdowns (the most in one year ever) and the abandonment of six proposed new reactors, not to mention cancellation of several power uprates. And more may be coming.

As economist Marc Cooper of the Vermont Law School's Institute for Energy and the Environment put it, "What we are seeing today is nothing less than the rapid-fire downsizing of nuclear power in the United States. It is important to recognize that the tough times the U.S. nuclear power industry faces today are only going to get worse."

And indeed, there are several − perhaps the word should be many − other reactors, both operating and proposed, that sit on the edge of the same intersection of cost and safety concerns that are bringing the industry down faster than anyone would have imagined just a year ago.

Conventional wisdom holds that it is the current abundance and dirt-cheap prices for natural gas brought about by the fracking boom that is undermining nuclear power, making it impossible for marginal ageing reactors to compete economically, much less for utilities to even consider extraordinarily expensive new reactors. When Duke Energy took a second look at its $24 billion Levy County, Florida project for example, it didn't take long for it to realise it could build the same amount of natural gas-fired capacity for a fraction of that amount.

Conventional wisdom isn't always wrong. And the availability of cheap natural gas is certainly taking its toll on the industry. There is no doubt that Wisconsin's Kewaunee reactor − by all accounts about as problem-free as an old reactor gets − would still be operating today if it could compete with low-cost gas. The UBS investment firm predicted Vermont Yankee's demise months ago, arguing that it couldn't compete in the regional marketplace.

Renewable energy

But over the long term, natural gas isn't what the nuclear industry should be most worried about. Clean alternatives to nuclear power, especially solar and wind, are growing at a frenetic pace as costs plunge. A rooftop photovoltaic system is now being installed in the US every four minutes, and that will become every 90 seconds by 2016.[1].

John Wellinghoff, the chairman of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, said in August 2013 that "Solar is growing so fast it is going to overtake everything." If a single drop of water on the pitcher's mound at Dodger Stadium is doubled every minute, Wellinghoff said, a person chained to the highest seat would be in danger of drowning in an hour. "That's what is happening in solar. It could double every two years," he said.[2]

The goal of a nuclear-free, carbon-free energy system by mid-century suddenly seems quite attainable. According to the Energy Information Administration, for the first five months of 2013, renewable energy sources (including hydropower) provided 18.48% more energy to the US than nuclear power. Solar grew by 32.26% from a year ago while wind grew by 20.99%, continuing a trend of the past few years. And this actually underestimates solar power: non-utility and small-scale (residential and commercial rooftop) photovoltaic systems don't show up as electric generation since to the utilities that provide generation statistics they represent only a reduction in demand.

Indeed, no one seems to know just how much rooftop solar power there is in the US, but with a new installation every four minutes, the amount is growing rapidly.

This movement toward small-scale distributed generation is turning the traditional utility model on its head and in the process scaring the pants off of utility officials. David Crane is CEO of NRG Energy, itself a major utility and operator of the two existing South Texas nuclear reactors. But after Fukushima, NRG dropped out of a project to build two new reactors there and is now betting heavily on solar power. Crane recently predicted to Business Week that "in about the time it has taken cell phones to supplant land lines in most U.S. homes, the grid will become increasingly irrelevant as customers move toward decentralized homegrown green energy."[3]

This coming change in the fundamental structure of electric utilities bodes poorly for large baseload power plants of any kind − especially nuclear power which cannot be powered up and down quickly − and has become another reason utilities are scrapping marginal power plants, both nuclear and coal.

Still, dinosaurs thrashing their tails didn't always go down easily, and neither do nuclear reactors. They have to be helped along by effective grassroots opposition.

Grassroots opposition

No one can doubt that Southern California Edison would still be trying to run the San Onofre reactors, even after their botched steam generator repair job, if it weren't for the sustained and stunningly-effective opposition mounted by Friends of the Earth and numerous grassroots groups in southern California, aided by the Nuclear Free California network formed in August 2011.

At Vermont Yankee, the history of protest and opposition dates back to the 1970s. While Clamshell Alliance protests at Seabrook were larger and got more attention, Vermont Yankee was a Clamshell target as well. The New England Coalition has been filing legal challenges in every venue possible for just about as long.

After having successfully closed the Yankee Rowe reactor in nearby western Massachusetts, the Citizens Awareness Network turned its attention to Vermont Yankee and the first Nuclear Free New England action camp was held there in 1998. Twenty-one people were arrested at the plant gates at the culmination of that camp on August 27, 1998. The reactor closed 15 years later to the day.

During those 15 years, CAN, the New England Coalition, VPIRG and more protested, lobbied, filed legal briefs, and never let up. New groups were formed, like the Shut It Down affinity group − composed entirely of women over 70 − which held monthly protests for more than eight years and often were arrested and the Sage Alliance, an umbrella group which brought together perhaps the largest Vermont Yankee protest ever in March 2012, more than 1,000 people in Brattleboro (which has a population of about 12,000), resulting in more than 130 arrests.

By the end, just about the entire state of Vermont was united against the reactor. The State Senate had voted 26-4 to close the reactor. The Governor wanted it shut, so did the entire Congressional delegation. Entergy had fought vigorously against all these efforts, and in early August had pretty much won a court victory that determined the state could not close the reactor on safety grounds, and that it was safety issues that had dominated the Senate's vote (though the decision left open the door for some different state actions that might have closed the reactor).

Some believe that Entergy closed the reactor now to keep that court victory as a precedent and prevent other state action that might also be viewed as precedent − Entergy also owns the much larger Indian Point reactors near New York City, where another major grassroots campaign, supported by Governor Andrew Cuomo, is underway to prevent relicensing and close them permanently.

The nuclear "renaissance" in the US began in the summer of 2007, when the first license application in more than 30 years was filed with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, for the Calvert Cliffs-3 reactor in Maryland. On March 11, 2013 − the second anniversary of the Fukushima disaster − the NRC Commissioners upheld the denial of a license for that reactor, the first in this year's remarkable sequence of shutdowns, cancellations and abandonments. All that's left are two reactors under construction in Georgia (which state officials now admit they might not have approved in today's climate), two in South Carolina, and one old TVA reactor that's been under construction for three decades.

Instead of a renaissance, the nuclear industry is being routed. Its ageing reactors face safety issues, big repair bills and growing public opposition. Its new reactors are too expensive to build. And, scariest of all for nuclear utilities, their entire business model of large, inflexible baseload power plants is being challenged not by off-the-grid hippies, but by other utility executives who see the writing on the wall.

The 2013 collapse of the U.S. nuclear power industry may seem astounding today. Over the next few years, it's more likely to seem routine.

[1] www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/america-installs-a-solar-system-eve...
[2] www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/ferc-chair-wellinghoff-sees-a-solar...
[3] www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-08-22/homegrown-green-energy-is-makin...

About: 
NIRSVermont Yankee

Sensitive nuclear technologies and US nuclear export agreements

Nuclear Monitor Issue: 
#766
23/08/2013
Jim Green - Nuclear Monitor editor
Article

US business groups are lobbying the US government to limit the negotiation of bilateral nuclear trade agreements (known as Section 123 agreements under the 1954 Atomic Energy Act [1]) containing clauses banning the development of sensitive nuclear technologies (SNT) − uranium enrichment and nuclear reprocessing. SNT can be used to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons − highly enriched uranium or plutonium.

The United Arab Emirates agreed not develop SNT as part of its 2009 agreement with the US.[2] However the agreement does prohibit the stockpiling of plutonium separated from spent fuel produced in reactors in the UAE and separated in another country − just as Japan stockpiles plutonium separated from spent fuel in European reprocessing plants. Moreover the agreement reportedly contains an escape clause that allows the UAE to exercise any more favourable terms that the US grants other Middle Eastern nations in subsequent nuclear trade pacts.

The Obama administration dubbed the UAE agreement the "gold standard" for future agreements around the world. There has been an ongoing debate as to whether the "gold standard" SNT ban should be a condition of all future US nuclear agreements or whether it should be considered on a case-by-case basis.

The Obama administration is currently undertaking its third successive internal review of the matter.[3] Some have suggested a compromise − US negotiators would seek an SNT ban in all or almost all agreements unless both the Secretary of State and the Energy Secretary agree to waive the requirement. There has also been discussion of a regional approach − for example the US might seek SNT bans in the Middle East but put Asia in the too-hard basket.

US business groups are fighting initiatives to limit the spread of SNT. In July, the Nuclear Energy Institute, the National Association of Manufacturers and the US Chamber of Commerce called on the Obama administration to expedite conclusion of bilateral agreements and to adopt a "pragmatic" approach to SNT.[4]

The business groups expressed concern that as well as losing out on business opportunities to competitors who do not impose the same restrictions, the US is also at risk of losing influence on nuclear security and non-proliferation on the global stage. The second argument is disingenuous − effectively the business groups are saying the government ought to permit the spread of SNT so the US is better placed to limit the spread of SNT.

That disingenuous argument was the basis of an April 25 joint letter to the Obama administration by former deputy Defense secretary John Hamre, former national security advisers Brent Scowcroft and James Jones, former Defense secretaries James Schlesinger and William Cohen, and retired Adm. Michael Mullen, previously chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.[5] They argue against tightening restrictions because the "U.S. civil nuclear industry is one of [Washington's] most powerful tools for advancing its nuclear nonproliferation agenda. ... Weakening it will merely cede foreign markets to other suppliers less concerned about nonproliferation than the United States." In other words, spread SNT to help stop the spread of SNT, and spread SNT or other countries less concerned about the spread of SNT will spread SNT.

Henry Sokolski from the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center questioned the letter's contention that nuclear trade must be a principal vehicle for Washington's non-proliferation objectives: "You'd think after our wretched experience with civil nuclear programs in Iran, India, Iraq, Pakistan and our past near-calls with Taiwan and South Korea's programs, this would be the last thing anyone truly opposed to nuclear weapons proliferation would push."[5]

Sokolski collaborated with Foreign Policy Initiative head Jamie Fly on a February 2012 letter to Obama, signed by 20 conservative defense experts, recommending an approach stronger than the case-by-case policy then in favour in Washington. The signatories − including former Defense Department policy head Eric Edelman, former national security adviser Steven Hadley and former nuclear nonproliferation envoy Robert Joseph − said: "Rather than abandon efforts to tighten nonproliferation controls on civil nuclear exports, the United States should be leveraging access to our market to encourage French, Russian, and Asian nuclear suppliers to tighten their own rules to meet the nonproliferation gold standard."[6]

Asia
There are indications that Taiwan might agree to an SNT ban as part of a nuclear trade agreement with the US. [7,8] The current US−Taiwan agreement, which does not include an SNT ban, expires next year. Taiwan might sign an agreement without an expiration date, meaning that the SNT ban would be in force indefinitely.

South Korea is effectively a member of the 'gold standard' club as the 1992 Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula prohibits both North and South Korea from possessing enrichment or reprocessing facilities. However North Korea has violated the Declaration, and the situation in north-east Asia is further complicated by Japan's stockpiling of vast amounts of separated plutonium − a problem which will only worsen if the Rokkasho reprocessing plant proceeds to operation (see Nuclear Monitor #763, 'Japan's reprocessing plans').

The US is pressing South Korea to agree to maintain SNT bans as part of negotiations on the extension of the nuclear agreement. South Korea is unwilling to continue to forego SNT, and deadlocked negotiations have been extended for two years. There is some hope that if Taiwan agrees to an SMT ban, South Korea might be persuaded to do likewise. But even if Taiwan foregoes SNT, two elephants remain in the room − North Korea and Japan − not to mention the nuclear weapons programs of the US itself and of China.

South Korea's research into 'pyroprocessing' complicates the issue. Pyroprocessing would involve separating short-lived fission products from spent fuel, leaving plutonium mixed with other transuranics (a.k.a. actinides). That is far preferable to conventional reprocessing. On the other hand, proliferators would much prefer to have access to a mix of transuranics (including plutonium) rather than spent fuel, as spent fuel generates much more radioactivity and heat and is therefore much more difficult to handle.

Negotiations on a nuclear trade agreement between the US and Malaysia may commence in coming years but there is no indication as to whether Malaysia would agree to SNT bans.

Negotiations on a nuclear trade agreement between the US and Vietnam have commenced, but Vietnam is reportedly unwilling to agree to an SNT ban.[9,10]

Middle East
Discussions are ongoing between the US and Saudi Arabia on a nuclear trade agreement.[11] The option of a ban on SNT in Saudi Arabia is under discussion according to US State Department official Thomas Countryman. However Saudi Arabia has expressed unwillingness to forego SNT.

Countryman dismisses concerns that Saudi Arabia might develop nuclear weapons, although members of the ruling family have said they might do just that in response to Iran's nuclear program.[12] Also of concern is the potential for instability in the kingdom and who might control SNT if the ruling family is overthrown.

Saudi Arabia has signed cooperation pacts with a number of other nations including China, France, South Korea and Argentina.[13] Canadian officials have expressed concerns about the potential for Saudi Arabia to pursue nuclear weapons. "Minimal [International Atomic Energy Agency] safeguards are in place in SA [Saudi Arabia] to verify peaceful uses of nuclear energy ... and it has refused to accept strengthened safeguards," officials said in an assessment prepared for Canada's Foreign Affairs Minister last year. "Many observers question SA's nuclear intentions, especially if Iran were to acquire a nuclear weapons capability. As a result, SA does not meet Canada's requirements for nuclear cooperation."[14]

Countryman said he is "confident that any civil nuclear cooperation we agree would not in any way contribute [to] or encourage" nuclear weapons development in Saudi Arabia, although he surely knows that nuclear exports to Saudi Arabia could indeed contribute to and encourage proliferation. The US National Intelligence Council warned in its 2008 ' Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World' report of the possibility of a nuclear arms race in the Middle East and noted that a number of states in the region "are already thinking about developing or acquiring nuclear technology useful for development of nuclear weaponry."[15]

The US has also held discussions with Jordan and Syria regarding nuclear trade in recent years, though the talks have stalled because of political turmoil in the Middle East.[10,12]

Jordan is reportedly unwilling to agree to an SNT ban [16] though there were hints in early 2012 that perhaps Jordan would agree to a ban.[17]

The unfolding saga over US nuclear export policy should be put in context. In particular, it needs to be seen in the context of countless failed multilateral and international proposals over the decades to limit the spread of SNTs, such as the Bush administration's 'Global Nuclear Energy Partnership'.[18]

Such proposals fail for various reasons, not least the unwillingness of nuclear have-nots to forego options and technologies that the nuclear haves (weapons states and weapons-capable states) will not renounce. Another complication is Article IV of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which states: "Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes ... All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy."

Lastly, an article on US nuclear export policy would be incomplete without mention of the tireless − and ultimately successful − efforts of the US under the Bush administration to end the global norm of prohibiting nuclear trade with countries that have not signed the NPT. The 2008 US−India nuclear trade agreement has had a number of unfortunate, predictable outcomes − legitimising nuclear weapons programs and fanning proliferation in South Asia, legitimising China's supply of reactor technology to Pakistan, undermining and complicating efforts to persuade Iran to forego SNT, etc. The Obama administration has done nothing to undo the damage.

References:
[1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Section_123_Agreement
[2] www.nti.org/gsn/article/obama-team-eyes-saudi-nuclear-trade-deal-without...
[3] www.nti.rsvp1.com/gsn/article/nuclear-trade-reform-bill-faces-hostile-lo...
[4] www.world-nuclear-news.org/NP-US_business_in_joint_plea_on_nuclear_trade...
[5] www.nti.org/gsn/article/former-defense-brass-object-more-restrictive-nuc...
[6] www.nti.org/gsn/article/us-nuclear-trade-policy-concerns-mounting-capito...
[7] www.nti.org/gsn/article/taiwan-ready-forgo-nuclear-fuel-making-us-pact-r...
[8] www.nti.rsvp1.com/gsn/article/q-senior-us-envoy-expects-taiwan-nuclear-t...
[9] www.nationaljournal.com/obama-team-eyes-saudi-nuclear-trade-deal-without...
[10] www.nti.org/gsn/article/us-could-secure-key-asian-nuclear-trade-deals-2013
[11] www.nti.org/gsn/article/us-nuclear-marketers-visited-saudi-arabia-trade-...
[12] www.nti.org/gsn/article/q-envoy-says-saudi-nuclear-pact-would-not-lead-w...
[13] www.nti.org/gsn/article/us-nuclear-marketers-visited-saudi-arabia-trade-...
[14] www.nti.org/gsn/article/saudi-atomic-aims-worry-canada/
[15] US National Intelligence Council, 2008, "Global Trends 2025 – a Transformed World", www.aicpa.org/research/cpahorizons2025/globalforces/downloadabledocument...
[16] www.nationaljournal.com/obama-team-eyes-saudi-nuclear-trade-deal-without...
[17] www.nti.org/gsn/article/us-nuclear-trade-talks-vietnam-jordan-moving-for...
[18] www.foe.org.au/anti-nuclear/issues/nfc/mnfc

US NRC to find out just how confident public is in radioactive waste policy

Nuclear Monitor Issue: 
#768
27/09/2013
Michael Mariotte
Article

Against the backdrop of this year's unprecedented spate of reactor shutdowns and cancellations, attention in the US is turning this Fall to the complete breakdown of radioactive waste policy.

Featured will be 12 public meetings across the country over the next 45 days to discuss the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's "waste confidence" policy, and likely action in the Senate on legislation that might − or might not − set a new path on radioactive waste.

Last summer, a federal court threw out the NRC's "waste confidence" policy, which forced the agency to institute a moratorium on licensing new reactors and relicensing old ones. The policy was established in the 1980s, after Congress decided that the federal government would be responsible for disposal of high-level nuclear waste.

At the time, Congress also decided that the government would begin accepting the waste for disposal in 1998 and directed the Department of Energy to sign contracts to do so. So much for bad ideas and poor prognostication. More than 25 years since the legislation was passed, the government has been unable to make good on any of those contracts − and is therefore being sued by nuclear utilities − and is also no closer to a radioactive waste solution than it was in the 1980s.

At the core of the "waste confidence" policy was the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) assertion that it was confident high-level radioactive waste would always be stored or disposed of safely, no matter where it was and that, in any case, a permanent waste disposal site was just around the corner. This assertion allowed the NRC to license and relicense reactors which otherwise would have been prohibited (as it is today).

But the court ruled that the utter lack of progress toward establishing a permanent site and the Obama Administration's efforts to end the Yucca Mountain, Nevada project meant there is no reason to assume a permanent site ever will be established. Further, the court said the NRC had provided no technical basis whatsoever to assume that waste would, or even could, be stored indefinitely onsite. Thus, the "waste confidence" policy was merely an assertion without foundation.

The NRC vowed to provide a basis for its waste confidence policy and resume licensing within two years − even though the agency's own experts said doing the job properly likely would take seven years. The result is a new proposed rule that asserts that radioactive waste can be stored indefinitely − as in essentially forever − in dry casks and even in fuel pools even without a permanent disposal site. The rule is backed by a 600-page "Generic Draft Environment Impact Statement" (DEIS) that conveniently understates, downplays and just plain ignores most of the possible, some would say likely, pitfalls and problems posed by long-term storage at both casks and pools.

For example, the DEIS determined that the risks of a fuel pool fire are "inconsequential". That's not because a fuel pool fire itself would be inconsequential − in fact, it would be calamitous. But the NRC says the odds of such a fire are so low the agency doesn't have to worry about it. The NRC put the odds at 1 in 60,000 per reactor year. Multiply that by 99 reactors over the next hundred or so years, and the odds grow scarily close to inevitable. And before March 11, 2011, most experts would have put the odds of three simultaneous meltdowns and four endangered fuel pools at well below 1 in 60,000.

Nor does the DEIS attempt to determine the relative value of dry cask versus fuel pool storage, apparently assuming both are equally safe − a view not shared by most outside experts. And while dry casks are the preferred technology for most concerned with nuclear safety issues at this time, few believe they are a permanent solution and the DEIS fails to consider any of the potential dangers they might pose in the future. For example, the NRC believes dry casks should last 100 years; then the fuel would have to be transferred to new dry casks − but unloading a cask full of extraordinarily radioactive fuel roads and re-loading them into a new cask is a job that never has been done. The potential effects of climate change-related sea-level and other water-level rise on dry casks also has been sloughed off, among other issues.

On October 1, the NRC will hold a public meeting (although industry and anti-nuclear groups already have been briefed by the agency) at its Rockville, Maryland headquarters to begin trying to sell its DEIS and proposed rule to the public. The next week it takes its show on the road, starting with a meeting in Denver, Colorado on October 3 and ending back in Rockville on November 14. In between, there will be meetings in California, Ohio, Minnesota, Illinois, Massachusetts, New York, North Carolina and Florida.

Activists across the country have vowed to pack the meetings to challenge both the technical details of the DEIS as well as to protest the very notion that new radioactive waste should be generated at all. The Nuclear Information and Resource Service has a new webpage with location and schedule information, talking points, and more: www.nirs.org/radwaste/wasteconfidence.htm

Note, however, that Tea Party interests seem intent on forcing a government shutdown over President Obama's attempt to ensure that most Americans are able to obtain some sort of health care. If a shutdown occurs, some or all of the meeting dates may be changed.

New independent agency?
Meanwhile, in the Senate momentum seems to have slipped from Energy Committee efforts to pass a bill (S.1240) to establish a new independent agency to take over the Department of Energy's (DOE) radioactive waste program. That bill, which is based on the recommendations of the DOE's Blue Ribbon Commission on waste (brc.gov), would also set up a new consent-based process for finding a permanent waste disposal site. In addition, it would allow creation of one or more new "consolidated interim storage" sites − a gift to the nuclear industry so that it could begin shipping high-level waste off its property and let the federal government take responsibility for it.

But the bill hasn't received the kind of support its backers had hoped. Environmentalists oppose it because the idea of "interim" storage would lead to massive transport of high-level waste across the country ("Mobile Chernobyl") to an unsuitable site from where it would have to be transported again. The Nuclear Information and Resource Service has collected about 40,000 signatures on petitions opposing the bill for that reason.

The program also would take a lot of the impetus away from the search for a scientifically-defensible permanent site since the industry's only real interest is in getting the stuff off its property and into government hands. Moreover, the bill fails to ensure that fuel pools would be emptied as quickly as feasible into dry casks, which environmentalists believe are much safer than the overcrowded pools.

And some Republicans don't want to see the establishment of a new federal agency of any kind for any reason, and don't really care that a new agency might be able to begin making up for the myriad of mistakes the DOE has made on waste policy over the years; thus they are at best lukewarm toward that idea. What they really want − especially in the House of Representatives, which would also have to approve radioactive waste legislation for it to become law − is a return to the discredited and failed Yucca Mountain project.

Republicans have seized on a recent federal court decision that ruled the NRC improperly ended its licensing review of Yucca Mountain; the NRC has said it will comply with the decision and is now working on how to restart its review. In the US, the DOE currently is responsible for finding a permanent disposal site and submitting an application for it to the NRC, which has final approval to license the site. But the NRC only has about $11 million left in its fund for the license review, and it will cost about half that just to re-establish the computer system to provide access to the literally millions of pages of documents involved in the licensing process.

As long as Sen. Harry Reid (D-Nev.) is Senate Majority Leader, Congress won't approve any more money for the NRC to complete the process (nor will it approve any legislation to mandate Yucca Mountain), so it's unlikely that either the court decision or legislative efforts to bolster the Yucca site will have any actual practical effect.

But despite the relatively poor outlook for radioactive waste legislation, sources indicate that S.1240's sponsors in the Senate Energy Committee are still hoping to hold a mark-up session and committee vote on the bill in mid-October. Whether any changes to the bill, one way or the other, will be sufficient to move it beyond the Committee level remains to be seen.

Author: Michael Mariotte − Executive Director of the Nuclear Information and Resource Service.
Web: www.nirs.org
Email: nirsnet[@]nirs.org

About: 
NIRS

US warned Kodak, not us, about radioactive fallout (John LaForge)

Nuclear Monitor Issue: 
#764
28/06/2013
John LaForge
Article

In the 1950s and '60s, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) doused the United States with thyroid cancer-causing iodine-131 − and 300 other radioisotopes − by exploding atomic and hydrogen bombs above ground in Nevada. To protect the dirty, secretive bomb-building industry, the government chose to warn the photographic film industry about the radioactive fallout patterns, but not the public.

In 1951, Eastman Kodak Co. had threatened a federal lawsuit over the nuclear fallout that was fogging its bulk film shipments. Film was not packed in bubble wrap then, but in corn stalks that were sometimes being fallout-contaminated. By agreeing to warn Kodak, etc., the AEC and the bomb program avoided the public uproar − and the bomb testing program's possible cancellation − that a lawsuit would have precipitated. The settlement kept the deadliness of the fallout hidden from the public, even though the government well knew that fallout endangered all the people it was supposed to be defending.

This staggering revelation was heralded on September 30, 1997, in the New York Times headline, "U.S. Warned Film Plants, Not Public, About Nuclear Fallout." The article began, "(W)hile the government reassured the public that there was no health threat from atmospheric nuclear tests. ..." The fallout's radioactive iodine-131 caused thyroid doses to virtually all 160 million Americans.

According to the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research in Takoma Park, Md., which discovered the cover-up, children were especially affected and received higher doses because they generally consumed more milk than adults and since their thyroids are smaller and growing more rapidly. The "milk pathway" moves radio-iodine from grass, to cows, to milk with extreme efficiency − a fact known to the government as early as 1951. Ingested iodine-131 concentrates in the thyroid gland where it can cause cancer. Doses to children averaged 6 to 14 rads (0.06−0.14 Gy), with some as high as 112 rads (1.12 Gy). Before 1997, the government claimed that thyroid doses to children were 15 to 70 times less.

Radioactive fallout spread to every corner of the US
My friend Steve O'Neil of Duluth, Minn., who was born in 1951, has been a public-spirited political activist all of his adult life, an advocate for the homeless and a campaigner against the causes of homelessness. As a St. Louis County commissioner in his third term, Steve made headlines by announcing that he has been attacked by an aggressive form of thyroid cancer. Steve is not alone in his affliction − more than 60,000 thyroid cancers will be spotted this year in the US. Tens of thousands of them have been caused by our government's nuclear weapons establishment.

The National Cancer Institute disclosed in 1997 that 75,000 thyroid cancer cases can be expected in the U.S. from just 90 − out of 235 − above-ground bomb tests and that 10% of them will be fatal. That year, the cancer institute said, about 70% of the thyroid cancers caused by iodine-131 fallout from those 90 tests had not yet been diagnosed but would appear years or decades later.

Its 14-year study said the 90 bomb blasts produced more than 100 times the radioactive iodine-131 than the government had earlier claimed. The cancer institute estimated that the tests dispersed "about 150 million curies of iodine-131, mainly in the years 1952, 1953, 1955 and 1957." The study reported that all 160 million people in the country at the time were exposed to iodine-131 (the only isotope it studied out of more than 300 dispersed by the blasts.) Children under 15, like Steve O'Neil, were particularly at risk.

High doses of fallout were spread nationwide. Wind patterns and local rainfall caused "hot spots" from Montana and Idaho to South Dakota, Minnesota, and Missouri and beyond.

In 1962, according to IEER, officials in Utah and Minnesota diverted possibly contaminated milk from the market when iodine-131 levels exceeded radiation guidelines set by the Federal Radiation Council. The council reacted harshly and declared that it did "not recommend such actions." It also announced that its radiation guidelines should not be applied to bomb test fallout because "any possible health risk which may be associated with exposures even many times above the guide levels would not result in a detectable increase in the incidence of disease." IEER's scientists condemned this fabulously implausible assurance, writing: "Since thyroid cancers can develop many years after radiation exposure and are therefore not immediately detectable, this reassurance was highly misleading."

Thyroid cancers are tip of bomb test cancer iceberg
The cancer institute's 1997 study said about 16,000 cases of thyroid cancer were diagnosed in the U.S. annually, and that 1,230 would die from the disease. It was a gross understatement.

Today it reports that 60,220 cases of thyroid cancer will be diagnosed in the US this year, and that 1,850 of them will be fatal.

The UN Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation says that iodine-131 doses comprise only 2% of the overall radiation dose from weapons testing. Ninety-eight percent of the fallout dose is from 300 other isotopes produced by the bomb. It is not idle speculation to suggest that the cancer pandemic afflicting the U.S. has been caused by our government's deliberately secret and viciously reckless weapons program.

This article appeared earlier in the Las Vegas Review Journal.
Author: John LaForge works for Nukewatch, a nuclear watchdog group in Wisconsin, USA, edits its Quarterly newsletter and is syndicated through PeaceVoice.

Inhuman radiation experiments

Nuclear Monitor Issue: 
#764
28/06/2013
John LaForge
Article

Author: John LaForge works for Nukewatch, a nuclear watchdog group in Wisconsin, USA, edits its Quarterly newsletter and is syndicated through PeaceVoice.

This year marks the twentieth anniversary of the declassification of top secret studies, done over a period of 60 years, in which the US conducted 2,000 radiation experiments on as many as 20,000 vulnerable US citizens.[1]

Victims included civilians, prison inmates, federal workers, hospital patients, pregnant women, infants, developmentally disabled children and military personnel − most of them powerless, poor, sick, elderly or terminally ill. Eileen Welsome's 1999 exposé The Plutonium Files: America's Secret Medical Experiments in the Cold War details "the unspeakable scientific trials that reduced thousands of men, women, and even children to nameless specimens."[2]

The program employed industry and academic scientists who used their hapless patients or wards to see the immediate and short-term effects of radioactive contamination − with everything from plutonium to radioactive arsenic.[3] The human subjects were mostly poisoned without their knowledge or consent. An April 17, 1947 memo by Col. O.G. Haywood of the Army Corps of Engineers explained why the studies were classified. "It is desired that no document be released which refers to experiments with humans and might have adverse effect on public opinion or result in legal suits."[4]

In one Vanderbilt U. study, 829 pregnant women were unknowingly fed radioactive iron. In another, 188 children were given radioactive iron-laced lemonade. From 1963 to 1971, 67 inmates in Oregon and 64 prisoners in Washington had their testicles targeted with X-rays to see what doses made them sterile.[5] At the Fernald State School in Massachusetts, mentally retarded boys were fed radioactive iron and calcium but consent forms sent to their parents didn't mention radiation. Elsewhere, psychiatric patients and infants were injected with radioactive iodine.[6]

The vast testing program went ahead in spite of a warning to use chimpanzees instead of humans, because, as a top radiation biologist wrote at the time, the experiments might have "a little of the Buchenwald touch," comparing them to the Nazis' torture of concentration camp inmates.[7]

A rare public condemnation came from Clinton Administration Energy Sec. Hazel O'Leary in 1994, who confessed being aghast at the conduct of the scientists. She told Newsweek: "I said, ‘Who were these people and why did this happen?' The only thing I could think of was Nazi Germany."[8] None of the victims were provided follow-on medical care.

Scientists knew from the beginning of the twentieth century that radiation can cause genetic and cell damage, cell death, radiation sickness and even death. A Presidential Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments was established in 1993 to investigate charges of unethical or criminal action by the experimenters. Its findings were published by Oxford U. Press in 1996 as The Human Radiation Experiments.

The abuse of X-radiation "therapy" was also conducted throughout the 1940s and '50s. Everything from ringworm to tonsillitis was "treated" with X-radiation because the long-term risks were unknown or considered tolerable. Children were routinely exposed to alarmingly high doses of radiation from devices like "fluoroscopes" to measure foot size in shoe stores.[9] Nasal radium capsules inserted in nostrils, used to attack hearing loss, are now thought to be the cause of cancers, thyroid and dental problems, immune dysfunction and more.[10]

Experiments spread cancer risks far and wide
In large scale experiments as late as 1985, the Energy Department deliberately produced reactor meltdowns which spewed radiation across Idaho and beyond.[11] The Air Force conducted at least eight deliberate meltdowns in the Utah desert, dispersing 14 times the radiation released by the partial meltdown of Three Mile Island in Pennsylvania in 1979.[12]

The military even dumped radiation from planes and spread it across wide areas around and downwind of Oak Ridge, Tenn., Los Alamos, New Mexico, and Dugway, Utah. This "systematic radiation warfare program," conducted between 1944 and 1961, was kept secret for 40 years. ("Secret U.S. experiments in '40s and '50s included dropping radiation from sky," St. Paul Pioneer, Dec. 16, 1993) "Radiation bombs" thrown from USAF planes intentionally spread radiation "unknown distances" endangering the young and old alike. One such experiment doused Utah with 60 times more radiation than escaped the Three Mile Island accident, according to Sen. John Glen, D-Ohio who released a report on the program 20 years ago.[13]

The Pentagon's 235 above-ground nuclear bomb tests, and the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, are not officially listed as radiation experiments. Yet between 250,000 and 500,000 U.S. military personnel were contaminated during their compulsory participation in the bomb tests and the post-war occupation of Japan.[14]

Documents uncovered by the Advisory Committee show that the military knew there were serious radioactive fallout risks from its Nevada Test Site bomb blasts. The generals decided not to use a safer site in Florida, where fallout would have blown out to sea. "The officials determined it was probably not safe, but went ahead anyway," said Pat Fitzgerald a scientist on the committee staff.[15] Dr. Gioacchino Failla, a Columbia Univ. scientist who worked for the AEC, said at the time, "We should take some risk ... we are faced with a war in which atomic weapons will undoubtedly be used, and we have to have some information about these things."[16]

With the National Cancer Institute's 1997 finding that all 160,000 million US citizens (in the country at the time of the bomb tests) were contaminated with fallout, it's clear we did face war with atomic weapons − our own.

References:
1. Secret Radioactive Experiments to Bring Compensation by U.S.," New York Times, Nov. 20, 1996
2. Eileen Welsome, The Plutonium Files: America’s Secret Medical Experiments in the Cold War, Delta Books, 1999, dust jacket
3. Ibid. p. 9
4. "Radiation tests kept deliberately secret," Washington Post, Dec. 16, 1994; Geoffrey Sea, "The Radiation Story No One Would Touch," Project Censored, March/April 1994
5. Subcommittee on Energy Conservation and Power, "American Nuclear Guinea Pigs: Three Decades of Radiation Experiments on U.S. Citizens," U.S. Government Printing Office,
ov. 1986, p. 2; St. Paul Pioneer, via New York Times, Jan. 4, 1994
6. "48 more human radiation experiments revealed, Minneapolis StarTribune, June 28, 1994; Milwaukee Journal, June 29, 1994
7. Keith Schneider, "1950 Note Warms About Radiation Test," New York Times, Dec. 28, 1993
8. Newsweek, Dec. 27, 1994
9. Joseph Mangano, Mad Science: The Nuclear Power Experiment, OR Books, 2012, p. 36
10. "Nasal radium treatments of ’50s linked to cancer," Milwaukee Journal, Aug. 31, 1994
11. "Reactor core is melted in experiment," Washington Post service, Milwaukee Journal, July 10, 1985
12. "Tests spewed radiation, paper reports," AP, Milwaukee Journal, Oct. 11, 1994
13. Katherine Rizzo, Associated Press, "A bombshell: U.S. spread radiation," Duluth News-Tribune, Dec. 16, 1993
14. Catherine Caufield, Multiple Exposures, p. 107; Greg Gordon in "Wellstone: Compensate atomic vets," Minneapolis StarTribune, Mach 17, 1995; Associated Press, "Panel Told of Exposure to Test Danger," Tulsa World, Jan. 24, 1995
15. Philip Hilts, "Fallout Risk Near Atom Tests Was Known, Documents Show," New York Times, March 15, 1995, p. A13; and Pat Ortmeyer, "Let Them Drink Milk," Institute for Environmental & Energy Research, November 1997, pp. 3 & 11
16. Philip J. Hilts, Ibid

This article appeared earlier in CounterPunch and TruthOut.

Nuclear News

Nuclear Monitor Issue: 
#763
13/06/2013
Shorts

Spain: Garoña plant closer to definitive end?
The nuclear power plant of Garoña (Burgos), the oldest of the Spanish nuclear plants, is a hostage of its owner Enterprise Nuclenor (itself owned by the large enterprises ENDESA and Iberdrola). Garoña, whose reactor is identical to Fukushima Daiichi reactor #1, has been used by the Spanish nuclear lobby to press on the Government.

The first part of this struggle, until December 2012, was public and Nuclenor used Garoña to try to stop the new Law on Fiscal Measures that introduced a tax on the spent fuel of Spanish nuclear power plants. The amount of this tax could be of the order of 1.6 euro-cents per kWh. As it was ordered by the European Commission, the tax was not modified and therefore Nuclenor decided to stop the plant and to put all the uranium into the spent fuel pool on 28 December 2012. So Garoña is now stopped with all the fuel in the pool.

The second part of the argument has been hidden and the citizens have had no information on the discussions. We know that the Industry Minister is preparing a new law covering the electricity sector but we do not know if any of the proposals of the large Spanish electrical enterprises will be taken into account. It is clear, nevertheless, that something has happened since Nuclenor surprisingly asked the Minister to keep Garoña 'frozen' for one more year, thus allowing for the possibility of restarting the plant.

This happened on May 24, only one month and ten days before the definitive closure of Garoña. Minister Soria decided to pass the request directly to the Spanish Regulator, the Consejo de Seguridad Nuclear (CSN). The CSN was heavily pressured by the nuclear lobby and approved an extension of Garoña's licence for one year. Three CSN members voted for the extension, two voted against.

This has damaged CSN's reputation, since it appears as a puppet that is able to approve a request in a very short time under pressure from the nuclear enterprises. Moreover, the CSN gave a new type of authorisation to keep the plant in its present status, with the fuel in the pool, but without starting the decommissioning.

The main spokespeople from Iberdrola, ENDESA and Unesa have been making public declarations that Garoña cannot stop or the investments of these enterprises will move from Spain to other countries like the US if they are not guaranteed by the new law under preparation. The CSN appears ready to accept the schedule imposed by the nuclear lobby.

Once the CSN has given its permission, the Government has only to issue an Order that allows Nuclenor to ask for the prolongation of the life of Garoña. This should have been published before June 6, that is the last day to start studying the documents issued by the CSN to proceed to the definitive stop of Garoña. Strange things happened again, since the Government did not publish such an order! So the CSN sent the documents related to the closure of the plant. Only a very strange and scandalous legal manoeuvre by the Government could avoid the definitive closure of Garoña.

We have a strange contradictory feeling now. On one hand, we are happy since we are closer to the end of this dangerous nuclear plant. On the other hand we have seen how the nuclear lobby is able to modify Government decisions and to press strongly on the regulator. Meanwhile, the public has been excluded from the debate. We would like to start thinking of future development of the area without Garoña.

− Francisco Castejón, Ecologistas en Acción, Spain
www.ecologistasenaccion.org
castejon.francisco[@]gmail.com

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UNSCEAR Fukushima propaganda
Since the last issue of the Monitor, the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effect of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR) has published a media release, based on an as-yet unpublished report, trivialising the long-term cancer death toll from the Fukushima nuclear disaster. UNSCEAR states in its May 31 media release that: "It is unlikely to be able to attribute any health effects in the future among the general public and the vast majority of workers."

That tells us nothing we didn't already know: epidemiological studies are unlikely to produce statistically-significant results given the high incidence of cancers in the general population. As discussed in Nuclear Monitor #758 (15 March 2013, available at wiseinternational.org), early estimates of the long-term cancer death toll range from 130 to 3,000.

The media release says that actions taken to protect the public (evacuation and sheltering) significantly reduced radiation exposures. Wolfgang Weiss from UNSCEAR said: "These measures reduced the potential exposure by up to a factor of 10. If that had not been the case, we might have seen the cancer rates rising and other health problems emerging over the next several decades." Weiss's statement falsely implies that cancer rates will not rise due to Fukushima fallout.

Carl-Magnus Larsson, chair of UNSCEAR, said: "Families are suffering, and people have been uprooted and are concerned about their livelihoods and futures, the health of their children ... it is these issues that will be the long-lasting fallout of the accident." Again, the implication seems to be that radiation exposure is not an issue. Larsson's statement is also an invitation to nuclear apologists and propagandists to trot out tired old lies about how the problem is not radiation itself but fear of radiation. Responding to the UNSCEAR media release, a World Nuclear News item was titled: 'Fear and Stress Outweigh Fukushima Radiation Risk'.

The UNSCEAR media release has still more to offer nuclear apologists and propagandists, noting that additional exposures received by most Japanese people from Fukushima fallout are less than the doses received from natural background radiation. That is certainly true, but UNSCEAR should note that radiation doses below background levels can cause cancer. A 2010 UNSCEAR report states that "even at low doses of radiation it is likely that there is a very small but non-zero chance of the production of DNA mutations that increase the risk of cancer developing. Thus, the current balance of available evidence tends to favour a non-threshold response for the mutational component of radiation-associated cancer induction at low doses and low dose rates."

The 31 May 2013 UNSCEAR media release is posted at www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/en/pressrels/2013/unisinf475.html
The 2010 UNSCEAR report is posted at www.unscear.org/docs/reports/2010/UNSCEAR_2010_Report_M.pdf
For useful background to UNSCEAR's latest jiggery-pokery, see Dr Ian Fairlie's 25 February 2013 web-post, 'UNSCEAR Attempt to Limit Collective Dose Assessments from Fukushima's Fallout', posted at www.ianfairlie.org/news/unscear-attempt-to-limit-collective-dose-assessm...

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USA: San Onofre reactors permanently shut down
Both reactors at the San Onofre nuclear power plant in California are being retired after a long battle. "We have concluded that the continuing uncertainty about when or if San Onofre might return to service was not good for our customers, our investors or the need to plan for our region's long-term electricity needs," said Ted Craver from Edison International - the parent company of San Onofre owners Southern California Edison (SCE).

In January 2012, a fault in one of two new steam generators installed as part of an uprate program of reactor #3 resulted in an automatic shut down when radioactive material was detected coming from a worn tube in the steam generator. Reactor #2 was kept off-line after a maintenance outage because it shares the same steam generator design and also suffered from tube wear and vibration issues to a lesser degree.

A review process by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, incomplete after eight months, will presumably be discontinued in light of the decision by Edison / SCE. The two reactors have licences to operate until 2022.

A well-organised local, state and national campaign fought against the restart of the reactors. Erich Pica, president of Friends of the Earth US, said: "This is very good news for the people of Southern California. We have long said that these reactors are too dangerous to operate and now Edison has agreed. The people of California now have the opportunity to move away from the failed promise of dirty and dangerous nuclear power and replace it with the safe and clean energy provided by the sun and the wind."

The two reactors — situated along the Pacific Coast in the densely populated corridor between San Diego and Los Angeles — are the largest to shut down permanently in the US in the past 50 years. San Onofre's two reactors are the third and fourth reactors to be retired so far this year in the US − Dominion shut its reactor in Wisconsin in May because of unfavourable economics, and Duke said in February that it would not restart Crystal River 3 because mechanical problems were too expensive to fix.

In other shut-downs over the years, the Shoreham plant in New York was completed in 1984 for US$6 billion but never opened because of community opposition. Decaying generator tubes helped push San Onofre's original reactor into retirement in 1992, even though it was designed to run until 2004. In 1993, the Trojan plant in Oregon was closed years earlier than planned because of cracks in steam tubes.

World Nuclear News, Regulatory delay closes San Onofre, 7 June 2013, www.world-nuclear-news.org/C_Regulatory_delay_closes_San_Onofre_0706132....
Timeline: San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station www.10news.com/home/timeline-san-onofre-nuclear-generating-station
Friends of the Earth to NRC: Operating San Onofre as a Nuclear Experiment Is Not an Option, http://www.commondreams.org/newswire/2013/05/24-1
San Onofre insider says NRC should not allow nuclear restart, www.10news.com/news/investigations/san-onofre-insider-says-nrc-should-no...
San Onofre Nuclear Plant at the Brink, www.counterpunch.org/2013/05/17/san-onofre-at-the-no-nukes-brink

About: 
Santa Maria de GaronaSan Onofre 2San Onofre 1San Onofre 3

US MOX plant may get the axe

Nuclear Monitor Issue: 
#763
13/06/2013
Article

The Obama administration has reduced funding for the construction of a MOX fabrication plant at the Department of Energy's Savannah River site in South Carolina. The plant is about 60% complete but the Obama administration has asked Congress for US$320 million in its 2014 budget — down more than 25% from the current annual budget of US$435 million. In its budget request, the administration wrote that its high costs "may make the project unaffordable" and pledged to look for different ways to dispose of plutonium.

The Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility is being built to carry out a bilateral deal with Russia to dispose of 34 tonnes of plutonium. However there is currently no agreed customer for the eventual MOX fuel, while Russia has decided to incorporate its plutonium into fuel for fast-neutron reactors rather than MOX for conventional reactors.

Planning for a MOX plant at Savannah River was first announced in 1998. The Department of Energy projected the construction and 25-year operating cost at US$1.8 billion to $2.3 billion, with operations starting in 2007. By the time construction began in 2007, the estimated construction cost had climbed to US$4.9 billion and the completion date had slid to 2016. In March, the Government Accountability Office told Congress that the construction cost has increased to at least US$7.7 billion, and the operational date will slip to 2019. Thus the estimated cost has risen from US$1.8 billion to US$7.7 billion, and start-up has slipped from 2007 to 2019. The project has cost US$3.7 billion so far, and the proposed allocation of US$320 million in 2014 represents less than 10% of the estimated US$4 billion required to complete construction.

Robert Raines from the National Nuclear Security Administration said that the project has suffered from rising costs, poor oversight, unrealistic expectations and inadequately designed critical components. He told a House appropriations subcommittee: "There was a tendency towards optimism in developing project estimates, assessing and assigning risks, identifying and locking in project requirements, and evaluating and monetizing the cost and schedule impacts of building a first-of- a-kind Hazard Category 1 nuclear facility."

Meanwhile, a Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensing board is reviewing claims that the propsed MOX plant does not include adequate security measures. Watchdog groups, including the Union of Concerned Scientists, Nuclear Watch South and the Blue Ridge Environmental Defense League, argue that "the risk of plutonium theft would be increased to an unacceptable level" if a federal contractor does not make "fundamental changes" to its plans to secure and account for material at the plant.

Shaw Areva MOX Services, which is building the plant, "proposes to rely on a computerized inventory system to meet certain NRC … regulations in lieu of conventional approaches that entail physical verification of plutonium items," the groups said in a statement.

Edwin Lyman, a senior scientist with Union of Concerned Scientists, argued the company "is proposing a cut-rate approach for plutonium accounting that will make it much harder to detect a diversion or theft of plutonium before it is too late." The "computer-heavy approach could also increase the vulnerability of their accounting system to cyber attack," Lyman said.

Shaw Areva MOX Services said its proposed system meets NRC standards requiring "a licensee to verify, on a statistical sampling basis, the presence and integrity of [sensitive nuclear material], with a 99 percent power of detecting losses of five formula kilograms or more, plant wide, within 30 days ..."

Problems associated with plutonium management and accounting were all too evident at the Sellafield plant in the UK in 2005. A broken pipe in the THORP reprocessing plant led to the leaking into a containment structure of 83,000 litres of a highly radioactive liquor containing dissolved spent nuclear fuel. The spill contained 160 kgs of plutonium − enough to build 15-20 nuclear weapons − yet the loss went undetected for at least eight months. The accident was classified as Level 3 ('serious incident') on the 7-point International Nuclear Event Scale. British Nuclear Group Sellafield Limited was fined 500,000 pounds plus costs after pleading guilty to three serious, prolonged breaches of its licence conditions.

The UK Health and Safety Executive concluded: "An underlying cause was the culture within the plant that condoned the ignoring of alarms, the non-compliance with some key operating instructions, and safety-related equipment which was not kept in effective working order for some time, so this became the norm. In addition, there appeared to be an absence of a questioning attitude, for example, even where the evidence from the accountancy data was indicating something untoward, the possibility of a leak did not appear to be considered as a credible explanation until the evidence of a leak was incontrovertible."

References and main sources:

 

EPR: outstanding desing issues

Nuclear Monitor Issue: 
#751
4250
15/06/2012
Pete Roche
Article

In both the Unites States and United Kingdom, the EPR-design is awaiting approval from the nuclear regulatory bodies. A whole list of outstanding issues have to be addressed by EDF and Areva in the UK and in the US, a new revised schedule shows the EPR is unlikely to receive design certification by the nuclear regulator before the end of 2014.

On 14th December 2011 the United Kingdom’s Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) and Environment Agency granted interim Design Acceptance Confirmations (iDACs) and interim Statements of Design Acceptability (iSoDAs) for the UK EPR and the AP1000 reactor designs. The ONR‘s interim approval for the UK EPR came with a long list of caveats – 31 so-called “GDA Issues”.

UK: Generic Design Assessment
Since then EDF and Areva have closed out only one of the 31 “GDA Issues” According to the ONR’s latest Generic Design Assessment (GDA) quarterly report — issued on 24th May for the period ending March 31 — EDF and Areva have fallen substantially behind in the number of responses to the GDA Issue resolution to date. ONR said the shortfalls in deliverables “are having an effect on our progress and on our ability to use the (outside) technical support contractors we had programmed to support our work, as their availability is not always guaranteed when the original assessment dates have been missed.”

The GDA Issue resolution plan Areva and EDF agreed to with ONR called for all GDA Issues to be resolved by November 2012. This will now extend into 2013. Areva and EDF have committed to deploy additional resources and submit a revised GDA Issue resolution plan, but ONR is still waiting to receive it. Building magazine reported in its May 25 issue, that the process is three months behind schedule.

Among the 30 remaining GDA Issues that have yet to be closed is one on the EPR’s control and instrumentation (C&I) system, which was the subject of an unprecedented joint regulatory letter from the UK, France and Finland in 2009. The French safety regulator, the Autorité de Sûreté Nucléaire, on April 16 removed its reservations about the digital C&I system for the EPR, but the ONR is still waiting for some deliverables due from EDF and Areva on the C&I GDA Issues.

The process of working to close out the 31 “GDA Issues” is leading to some design changes, according to ONR. “We have received a number of modification proposals to amend the EPR design to take account of the solutions proposed to some of the GDA Issues,” ONR said in its latest quarterly report, citing two examples. There are two related design changes to the main coolant loop pipework and both improve the quality of inspection achievable during construction and operation.

US: delay EPR certification
Design certification in the US is also likely to be delayed: the EPR is unlikely to receive design certification by the US nuclear regulator, NRC, before the end of 2014, and even that will “present a challenge”. Design certification for the EPR had earlier been targeted for June 2013. Areva submitted its application for certification of the EPR design in December 2007 aiming to clear the way for reactors of that generic type to be built anywhere in America subject to site-specific licensing procedures and the issue of a combined construction and operating licence (COL). Four COL applications referencing the EPR have already been submitted to the NRC.

The NRC has issued a new review schedule to allow Areva to respond to outstanding technical issues previously raised by the NRC and to provide additional information related to new post-Fukushima requirements issued by the commission in February.

Under the revised schedule, Areva is expected to submit to the NRC, by 30 August 2013, details about how the EPR design meets the post-Fukushima requirements and all outstanding technical issues should be resolved by 1 November 2013.

Matthews told Areva that there is "no margin" in the schedule to allow for the timing of "critical milestones" to be changed and still achieve certification by the end of 2014. He added, "While the staff has increased its attention to meeting the schedule, we will ensure that the design meets all applicable NRC regulatory requirements before we proceed to certification rulemaking."

In July 2010, the NRC highlighted two areas of concern related to the EPR design. These centered on design complexity and independence issues: each safety division within the system must be able to perform its function without relying on data from outside and must also be protected from adverse external influences. Areva needs to demonstrate to the regulator's satisfaction that these issues have been addressed, and show that data exchange between systems will not adversely affect safety.

Areva has already described proposed design changes intended to reduce the level of complexity as well as to address some of the intercommunication issues. However, Areva has notified the NRC of some areas where its feels that design changes are not advisable, and these appear to be the areas which the regulator feels may not meet its standards.

Source: NuClear News No.41, June 2012 / World Nuclear News, 31 May 2012
Contact: Pete Roche
Email: pete[at]no2nuclearpower.org.uk

About: 
WISE

Shake-up at U.S. NRC: Jackzo resigning, anti-Yucca geologist nominated as replacement

Nuclear Monitor Issue: 
#750
4239
01/06/2012
Michael Mariotte
Article

For many months, four of the five NRC Commissioners, backed loudly by Congressional Republicans, have been waging an unprecedented and nasty campaign to remove NRC Chairman Greg Jaczko from his post. Their public complaints have focused on management style, accusations of bullying of NRC staff, and an unwillingness to keep the four informed on some key issues.

The real issue for waging a campaign to remove NRC Chairman Jaczko from his post has been policy. Jaczko was appointed Chair by President Obama in 2009 at the urging of his former employer, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, in part because Jaczko was a longtime and effective opponent of the Yucca Mountain radioactive waste dump. Obama had agreed to end the Yucca Mt. project and Jaczko was expected to—and did—end NRC review of the Department of Energy’s license application for the project. After all, with DOE no longer pursuing the project nor willing to spend money to defend its application or participate in the process, there wasn’t much left to review. But some of the Commissioners felt differently.

That alone wouldn’t have been enough, however, to foment this kind of revolt. The last straw for the Commission majority was Fukushima. First, Jaczko kept them out of the NRC’s emergency operations center during the height of the crisis. He didn’t want critical NRC staffers having to disrupt their 24-hour/day work to answer Commissioner questions. Then Jaczko stood with President Obama and urged Americans within 50 miles of Fukushima to evacuate—even though NRC policy only contemplates evacuations out to 10 miles.

And when an NRC staff task force was set up to examine lessons learned from Fukushima and recommend regulatory changes, Jaczko ran interference for them and kept the other Commissioners from disrupting their process. He then took those recommendations and pressed hard for their speedy implementation against the opposition of the other Commissioners. Finally, Jaczko voted against both new reactor licenses granted by the NRC in 2012 (and voted against relicensing of the Fukushima-clone Pilgrim reactor in Massachusetts end of May).

None of this was welcomed by the nuclear power industry, nor their allies on the Commission and on Capitol Hill. So despite the fact that the NRC ranked in annual surveys as the best place to work in the entire federal government throughout Jaczko’s term, Jaczko’s management abilities were suddenly brought into question and the bullying (and worse) charges levied against him. Bitter Congressional hearings were held.

Jaczcko has his powerful Congressional supporters of course, like Sen. Reid, along with Senate Environment Committee chair Barbara Boxer and Rep. Ed Markey, usually the most outspoken nuclear critic in Congress. But it was becoming obvious that he would be unlikely to be confirmed for another term as Chair when his appointment runs out in June 2013. And, really, who in his right mind would want to subject themselves to five more years of the kind of abuse heaped on him?

So in May, Jaczko announced he would resign, but that his resignation would only become effective upon confirmation of a new chair. Given the slow pace of action and deep polarization in Congress, that might keep him in the job for months and perhaps fully through his term.

But the nuclear industry and Congressional Republicans really want a new term for Commissioner Kristine Svinicki—by voting record the most pro-industry Commissioner of them all. Her term ends next month. Sens. Reid and Boxer had already stated their opposition to that renomination (which Obama unfortunately did make), and it appeared unlikely she would be confirmed.

But with Jaczko’s announcement, Reid—who is dedicated to permanently defeating Yucca Mountain--seized on the opportunity, and apparently convinced President Obama to nominate Allison Macfarlane as the new NRC chair.

Macfarlane is a geologist and a longtime opponent of Yucca Mountain, on strictly scientific grounds. She simply doesn’t believe it is a suitable site for radioactive waste and has said so clearly. She also opposes reprocessing of radioactive waste, and believes waste in fuel pools should be moved to dry casks. Most recently she was a member of the Department of Energy’s Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future, which adopted some of her positions.

Macfarlane is not anti-nuclear power, however, and it is somewhat unclear how far her expertise extends on nuclear reactor safety issues.

Macfarlane would never be confirmed by the Senate in normal times. Except there is that Svinicki nomination, which was headed for a no vote. So, the Nuclear Energy Institute quickly fell into line and endorsed Macfarlane as a package deal with Svinicki. So did Senator Reid. While some extreme right-wing commentators and industry people have since weighed in urging the Senate to reject Macfarlane, at this point it looks like the deal will hold. One thing is certain at this point: either the NRC will get both of them, or neither of them. Hearings are expected on both nominations early in June, and possibly a Senate floor vote shortly thereafter.

Source and contact: Michael Mariotte, NIRS Washington
Email: nirsnet[at]nirs.org

About: 
NIRS

In brief

Nuclear Monitor Issue: 
#749
11/05/2012
Shorts

Two possible suppliers left for Jordan's first.  Jordan's first nuclear power plant will be supplied by either AtomStroyExport of Russia or the Areva-Mitsubishi Heavy Industries joint venture, Atmea.
The past three years have seen the Jordan Atomic Energy Commission (JAEC) whittle down a list of seven offers from four reactor vendors to the two announced on April 30. Jordanian official news agency Petra reported that the JAEC has decided to continue discussions with AtomStroyExport and the Atmea consortium, describing them as the two suppliers "best qualified" with the technology to best meet Jordan's requirements and needs. Both reactors still under consideration are advanced pressurized water reactors (PWRs) offering enhanced active and passive safety systems. The 1150 MWe Atmea 1 represents an evolution of French standard designs, and received preliminary safety approval from French nuclear regulators earlier this year. The AES-92 is a version of the VVER-1000 with enhanced safety and seismic features. Two AES-92 units are under construction at Koodankulam in India, while the closely related AES-91 is under construction at Tianwan in China. The JAEC will now continue discussions with the two shortlisted suppliers to resolve outstanding technical issues including the site selection process.
World Nuclear News, 30 April 2012


Charges dropped against Vermont Yankee protesters.
Prosecutors in Vermont are dropping criminal trespassing charges against 136 protesters who were arrested March 22,  at the corporate offices of the Vermont Yankee nuclear power plant. The protesters were arrested at the Entergy Corp. offices in Brattleboro. They refused to leave the property while demonstrating on the first day of the Vermont Yankee plant's operation after the expiration of its 40-year state license. On April 26, Windham County State's Attorney Tracy Shriver decided against moving forward with the charges given the limited resources of her office and the courts. "Weighing the seriousness of the criminal offences committed by the protestors against the time and means necessary to proceed with these cases has led me to decide against moving forward with these cases."

The Vermont Yankee plant, located in Vernon, has a new permit from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to operate for 20 more years, but its state license is expired. Over a 1000 people took place in the March 22 protest. (see Nuclear Monitor 741: Showdown for Vermont Yankee).
Brattleboro Reformer, 26 April 2012


Jaitapur: commemoration of death protestor. 
In India, opposition to nuclear projects is large. Besides the more publicized, but still rather unknown struggle at Koodankulam, the struggle at Jaitapur is fierce. On 18 April 2012, it was exactly one year ago that the people’s expression of anger against the proposed 9900 MW Jaitapur nuclear power project at Madban village of Ratnagiri district in Maharashtra was on full display. People were continuously protesting from 2005 on when the land acquisition was set in motion and against environment clearance granted by the central government. A group of furious women ransacked and burnt papers and furniture at the Nate police station. The tension between the police and the people mounted which culminated in the police firing causing the death of Tarbej Sayekar, a 27 year youth.

The people in the Jaitapur locality observed the first death anniversary of martyr Tarbej Sayekar by observing a bandh (Bandh originally a Hindi word meaning 'closed', is a form of protest. During a Bandh, a political party or a community declares a general strike) and once again opposing the Jaitapur power project. On this occasion, between 3 to 5 in the afternoon, a crowd of about 3000 people gathered together and offered their tributes to martyr Tarbej Sayekar by reading the Koran.

Jaitapur Nuclear Power Project is a proposed 9900 MW power project of Nuclear Power

Corporation of India (NPCIL) at Madban village of Ratnagiri district in Maharashtra. On December 6, 2010 agreement was signed for the construction of first set of two third-generation European Pressurized Reactors and the supply of nuclear fuel for 25 years in the presence of French President Nicolas Sarkozy and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh.
South Asians Against Nukes (SAAN), 18 April 2012


South Africa: environmental campaigner resigns from regulator.
Long-time environmental campaigner Mariette Liefferink has resigned from the NNR (South Africa's National Nuclear Regulator) citing her frustration over the organization's failure to deal with vulnerable communities exposed to dangerous mining waste. In 2009, the Minister of Energy appointed Liefferink, the chief executive of the Federation for a Sustainable Environment, to the board of the regulator to represent the concerns of communities affected by nuclear issues. But now she says: "I see no benefits to remaining on the board because I cannot raise the concerns of communities." "There are 1.6 million people living in informal settlements on or adjacent to radioactive waste... and there are no management plans in place." A number of 36 sites are identified as 'radiological hotspots' in the Wonderfonteinspruit area. These sites are radioactive because of the uraniferous nature of the ore, but "[T]here is still no physical evidence of rehabilitation."

"The communities living in radioactive mine residue areas are mostly informal settlements but no regulatory decisions have been take regarding their protection."

She ends her resignation-letter saying: "It has become evident that there is a fundamental anomaly between what I perceive as the duty of the Board and the NNR and the Board’s and the NNR’s understanding of their duties."
Mariette Lieferinks resignation letter to Energy Minister Peters, 16 April 2012 / Star newspaper, 21 April 2012


PE planned reactor project now decade delayed.
US: Progress Energy -not long ago considered to be in the forefront of the US's nuclear renaissance- said on May 1, it will delay building its planned Levy nuclear plant in Florida by another three years. The announcement sets back the twin reactor project to a 2025-26 time frame from the original planned date of 2015-17 for the reactors to come online and start generating electricity. The company also updated its cost estimate for the planned Florida reactors from US$17 billion. The new estimate is US$19 billion to US$24 billion. The estimates don't include the cost of debt interest, which would likely add hundreds of millions of dollars to the price tag.
The delay in Florida is also taking place in North Carolina. Progress had originally planned to add two reactors at the Shearon Harris nuclear plant in Wake County by 2020-21. But now those proposed reactors are not in the company's 15-year plan, which means they would not be added until 2027 at the earliest, and possibly much later.
.biz (blogs.newsobserver.com/business), 1 May 2012


Lithuania: no case for compensation Hitachi before 2015. On May 9, Lithuania's government gave its final approval to several plans aimed at "reducing its dependency on Russian energy sources", including the 1,350 ABWR nuclear power plant which it said could cost up to 7 billion euros (US$9.1 billion).

Lithuania has already initialled an outline plan with Hitachi-GE Nuclear Energy with aim to build it by 2020-2022 for about 5 billion euros. However, the Finance Ministry said in a statement the end cost for the project could be 6.8 billion euros.

Around 4 billion euros would be borrowed and the rest would come from the countries backing the project, Lithuania (38%), Latvia (20%) and Estonia (22%), as well as Hitachi (20%). Poland was originally part of the project, but dropped out.

On April 16, Lithuanian Finance Minister Ingrida Šimonytė, said Lithuania has time until March 2015 to cancel the Visaginas plant without having to pay high compensation to the Japanese company Hitachi. "Based on the information that I have, in the initial design stage, before a final decision to invest and build a nuclear power plant, financial risks, which may be incurred by Lithuania is very limited", said Šimonytė.

According to the President of the Parliamentary Committee on Budget and Finance, Kestutis Glaveckasa, however, Lithuania will be forced to pay billions in damages, if the government withdraws from the contract for the construction of nuclear power plant. But Šimonytė stresses that the Ministry of Finance is at the stage of analyzing the concession agreement, the Lithuanian government signed in late March with a Japanese corporation. Later, a draft agreement will be presented to Parliament.
www.cire.pl, 16 April 2012 / Reuters, 9 May 2012


Why the fuzz? Lauvergeon vs Lauvergeon.
Anne Lauvergeon, the former head of France's state-controlled nuclear group Areva accused French President Nicolas Sarkozy of wanting to try to sell a nuclear reactor to  Muammar Gaddafi's Libya at least until the summer of 2010. In interview published on April 10, on the website of L'Express weekly Lauvergeon said that Sarkozy proposed in July 2007 to sell a nuclear reactor to the Gaddafi government to be used to desalinate ocean water. Gaddafi, who ruled Libya for 42 years, was overthrown and killed in October by rebels backed by a NATO force in which French warplanes played a major role. Lauvergeon said she opposed the idea "vigorously". She said: "The state, which was supposed to be responsible, was supporting this folly. Imagine, if we'd done it, how it would look now!" Nothing new, one would imagine, but the interview received some resonance in the international press.

On July 2, 2007 Sarkozy signed an widely publicized global partnership agreement with Libya: the two countries "agree to enhance cooperation on the peaceful use of nuclear energy, possibly leading to a civilian nuclear power program". It paved the way for the potential export by Areva of an EPR reactor to Lybia. There are no documents showing Lauvergeon, at that time head of Areva, opposed such a deal then. Lauvergeon was fired June last year.

Sarkozy was defeated by socialist party candidate Francois Hollande in the presidential elections on May 6, 2012.
Yves Marignac, WISE Paris, 15 November 2007 / Reuters, 10 April 2012.


Metsamor operations officially extended.
The Armenian government formally decided on April 19 to extend operations at the Metsamor VVER 440/230 nuclear power reactor, apparently because there is a delay in its planned replacement by a new facility. "Taking into account possible time frames for the launch of the new atomic energy block in the Republic of Armenia and the need to maintain the country´s energy security and independence during that period, it is necessary to extend the exploitation period of the Power Block No. 2," Energy Minister Armen Movisian said at a cabinet meeting that approved the measure.

The government assigned the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources to draw up by May next year a program of measures to ensure Metsamor´s longer-than-planned operations and their safety. The program will have to be submitted to the government for approval by September 2013. The construction of the new reactor is currently planned in 2013.

Metsamor was due to be decommissioned by September 2016 in accordance with the 30-year design life span. Armenia and in particular the area where Metsamor is located is an extreme seismic active area.
Azatutyan, 19 April 2012

Vogtle construction faces "additional delay"

Nuclear Monitor Issue: 
#749
4234
11/05/2012
Article

Late March, less than two months after receiving a nuclear construction license for its new Vogtle reactors, Southern Company is already pressing Nuclear Regulatory Commission for an expedited license amendment to avoid further slippage. Delays are already considerable, since pouring of the concrete, planned to start immediately after receiving permission in February, will not start before June. Furthermore, Southern Company has already identified 32 License Amendment Requests it will seek by 2014. This could add millions to cost overruns already documented at Vogtle and lead to other construction delays.

Less than two months after receiving the nuclear construction license for Vogtle in eastern Georgia, Southern Company is already requesting a license amendment to allow changes to the foundation on which the reactor building would be built. A request which the company aimed to file by last Friday seeks to relax standards for the concrete foundation due to Southern’s miscalculation of soil compaction, and the company is pressing regulators for swift approval to avoid what it calls “an additional delay in the construction of the nuclear island basemat structure and subsequent construction activities …”.

In a letter to the NRC dated March 30, 2012, Southern Company admits that construction of the reactor base has not yet begun and that construction will begin in mid-June – if NRC quickly approves the licensing change. It had been thought that pouring of so-called “nuclear concrete” would begin immediately on issuance of the construction license in February, but the letter confirms the long delay.

In the filing made public early April, Southern has asked the NRC to allow it to pour the foundation at its own risk in June even though the foundation may not meet current license specifications. Southern asked that NRC approve the preliminary amendment request (PAR)  by June 1. If NRC does not object to a PAR, the licensee may proceed with the action described at its own risk while the agency reviews the related license amendment. If NRC were to subsequently reject the license amendment request, the licensee would have to restore the site to an acceptable condition, the agency has said. Industry pressed for the PAR process to prevent project delays while NRC conducts year-long reviews of license amendments.

Southern Company’s amendment request describes how recent surveys determined that a level foundation for three “nuclear island” buildings cannot be obtained unless the previously allowed one-inch variation in the “mudmat” substrate is increased to four inches. The nuclear island foundation supports the weight of the buildings and equipment and is vital in protecting the plant against earthquakes and other loads.

Southern told NRC that the increased tolerance should not impact earlier analyses or require additional testing, and it warned that the unforeseen need for the foundation change could cause serious delays to numerous parts of the project. But public interest groups pointed out today that foundational concrete is central to the entire project, and that any relaxing of requirements could have serious safety and cost implications.

“Southern Company clearly miscalculated soil compaction in the holes excavated for both reactors at the Vogtle site, which could be an omen about the path forward,” said Jim Warren of NC WARN today. “The NRC simply cannot skip any steps in reviewing this fundamental safety issue just to accommodate the construction schedule, and a public hearing on the design change is warranted.” 

32 Amendment requests
Additionally, Southern Company has already identified 32 License Amendment Requests it will seek by 2014. The list of LARs contains little mention of impacts on construction schedule or cost. Nor is it clear how the list of proposed changes might impact a federal lawsuit that is seeking to stop construction at Vogtle.

NC WARN and the Alliance for Nuclear Accountability believe that the changes being sought via the LARs could add millions to cost overruns already documented at Vogtle and lead to other construction delays.

The public interest groups noted today that each LAR proceeding normally takes up to one year or longer, and that one or more of the nine nonprofits contesting the Vogtle project might choose to intervene in any of the 32 license amendments being sought. Regardless of interventions, the NRC’s ability to handle so many license amendment reviews is in question.

Also, it is not clear whether Georgia utility law allows Southern to continue construction without the NRC’s full approval of LARs – while pre-charging ratepayers for the plant. And the problems could further complicate a pending and highly controversial US$8.3 federal taxpayer loan guarantee.

Tom Clements of the Alliance for Nuclear Accountability said: “The foundation problem raises questions about quality control and highlight concern about slippages in the construction schedule. The foundation problem and the long list of scheduled license amendments show that other changes and unexpected ahurdles are ahead for the Vogtle project.”

Source: News release from NC WARN and Alliance for Nuclear Accountability, 9 April 2012 / International Energy (en.in-en.com), 10 April 2012
Contact: NC WARN (North Carolina Waste Awareness and Reduction Network), P.0. Box 61051, Durham NC 27715-1051, USA.
Tel: +1-919 416-5077
Email: ncwarn@ncwarn.org
Web: www.ncwarn.org

About: 
Vogtle 3Vogtle 4

Taiwan, Ukraine, United Kingdom, USA

Nuclear Monitor Issue: 
#746, 747, 748
Waste special
01/05/2012
Article

Taiwan

Nr. of reactors

first grid connection

% of total electricity 

6

1977-11-16

19.02%

Taiwan has adopted the following management strategy for spent nuclear fuel: “storage in spent fuel pools for the near term, onsite dry storage for the mid-term, and final deep geological disposal for the long term".(*01)

Atomic Energy Council (AEC) was founded in 1955 at the ministerial level under the Executive Yuan as the Competent Authority (regulatory body). FCMA is the unique agency for the supervision of spent fuel and radioactive waste safety management. Radwaste Administration (RWA) was established in January 1981, as an affiliated agency under AEC, to meet the growing need for radioactive waste management. After restructuring RWA was renamed as Fuel Cycle and Materials Administration (FCMA) in early 1996.(*02)

Low-level waste
The Lan-Yu Storage Site provides off-site interim storage for solidified low-level radioactive waste from 1982 to 1996, and has not received any radioactive waste since then. Because of the high temperature, moisture, and salty ambient atmosphere in Orchid Island, many drums stored on site for decades has shown paint scaling or rusted, some waste in drums even presents solification deformation.(*03)

Interim dry storage
Taiwan’s current policy calls for dry storage of spent fuel at the reactor site until final disposal, although it is recognized that additional storage facilities will be needed soon to deal with the growing amount of spent fuel being produced. Taiwan is also looking at sending its fuel overseas for reprocessing. However, U.S. government opposition to Taiwanese reprocessing has so far blocked significant movement on this; since Taiwanese reactors and fuel are of U.S. origin, bilateral agreements require Taiwan to obtain U.S. consent for reprocessing.(*04)

Recognizing the problem of spent fuel storage, the authorities began looking toward cooperation on the development of dry storage technology, with mixed success. China offered to take over Taiwan’s spent fuel inventory in the late 1990’s but Taiwan refused due to fears that Beijing would demand political concessions in exchange.(*05) In 2001, Taiwan also explored the possibility of storing its spent fuel on Russian territory; but dropped negotiations after U.S. objections.(*06) However, this could still be a possibility in the long-term.

Since December 1983, research for final disposal has been carried out. The "Nuclear Materials and Radioactive Waste Management Act" was issued in December 2002. It states that the producer of high-level waste is responsible for the implementation of final disposal and is required to submit a final disposal plan for HLRW within two years after the Act came into effect. In Dec. 2004, TPC submitted the "Spent Nuclear Fuel Final Disposal Plan" to AEC. The plan was approved in July, 2006, and will be carried out in five phases: (1) Potential host rock characterization (2) Candidate site investigation; (3) Detailed site investigation and testing; (4) Repository design and license application; and (5) Repository construction. Finally, a deep geological disposal repository is expected to be operational after 2055.(*07)

Ukraine

Nr. of reactors

first grid connection

% of total electricity 

15

1977-09-26

47.20%

Established in 1996 the State Enterprise National Nuclear Energy Generating Company 'Energoatom' is responsible for everything nuclear in Ukraine, including radioactive waste management. There is no intention for final disposal in Ukraine in the coming decades, though the possibility remains under consideration. In 2008 the National Target Environmental Program of Radioactive Waste Management was approved. Storage of used fuel for at least 50 years before disposal remains the policy.(*01)

Waste management: Interim storage
Before 2005, Ukraine transported annually about 220 tons of spent fuel to Russia.(*02) Because of the rising price of Russia’s reprocessing and spent-fuel storage services, however, Energoatom  decided in the 1990s to construct dry storage facilities. The first Ukrainian dry-cask interim storage facility came into operation in July 2001 at the Zaporozhe nuclear power plant for storage of fuel from the six reactors.(*03) But since 2005, Ukraine has been shipping spent fuel again to Russia from its other sites: about 150 tons a year from seven VVER-1000s and about 30 tons a year from its two VVER-440s,(*04) at a cost to Ukraine of over US$100 annual.(*05)

In December 2005, Energoatom signed a US$ 150 million agreement with the US-based Holtec International to implement the Central Spent Fuel Storage Project for Ukraine's VVER reactors.(*06) This was projected for completion in 2008, but was held up pending legislation.

Then in October 2011 parliament (and upper house in February 2012) passed a bill on management of spent nuclear fuel. It provides for construction of the dry storage facility within the Chernobyl exclusion area. The storage facility will become a part of the spent nuclear fuel management complex of the state-owned company Chernobyl NPP,(*07) also constructed by Holtec.

The first pond-type spent fuel storage facility (SFSF-1) for RBMK-1000 spent fuel at Chernobyl has been in operation since 1986. Due to the “unavailability of SFSF-2 and taking into account the future prospects of this project it was decided to withdraw SFSF-1 from the list of facilities, subject to decommissioning.

SFSF-2 (or Interim Storage Facility-2 as it is often called outside Ukraine) construction started in June 2000 by Framatome (later Areva), financed by EBRD's Nuclear Safety Account, and part pf the Shelter Implementation Plan. ISF-2 is designed for long-term storage (100 years) of all Chernobyl spent fuel and is a necessary condition for decommissioning Chernobyl and SFSF-1. At the beginning of April, 2007 the agreement was canceled and in September 2007 a contract for completion was signed also with Holtec.(*08) The design of the new facility was approved by the Ukrainian regulator in late-2010. Work can commence once the contract amendment for the implementation is signed. It is expected that construction work will be finalized by 2014.(*09) Negotiations with Holtec on the construction could be completed in April 2012. Costs, however, have been escalating since the project financing scheme was drawn up before the 2008 financial crisis: some U.S. banks that participated in the financing scheme had ceased to exist.(*10)

High-level wastes from reprocessed spent fuel will be returned from Russia from 2013 onwards and should be stored at the existing repository 'Vektor' 17 km away from Chernobyl where a low-level waste repository has been built.(*11) Preliminary investigations have shortlisted sites for a deep geological repository for high- and intermediate-level wastes including all those arising from Chernobyl decommissioning and clean-up.(*12)

United Kingdom

Nr. of reactors

first grid connection

% of total electricity 

17

1956-08-27

17.82%

In 1981, the government in Britain decided to postpone plans for the disposal of high-level radioactive waste. In 2010, the NDA came up with a plan that has to lead to final disposal of high-level waste from 2075. The government claims to follow an advisory committee, but the committee thinks the government gives a distorted view of their advice. Nuclear fuel is reprocessed and liquid and glassified waste is stored at Sellafield until a final repository will be opened.

Low- and medium-level radioactive waste
Great Britain dumped solid low and intermediate level radioactive waste in sea from 1949 untill 1982.(*01) A near-surface repository in Drigg (near Sellafield) has operated as a national low-level waste disposal facility since 1959. Wastes are compacted and placed in containers before being transferred to the facility.(*02)

Investigation from 1978 to 1981 into the disposal of high-level radioactive waste in Caithness led to much opposition. In 1981, the British government therefore decided to postpone a decision on the storage of high-level waste by fifty years.(*03)

Although in 1981 the government decided to postpone the plans for a high-level radioactive waste facility, the search for a storage place for low- and medium-level  radioactive waste had to be continued. For this purpose the British nuclear industry created Nirex in 1982. After repeated selections of a number of new sites and abandoning them again, Nirex chose Sellafield in 1991 for detailed studies on a deep repository for long-lived low-level and intermediate level radioactive waste.(*04)

In March 1997, however, the government rejected Sellafield due to the unfavorable geological conditions. The government has also decided that a new choice of location can take place only  after the government has adopted new procedures for that purpose, and for that participation is required. It took until 2001 before new procedures have been settled.(*05) It will take at least 25-30 years before a deep geological disposal facility for low en intermediate level radioactive waste will be in operation.(*06) Large information campaigns for years and years hasn’t led to a final repository for nuclear waste.

High-level radioactive waste
After the 1981 postponement of a decision on the storage of high-level, the parliament established a new waste policy in 2001, which led to the foundation of the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA) in 2002. The government set up the commission on radioactive waste management (CoRWM) in 2003 to consider long-term waste strategy. This committee has to advise the government on all sorts of nuclear waste, of which "inspire public confidence" and "protect people and the environment" have been central principles.(*07)

The CoRWM released an advice in July 2006.(*08) The committee calls robust interim storage (100 years) and geological disposal as the end-point for all high and intermediate level waste. in deep underground after intensive research into the long-term safety of disposal. For the realization of the storage "voluntarism and partnership" is important: the local population should be willing to cooperate. The government adopted the recommendations of the CoRWM in October 2006 and initiated a new round of official consultations that would end in 2008. Nirex was wound up and the government-owned Nuclear Decommissioning Authority was given responsibility for the long-term management of all UK radioactive wastes.

Meanwhile, it became clear there was a more positive feeling about the construction of nuclear power plants. CoRWM found it necessary to emphasized that its opinion is about nuclear waste that already exists ('legacy waste'): with nuclear waste from new-build power plants other ethical and political aspects play a role than with the present waste. CoRWM states there was no distinction, technically. Both could be accommodated in the same stores and disposal sites. But creating new-build wastes was a choice, and there were alternatives. The political, social and ethical issues surrounding the deliberate creation of new wastes were therefore quite different from those arising from the inevitable need to manage the legacy.(*09) CoRWM argued that the waste implications of any new build proposals would need their own assessment process.

On 10 January 2008, the government announced plans for the construction of new nuclear power plants, followed by a new nuclear waste policy on 12 June 2008.(*10) The government indicated to make no distinction between waste, which is now simply inevitable, and waste from new power plants. The government said that principles of "voluntarism and partnership" are to be used in the selection process and calls on municipalities to present themselves to host a disposal facility. Most of the land in the UK is thought to be geologically suitable for the store.(*11)

Several members of the first CoRWM don’t agree with the government. On a November 20, 2009, letter to the Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change(*12), Ed Miliband, they stated that the government has reproduced the CoRWM report in an incorrect and distorted way. "In conclusion we reiterate that we do not consider it credible to argue that effective arrangements exist or will exist either at a generic or a site-specific level for the long—term management of highly active radioactive wastes arising from new nuclear build." The members also protest against the fact that the government makes no distinction between unavoidable nuclear waste, which has been produced already, and new nuclear waste that can be avoid. "However, it is clear that government has conflated the issue of new build with legacy wastes and thereby intends the CoRWM proposals to apply to both. No separate process, as suggested by CoRWM1, for new build wastes is contemplated. There will be no opportunity for communities selected for new nuclear power stations to consider whether they wish to volunteer to host a long term radioactive waste facility; it will simply be imposed upon them."

On 15 January 2010, the Scottish government said that nuclear waste must be just stored above ground at or close to existing nuclear facilities (in Dounreay, Hunterston, Torness and Chapelcross), reducing the need for waste to be transported long distances. A consultation exercise on the issue has been launched. Underground storage is not eligible because "Having an out of sight, out of mind policy is losing support." The strategy is at odds with the UK government's preferred option of storing nuclear waste deep underground.(*13)

In March 2010, the NDA published a report in which it states that "a geological disposal facility will be available to receive ILW and LLW in 2040 and HLW and spent fuel in 2075",(*14) but spending cuts could delay the plans, and community support is vital.(*15)
The government thinks this takes too long, and Energy Minister, Charles Hendry, asked NDA's Radioactive Waste Management Directorate (RWMD) to look at reducing the timescales for first emplacement of high level waste (currently 2075) as well as the dates for spent fuel and waste from new build power stations presently indicated to take place in 2130.(*16)

In a preliminary response to the Minister's request RWMD says: "There are fundamental principles that are critical to the success of the implementation of the geological disposal programme. These are: the vital role of voluntarism and partnership with local communities (…); and, the need for technical and scientific work necessary to underpin the safe disposal of radioactive waste to be done rigorously and to the required high standard."(*17) RWDM will evaluate and "be in a position to consider whether or not changes to the programme would be realistic" in December 2012. (*18)

The long and tortuous story of UK radioactive waste policy demonstrates that achieving legitimacy around the management of these wastes is a social process with long time horizons. After 50 years of policies, institutional change and debate, extraordinarily little has been achieved in securing the long-term disposition of wastes.

United States of America

Nr. of reactors

first grid connection

% of total electricity 

104

1957-10-19

19.25%

The U.S. nuclear waste management policy in the 1960s was focused on underground storage in salt. From 1987 on it was all about Yucca Mountain. In 2009 newly elected President Obama thwarted the plan and a commission was founded to study possible disposal: the nuclear waste policy is back to square one. Awaiting a final disposal facility, spent fuel is stored on site of nuclear power plants. U.S. nuclear utilities are eager to demonstrate that the spent fuel will not stay on-site indefinitely. Thus far, however, all efforts to establish central interim storage facilities have been unsuccessful.(*01) The U.S. dumped between 1949 –1967 in an unknown number of operations radioactive waste in the Atlantic Ocean, and between 1946-1970 in the Pacific Ocean.(*02) No commercial reprocessing has taken place.

No high-level radioactive waste in salt
Already in 1957 the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) called storage of nuclear waste in salt the best option.(*03) Also the Atomic Energy Commission developed plans in that direction. In 1963 test drilling in salt began at Lyons, Kansas for a national repository. Because this produced unfavorable results, one went to other places to drill in salt. Also without success.(*04)

Then the eye fell on salt at Carlsbad, New Mexico. The construction of the storage mine (called Waste Isolation Pilot Plant -WIPP) was expected to cost US$ 100 million in 1974,(*05) was cancelled by president Carter in 1980, but Congress restored budget to keep it alive.(*06) The storage would initially begin in 1988, but, although the underground facility was finished by then, because water leaked into the mine (*07) the start of disposal is delayed many times.(*08,09,10) The first waste arrived at WIPP on March 26, 1999. (*11) Construction costs were estimated at US$ 2 billion. (*12)

Around 64,000 m3 of waste – out of the maximum allowed quantity of 175,600 m3 - was stored by the end of 2009. Storage is planned to continue until the end of the 2020s when the maximum allowed capacity will be reached; the mine will be closed in 2038.(*13) It is the world's first geological repository. However, not all nuclear waste can be stored at WIPP. The U.S. government makes a distinction between nuclear waste generated from the production of nuclear weapons and nuclear waste generated by the production of electricity from nuclear power plants. In Carlsbad, the storage of low and high level radioactive waste (including spent fuel) from nuclear power plants for electricity production has been expressly prohibited by the government.(*14) However, one part of the radioactive waste from nuclear weapons production was allowed to go there. Generally, TRU (Transuranic) waste consists of clothing, tools, rags, residues, debris, soil and other items contaminated with radioactive elements, mostly plutonium.(*15)

In 1982, the government established the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. This Act gave states with possible locations an important role in the supervision on the choice of location, including federal funds for its own investigation into the suitability of the site, for an amount of US$10 million per year. States also had the power to prevent the storage. The NWPA mandated that the DOE select three candidate sites for a geological repository for U.S. spent fuel and high-level waste.(*16)

The government adapted the rules. In 1984, the DOE put salt lower on the list and a year later only one salt layer remained on the list: Deaf Smith, Texas.(*17) In 1986, the DOE nominated sites in Texas (salt), Washington state (basalt) and in Nevada’s Yucca Mountain (volcanic tuff).(*17)

At the time, two of the most politically powerful members of Congress, the Speaker of the House and the House Majority Leader, represented Texas and Washington state respectively. They opposed siting the repository in their states. By comparison, the delegation from Nevada was politically relatively weak and so Yucca Mountain became the focus of attention.(*19) In 1987, therefore, Congress amended the Nuclear Waste Policy Act to direct that Yucca Mountain would be the only site to be examined for suitability for the first U.S. Geological repository. (*US20) The 1982 NWPA had mandated that the second repository be in crystalline rock, i.e., in the eastern half of the country, where most of the country’s power reactors are located. However, the 1987 amendments also instructed the DOE to “phase out in an orderly manner funding for all research programs … designed to evaluate the suitability of crystalline rock as a potential repository host medium.” (*21)

To reassure Nevada that other states would ultimately share the burden of hosting the nation’s radioactive waste, Congress also set a legal limit on the amount of radioactive waste that could be emplaced in Yucca Mountain “until such time as a second repository is in operation.” The limit was established as “a quantity of spent fuel containing in excess of 70,000 metric tons of heavy metal or a quantity of solidified high level radioactive waste resulting from the reprocessing of such a quantity of spent fuel.”(*22)

No high-level radioactive waste at Yucca Mountain
The implementation of the decision to dispose nuclear waste at Yucca Mountain did not go smoothly. "Yucca Mountain is not selected through a scientific method, but through a political process," said Robert Loux. He worked for the government of the state of Nevada as a leader of the real estate developer for radioactive waste. "The choice of the repository led to much resistance. The governor, congress delegates, local authorities and almost the entire population was against it." Yucca Mountain is located in an earthquake zone. Loux: "There are 32 underground fractures and four young volcanoes. In the summer of 1992, an earthquake occurred with a magnitude of 5.4 on the Richter scale. This led to considerable damage. Therefore Yucca Mountain is unsuitable. The government of Nevada has made laws that prohibit the storage.”(*23) In March 1998, a survey of the California Institute of Technology found that the risk of earthquakes and volcanic eruptions is larger than hitherto assumed.(*24)

The Yucca Mountain nuclear waste repository would have to come in operation in 2010, according to plans made in the 1980s. But it took until July 2002, when President Bush signed a resolution clearing the way for disposal at Yucca Mountain, (*25) and until June 2008 before the DOE applied for a permit to build the storage.(*26) President Barack Obama stopped the storage at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, in late February 2009,(*27) although DOE had spent US$14 billion (in 2009 dollars) from 1983 through 2008 for the Yucca Mountain repository. The construction of the storage mine and exploitation would have cost between US$41 and US$67 billion (2009 dollars) according to the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO).(*28) Obama finds Yucca Mountain unsuitable and unsafe for the disposal of radioactive waste and therefore "no option". A new strategy for the disposal of nuclear waste must be developed and on 29 January 2010, Obama appointed a commission to work out a new policy: the 'Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future'.(*29)

On 27 January 2012, after nearly two years of work, the Blue Ribbon Commission has issued its final recommendations for "creating a safe, long-term solution" for dealing with spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste. Efforts to develop a waste repository and a central storage facility should start immediately, it says. “Put simply, this nation's failure to come to grips with the nuclear waste issue has already proved damaging and costly. It will be even more damaging and more costly the longer it continues.” It continued, "The need for a new strategy is urgent, not just to address these damages and costs but because this generation has a fundamental, ethical obligation to avoid overburdening future generations with the entire task of finding a safe, permanent solution for managing hazardous nuclear materials they had no part in creating."(*30) Experience in the U.S. and in other nations suggests that any attempt to force a top down, federally mandated solution over the objections of a state or community - far from being more efficient - will take longer, cost more, and have lower odds of ultimate success. By contrast, the approach the commission recommends is explicitly adaptive, staged, and consent-based. In practical terms, this means encouraging communities to volunteer to be considered to host a new nuclear waste management facility while also allowing for the waste management organization to approach communities that it believes can meet the siting requirements. Siting processes for waste management facilities should include a flexible and substantial incentive program.(*31) On 31 January 2012, Energy Secretary Steven Chu said that the U.S. will likely need more than one permanent repository for commercial nuclear fuel.(*32) The U.S. nuclear waste policy is therefore back to square one. Except that there is no chance of returning to the option of salt domes or layers. This follows from the 2008 "Nuclear waste trust decision" of the U.S. government,(*33) stating: "Salt formations currently are being considered as hosts only for reprocessed nuclear materials because heat-generating waste, like spent nuclear fuel, exacerbates a process by which salt can rapidly deform. This process could potentially cause problems for keeping drifts stable and open during the operating period of a repository”.

Refrerences:

Taiwan
*01- Atomic Energy Council: High Level Radioactive Waste Final Disposal, 1 April 2011
*02- Taiwan: National Report under the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, June 2007
*03- Atomic Energy Council: Lan-yu Storage Site status, February 2012
*04- Nuclear Fuel:  Long-Term Spent Fuel Dilemma at Issue in Taiwan-U.S. Renegotiation, Nuclear Fuels, June 1, 2009.
*05- Nuclear Fuel: Taiwan Rejected Chinese Offer of Fresh Fuel for Waste Disposal, 20 April 1998
*06- Nuclear Fuel: Taiwan to Wait on U.S.-Russian Deal Before Taking Spent Fuel Initiative, 9 July 2001
*07- Atomic Energy Council, 1 April 2012

Ukraine
*01- World Nuclear Association, Nuclear Power in Ukraine, February 2012
*02- K.G. Kudinov: Creating an Infrastructure for Managing Spent Nuclear Fuel, in Glenn E. Schweitzer and A. Chelsea Sharber, ed., An International Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage Facility-Exploring a Russian Site as a Prototype, National Academies Press, 2005, pp. 145-151
*03- David G. Marcelli and Tommy B. Smith: The Zaporozhye ISFS, Radwaste solutions, Jan/Febr 2002
*04- International Panel of Fissile Materials: Managing spent fuel from nuclear power reactors, 2011
*05- World Nuclear Association,  February 2012
*06- Business wire: Energoatom and Holtec International Formalize the Contract to Build a Central Storage Facility in Ukraine, 30 December 2005
*07- World Nuclear Association,  February 2012
*08- JC-  Ukraine: Ukraine National Report on Compliance with the Obligations under the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, September 2008, p.48-49
*09- EBRD: Chernobyl: New Safe Confinement and Spent Fuel Storage Facility, March 2011
*10- Ukrinform: Talks on construction of storage facility for spent nuclear fuel to be completed in April, 28 March 2012
*11- Foratom: Ukrainian Nuclear Forum Association, 28 February 2012 www.foratom.org/associate-members/ukraine.html
*12- World Nuclear Association, February 2012

United Kingdom
*01- IAEA: Inventory of radioactive waste disposals at sea, IAEA-Tecdoc-1105, August 1999, p53
*02- Low Level Waste Repository Ltd: http://www.llwrsite.com
*03- Gordon MacKerron and Frans Berkhout: Learning to listen: institutional change and legitimation in UK radioactive waste policy; in: Journal of Risk Research, Volume 12 Issue 7 & 8 2009, December 2009, p. 989 – 1008. 
*04- John Knill: Radioactive Waste Management: Key Issues for the Future, in: F. Barker (ed), Management of Radioactive Wastes. Issues for Local Authorities. Proceedings of the UK Nuclear Free Local Authorities Annual Conference 1997 held in Town House, Kirkcaldy, Fife, on 23 October 1997, Publisher Thomas Telford, London, 1998, p 1 - 17.
*05- Gordon MacKerron and Frans Berkhout
*06- NDA: Strategy for the management of solid low-level radioactive waste from the nuclear industry, August 2010
*07- Department for Trade and Industry (DTI): Managing the Nuclear Legacy: a Strategy for Action, CM 5552, HMSO, London, July 2002.
*08- The Committee on Radioactive Waste Management: Managing our Radioactive Waste Safely, CoRWM’s recommendations to Government, Doc 700, HMSO, London, July 2006
*09- The Committee on Radioactive Waste Management: Re-iteration of CoRWM’s Position on Nuclear New Build, Doc 2162.2, HMSO, London, September 2007
*10- Defra/BERR: Managing Radioactive Waste Safely: A Framework for Implementing Geological Disposal, Cm 7386, HMSO, London, June 2008.
*11- World Nuclear News: Waste Plan Revealed, 12 June 2008
*12- Blowers, MacKerron, Allan, Wilkinson, Pitt and Pickard:  New Nuclear Build and the Management of Radioactive Wastes, Letter to Secretary of State from Former Members of CoRWM, 20 November, 2009
*13- BBC News: Nuclear waste storage options examined, 15 January 2010
*14- NDA: Geological Disposal, Steps towards implementation, March 2010 p.24
*15- BBC News on line: Budget cuts caution on UK nuclear waste plan, 7 July 2010
*16- NDA, Review of timescales for geological disposal of higher activity radioactive waste, 22 December 2011
*17- NDA: Geological Disposal. Review of Options for Accelerating Implementation of the Geological Disposal Programme, December 2011
*18- NDA, Review of timescales for geological disposal of higher activity radioactive waste

United States of America
*01- IPFM: Managing spent fuel from nuclear power reactors, 2011, p.106
*S02- IAEA: Inventory of radioactive waste disposals at sea, IAEA-Tecdoc-1105, August 1999
*03- Department of Energy: WIPP Chronology, 5 February 2007
*04- For a detailed discussion on the history of the plans for the storage of nuclear waste in the U.S. we refer to: 1- Ronnie Lipschutz: Radioactive Waste: Politics, Technology and Risk, Cambrigde USA, 1980; 2- A.A. Albert de la Bruhèze, Political Construction of Technology. Nuclear Waste disposal in the United States, 1945-1972, WMW-publication 10, Faculteit Wijsbegeerte en Maatschappijwetenschappen Universiteit Twente, Netherlands, 1992; 3- Roger E. Kasperson, Social Issues in Radioactive Waste Management: The National Experience, in: Roger E. Kasperson (ed), Equity Issues in Radioactive Waste Management, Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain Publishers, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1983, chapter 2.
*05-World Watch: WIPP-Lash: nuclear burial plan assailed, Vol 4, No 6 , Nov/Dec 1991, p.7
*06- Science: Radwaste dump WIPPs up a controversy,19 March 1982
*07- US Guardian weekly: Pilot waste dump is already in trouble, 12 October 1988
*08- Nucleonics Week: WIPP moves toward 1993 waste tests, senate okays bill in 11th hour, 15 October 1992. p 8
*09- WISE News Communique: US DOE delays (abandons?) giant waste projects, no 389, 19 November 1993, p 6
*10- WISE News Communique, US: WIPP is delayed again and again…, no. 496, 21 August 1998, p 2
*11- WISE News Communique: First waste at WIPP, but problem not solved, no 508, 9 April 1999
*12- Nuclear Fuel: After two decades and $2billion, DOE targets spring for WIPP operations, 9 March 1998, p 6-7
*13- Waste Isolation Pilot Plant: Renewal Application Chapter 1, Closure Plan, May 2009
*14- WIPP: Why WIPP, 5 February 2007
*15- Luther. J. Carter, Waste Management; Current Controversies  over the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant; in: Environment, Vol. 31, no. 7, September 1989, p 5, 40-41
*16- Ralph. L. Keeney and Detlof von Winterfeldt: Managing Waste from Power Plants, in: Risk Analysis, Vol. 14, No. 1, 1994, pp 107-130.
*17- Department of Energy: Mission Plan for the Civilian Radioactive Waste Management Program, June 1985, Volume 1, p 41
*18- Department of Energy: A Multi-attribute utility analysis of sites nominated for characterization for the first radioactive waste repository – A decision aiding methodology, DOE/RW-0074, 1986
*19- IPFM: Managing spent nuclear fuel from power reactors, 2011, p.109
*20- United States of America Congress: Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, The Act was extensively amended on 22 December 1987, Sec. 160
*21- NWPA, Sec. 161
*22- NWPA, Sec. 114, d
*23-  Interview Robert Loux by Herman Damveld, in: Herman Damveld, Steef van Duin en Dirk Bannink: Kernafval in zee of zout? Nee fout! (Nuclear waste in sea or salt? No wrong!),  Greenpeace Netherlands, 1994, p. 29-30
*24- Nuclear Fuel: 6 April 1998, p 13.
*25- Reuters: Bush clears way for Yucca Mountain nuclear waste dump, 23 July 2002
*26- Barry D. Solomon: High-level radioactive waste management in the USA, in: Journal of Risk Research, Volume 12 Issue 7 & 8 2009,  p. 1009–1024
*27- World Nuclear News: Obama dumps Yucca Mountain, 27 February 2009
*28- Government Accountability Office: Nuclear Waste Management. Key attributes, challenges, and costs for the Yucca Mountain repository and two potential Alternatives, GAO-10-48, November 2009. p.19
*29- World Nuclear News: Post-Yucca nuclear waste strategy group, 1 February 2010. One issue that will not be on the table is the exact location of any eventual waste facilities. The 'Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future' is only to consider strategy, not implementation
*30- World Nuclear News: Immediate action needed on US waste policy, 27 January 2012
*31- Blue Ribbon Commission: Report to the Secretary of Energy, 26 January 2012
*32- Platts: More than one permanent US nuclear repository likely needed: Chu, 31 January 2012
*33- Nuclear Regulatory Commission: Waste Confidence Decision Update, 9 October 2008, p. 59555

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