Michael Shellenberger's pro-nuclear lobby group 'Environmental Progress' (EP) is celebrating the decision to proceed with two partially-built reactors in South Korea. A citizens jury appointed by the government voted almost 60% in favor of completing the reactors. President Moon Jae-in said the government would allow construction of the reactors to proceed but "we will completely stop all plans for the construction of new nuclear reactors."1
It's doubtful that Shellenberger's California-based organization could have significantly swayed the citizens jury in South Korea, but EP was very active in the debate and presumably had some effect in shifting opinions. Here is a summary of the work EP carried out in South Korea this year:2
- EP published a 62-page pro-nuclear report ‒ 'The High Cost of Fear: Understanding the Costs and Causes of South Korea's Proposed Nuclear Energy Phase-Out'.3
- Shellenberger visited South Korea four times between April and October 2017, giving speeches, holding press conferences on collaborating with nuclear advocates. He claims that dozens of media outlets reported on EP's visits, that a press conference in Seoul was "packed"4, and that he enjoyed "a crush of media attention".5
- EP sent a sign-on letter to South Korean President Moon Jae-in in July 2017 and another in August 2017.
- In October, EP wrote to the citizens jury tasked with deciding the fate of the two partially-built reactors (Shin Kori 5 and 6).6
- EP produced a video promoting nuclear power in South Korea.
- Shellenberger has been talking and writing about his bizarre plan to bring peace to the Korean Peninsula by supporting the development of nuclear power in North Korea.
- And, according to Shellenberger, EP countered the "lies" of Friends of the Earth (FOE) and Greenpeace in "two investigative pieces and three separate open letters to President Moon and the citizens jury that were signed by climate scientists and environmentalists from around the world."6
EP's campaign has involved a blizzard of misinformation and relentless, dishonest attacks against environment groups, particularly Friends of the Earth (FOE) and Greenpeace. Shellenberger claims4 that the "greatest coup" of the two groups was the "Hollywood-style anti-nuclear disaster movie" called Pandora7 which was released last year and has been watched by millions, mostly on Netflix. But FOE and Greenpeace had nothing to do with the production of the Pandora film!
Shellenberger states: "After it was accused of secretly financing the film, Greenpeace insisted it had merely funded the screenings ..."8 To translate and correct Shellenberger's misinformation: Greenpeace was falsely accused of secretly financing the film (it isn't clear why funding an anti-nuclear film would be objectionable, any more than EP's funding of a pro-nuclear film). The source of the accusation isn't named ‒ perhaps it was Shellenberger himself! Greenpeace merely hosted a screening of the film (or at most a few screenings) and spoke at Q&A sessions at a few film screenings.9
Shellenberger claims the Pandora film must have cost tens of millions of dollars to make (although the film-makers say the budget was half a million) but that "amount is peanuts to an organization like Greenpeace International and natural gas interests".8 He seems to be insinuating that Greenpeace and/or natural gas interests funded the film but provides no evidence in support of his claims.
The funding of the Pandora film isn't an important issue but it neatly illustrates Shellenberger's M.O. of relentless repetition of falsehoods in the hope that some mud sticks.
The Pandora film "propelled to the presidency an anti-nuclear candidate, Moon Jae-in", Shellenberger claims.4 Seriously? Moon Jae-in would not have been elected if not for a Netflix film?!
Shellenberger himself featured in the dishonest and wildly inaccurate 'Pandora's Promise' film a few years ago.10,11
South Korea's 'nuclear mafia'
Arguably the main reason Moon Jae-in was elected to the presidency in May 2017 was to clean up widespread corruption ‒ including corruption in the nuclear industry.12
EP describes the nuclear corruption scandal as a "paperwork scandal".3 But it wasn't just a "paperwork scandal" ‒ it involved serious incidents such as a power failure in May 2012 which led to a rapid rise in the Kori-1 reactor core temperature, and a cover-up up of that incident.13 That was followed by revelations of an industry-wide scandal involving fake safety certificates ("paperwork") for reactor parts, sub-standard reactor parts, and bribery.13 The sub-standard reactor parts included safety-critical components such as defective control cabling that triggered shutdowns at two nuclear plants.14 According to a whistleblower, equipment failed under Loss-Of-Coolant-Accident conditions during at least one concealed test.15 Another whistleblower revealed that control cables supplied to four reactors with faked certificates had failed safety tests.16
EP argues that the nuclear corruption scandal "demonstrated the independence of the Korean safety regulator". But the corruption dated back to 200414 and possibly earlier and went undetected for at least seven years. Public revelation of the scandal was a triumph for a small number of whistleblowers; it was deeply embarrassing for the regulator.
EP asserts that "suppliers as well as senior executives were held accountable" for their corruption. But a 2014 parliamentary audit revealed that some officials fired from KEPCO Engineering and Construction were rehired.17 And the New York Times reported that despite the government's pledge to impose a 10-year ban on suppliers found to have falsified documents, KHNP imposed a six-month ban.18 The New York Times continued: "And nuclear opponents say that more fundamental changes are needed in the regulatory system, pointing out that one of the government's main regulating arms, the Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety, gets 60 percent of its annual budget from Korea Hydro [& Nuclear]."18
The scandal was still on the boil in 2014. Korea Times noted in June 2014 that more fake quality certificates had been uncovered and that government testing facilities were found to have failed to conduct adequate tests before issuing certificates.19
Korea Times editorialized: "Most disheartening in the latest revelation of irregularities is that the state-run certifiers failed to detect fabrications by skipping the required double-testing. ... Given the magnitude of corruption in the nuclear industry arising from its intrinsic nature of being closed, the first step toward safety should be to break the deep-seated food chain created by the so-called nuclear mafia, which will help enhance transparency ultimately. With the prosecution set to investigate the suppliers, the certifiers will face business suspension. But it's imperative to toughen penalties for them, considering that light punitive measures have stood behind the lingering corruption in the nuclear industry."19
South Korea's energy mix
The Moon Jae-in government plans to reduce reliance on coal (from 43% of electricity generation to 25% by 203020) and nuclear (from 30% to 18% by 203020, with long-term ambitions to phase-out nuclear power) in favour of gas (from 20% to 37% by 203020) and renewables (from 1.8%21 to 20% by 203020).
In an August 2017 report, EP plugs in a bunch of false and arbitrary assumptions to concoct a scare-story in which the proposed changes to the power-generation mix cost a minimum of US$10 billion per year (to import gas and to build gas-fired power plants ... there is no costing for the replacement of aging reactors, apparently they will operate forever), result in thousands of avoidable deaths from air pollution, and increase carbon emissions by an amount equivalent to adding 15‒27 million cars.3
Among other arbitrary, inexplicable assumptions is the assumption that gas replaces nuclear power.3 (That assumption is part of a broader EP propaganda campaign to convince people of the falsehood that "every time nuclear plants close they are replaced almost entirely by fossil fuels".22) If EP wants to arbitrarily assume that gas replaces nuclear under the 2030 targets, then it ought to assume that the planned 18% reduction in coal is replaced by the planned 18% increase in renewables ‒ but no such assumption is made.
Instead, the EP report asserts that "replacing the nation's nuclear plants would require a significant increase in coal and/or natural gas".3 But the 2030 targets have the growth in renewable electricity generation comfortably ahead of the reduction in nuclear power.
And the EP report falsely asserts that the "removal of nuclear plants from the grid would extend the life of coal plants"3 even though the government clearly plans to reduce reliance on coal plants and has already taken steps in that direction since the May 2017 election.
The EP report asserts that replacing "South Korea's remaining nuclear plants with natural gas would produce carbon pollution the equivalent of adding 27 million U.S. cars to the road."3 But ... again ... the South Korean government isn't planning to replace nuclear with gas; it is planning to reduce reliance on coal and nuclear in favour of gas and renewables. The planned increase in gas nearly matches the decline in more carbon-intensive coal, and the growth of renewables more than compensates for the loss of nuclear.
A sign-on letter organized by EP warns that a "significant expansion of natural gas could pose a significant threat to public safety" and cites two accidents in South Korea resulting in 83 deaths and 181 injuries.23 But it is silent about the costs, ill-health and deaths arising from nuclear disasters such as the Fukushima fires, meltdowns and hydrogen explosions. And it is silent about the myriad benefits of expanding renewable power generation.
Peace on the Korean peninsula
Shellenberger thinks that supporting the development of nuclear power in North Korea is the key to peace on the Korean peninsula. He claims that "a nuclear phase-out in South Korea would destroy one of the best means of creating peace with North Korea" because it would compromise South Korea's ability to promote the development of nuclear power in North Korea.4
A sign-on letter initiated by EP advocates a new framework agreement involving US and South Korean support for the development of nuclear power in North Korea, in return for North Korea accepting IAEA inspections of its nuclear program, ending its missile tests and limiting its nuclear arsenal.24
The "new framework" is much the same as the old 1994 Agreed Framework, which was a complete failure. If the power reactors proposed under the 1994 agreement had been completed before North Korea terminated IAEA safeguards during the collapse of the Agreed Framework, those reactors might now be used for weapons production in addition to North Korea's small 'experimental power reactor' and its enrichment program.
There is no reason to believe the North Korean regime would limit let alone abandon its nuclear weapons program if other nations helped the regime develop nuclear power plants (or other types of power plants). Nor is there any reason to believe that the US and other nations would consider a "limiting" of the regime's nuclear arsenal (whatever that means) to be adequate.
Another reason to be skeptical about the "new framework" is the possibility that reactors in both North and South Korea could be deliberately or inadvertently struck in the event of military conflict. According to Yonhap News, a report by South Korean energy utility KHNP noted that South Korea's power reactors have not been designed to deal with military attacks ‒ the outer protective walls were not designed to withstand a missile strike or other forms of concerted attacks.25 Kim Jong-hoon, a parliamentarian representing the conservative Liberty Korea Party, said earlier this year that Seoul was several years behind the US in coming up with safety measures to deal with military and terrorist attacks. "The fact that the country has not taken action in the past is a serious lapse, especially with North Korea's evolving missile threats," Kim said.25
Nuclear power and weapons proliferation
Shellenberger states: "One of FOE-Greenpeace's biggest lies about nuclear energy is that it leads to weapons. Korea demonstrates that the opposite is true: North Korea has a nuclear bomb and no nuclear energy, while South Korea has nuclear energy and no bomb."4
In fact, the connections between nuclear power (and associated industries such as enrichment and reprocessing) and weapons proliferation are well understood and there are countless real-world examples demonstrating the risks.26
Prominent nuclear lobbyists are now openly talking about the connections between nuclear power (and related industries) and weapons production in order to boost the case for further subsidies to support the 'civil' nuclear industry, particularly in the US.27 It seems Shellenberger didn't get the memo.
As for Shellenberger's claims about proliferation on the Korean peninsula, he ignores the fact that North Korea uses what is calls an 'experimental power reactor' (based on the UK Magnox power reactor design) to produce plutonium for weapons.28 He ignores the fact that North Korea acquired enrichment technology from Pakistan's A.Q. Khan network, who stole the blueprints from URENCO, the consortium that provides enrichment services for the nuclear power industry.28 He ignores the fact that North Korea's reprocessing plant is based on the design of the Eurochemic plant in Belgium, which provided reprocessing services for the nuclear power industry.28
And Shellenberger ignores South Korea's history of covertly pursuing nuclear weapons, a history entwined with the country's development of nuclear power. For example, the nuclear power program provided a rationale for South Korea's pursuit of dual-use reprocessing technology.
Chernobyl and Fukushima
Shellenberger says that at a recent talk in Berlin: "Many Germans simply could not believe how few people died and will die from the Chernobyl accident (under 200) and that nobody died or will die from the meltdowns at Fukushima. How could it be that everything we were told is not only wrong, but often the opposite of the truth?"4
There's a simple reason that Germans didn't believe Shellenberger's claims about Chernobyl and Fukushima ‒ they are false.
Shellenberger claims that "under 200" people have died and will die from the Chernobyl disaster. In fact, the lowest of the estimates of the Chernobyl cancer death toll is the World Health Organization's estimate of "up to 9,000 excess cancer deaths" in the most contaminated parts of the former Soviet Union.29 And of course there are higher estimates for the death toll across Europe.30,31
Shellenberger claims that the Fukushima meltdowns "killed precisely no one" and that "nobody died or will die from the meltdowns at Fukushima".4 An EP report has this to say about Fukushima: "[T]he science is unequivocal: nobody has gotten sick much less died from the radiation that escaped from three meltdowns followed by three hydrogen gas explosions. And there will be no increase in cancer rates."3
In support of those assertions, EP cites a World Health Organization report that directly contradicts EP's claims. The WHO report concluded that for people in the most contaminated areas in Fukushima Prefecture, the estimated increased risk for all solid cancers will be around 4% in females exposed as infants; a 6% increased risk of breast cancer for females exposed as infants; a 7% increased risk of leukaemia for males exposed as infants; and for thyroid cancer among females exposed as infants, an increased risk of up to 70% (from a 0.75% lifetime risk up to 1.25%).32
Applying a linear-no threshold (LNT) risk factor to the estimated collective radiation dose from Fukushima fallout gives an estimated long-term cancer death toll of around 5,000 people.33 Nuclear lobbyists are quick to point out that LNT may overestimate risks from low dose and low dose-rate exposure. But LNT may also underestimate the risks. The 2006 report of the US National Academy of Sciences' Committee on the Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation (BEIR) states: "The committee recognizes that its risk estimates become more uncertain when applied to very low doses. Departures from a linear model at low doses, however, could either increase or decrease the risk per unit dose."34 And the BEIR report states that "combined analyses are compatible with a range of possibilities, from a reduction of risk at low doses to risks twice those upon which current radiation protection recommendations are based."34
Shellenberger claims that the Fukushima evacuation was "entirely unnecessary and indeed counterproductive" and it was the "outcome of the kind of fear-mongering engaged in by Moon, FOE, and Greenpeace."4 But of course Moon Jae-in, FOE and Greenpeace had nothing to do with the evacuation of 160,000 people in the aftermath of the Fukushima disaster. Evacuations were ordered not on the basis of fear-mongering by nuclear critics; they were ordered on the basis of multiple fires, hydrogen explosions and presumed meltdowns.
EP states: "In 2013, the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR) concluded that the vast majority of the Fukushima evacuation zone is safe and nearly all residents could have returned long ago ‒ indeed, most should never have left."3 But the UNSCEAR report didn't conclude that the vast majority of the Fukushima evacuation zone is safe or that nearly all residents could have returned long ago, and it didn't state that most evacuees should never have left.35 The UNSCEAR report states: "The actions taken to protect the public significantly reduced the radiation exposures that could have been received. This was particularly the case for settlements within the 20-km evacuation zone and the deliberate evacuation zones, where the protective measures reduced the potential exposures in the first year by up to a factor of 10."35
An EP report berates the Japanese government for failing to follow "normal protocols" by ordering Fukushima residents to evacuate instead of sheltering in place.3 EP cites a 2015 IAEA report36 in support of that argument, but nowhere in the IAEA report (or any IAEA report) is there a proscription against evacuation in response to nuclear accidents. No IAEA report states that sheltering in place should be the "normal protocol" in the event of a nuclear accident ‒ the appropriate response depends entirely on the circumstances. A 2011 IAEA report points to the impracticality of sheltering in place as a long-term response to elevated radiation levels following nuclear accidents: "Lesson 12: The use of long term sheltering is not an effective approach and has been abandoned and concepts of 'deliberate evacuation' and 'evacuation-prepared area' were introduced for effective long term countermeasures using guidelines of the ICRP [International Commission on Radiological Protection] and IAEA."37
The 2015 IAEA report notes that radiation levels were astronomical in some areas in the days after the Fukushima disaster ‒ even in some locations beyond the 20 km exclusion zone, dose rates of the order of a few hundred microsieverts per hour were measured from 15 March 2011 onward.36 Thus the annual public limit of 1 millisievert from anthropogenic sources would be reached in just a few hours, and the Japanese government's new limit of 20 millisieverts in Fukushima-contaminated regions would be reached in just a few days.
Fake scientists and radiation quackery
EP's UK director John Lindberg is described as an "expert on radiation" on the EP website.38 In fact, he has no scientific qualifications whatsoever let alone specialist qualifications regarding the health effects of ionizing radiation. Likewise, a South Korean article39 reposted on the EP website (without correction) falsely claims that Shellenberger is a scientist; in fact, he has a degree in cultural anthropology.
Lindberg is an 'Associate Member' of Scientists for Accurate Radiation Information (SARI)40, a group comprised mostly of quacks, cranks, non-scientists and conspiracy theorists whose views are directly at odds with those of scientific associations such as UNSCEAR.
SARI is at war with the linear, no-threshold (LNT) model ‒ the group's short 'Charter & Mission' insists three times that LNT is "misinformation".41 Yet LNT enjoys heavy-hitting scientific support. For example the 2006 report of the US National Academy of Sciences' Committee on the Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation states that "the risk of cancer proceeds in a linear fashion at lower doses without a threshold and … the smallest dose has the potential to cause a small increase in risk to humans."34 Likewise, a report in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences states: "Given that it is supported by experimentally grounded, quantifiable, biophysical arguments, a linear extrapolation of cancer risks from intermediate to very low doses currently appears to be the most appropriate methodology."42
A 2010 UNSCEAR report isn't sold on the linear part of LNT but it is at odds with SARI (and EP) on the question of a threshold. The UNSCEAR report states that "the current balance of available evidence tends to favour a non-threshold response for the mutational component of radiation-associated cancer induction at low doses and low dose rates."43 By contrast, SARI promotes hormesis ‒ the discredited view that low-dose radiation exposure is beneficial to human health.44
Attacking environment groups
Shellenberger reduces the complexities of environmental opposition to nuclear power to the claim that in the 1960s, an "influential group of conservationists within Sierra Club feared that cheap, abundant electricity from nuclear would result in overpopulation and resource depletion" and therefore decided to campaign against nuclear power.4
If such views had any currency in the 1960s, they certainly don't now. Yet EP asserts that Greenpeace and FOE "oppose cheap and abundant energy"3 and Shellenberger asserts that "the FOE-Greenpeace agenda has never been to protect humankind but rather to punish us for our supposed transgressions."4 And Shellenberger suggests that such views are still current by asserting that the anti-nuclear movement has a "long history of Malthusian anti-humanism aimed at preventing "overpopulation" and "overconsumption" by keeping poor countries poor."8 Again we see Shellenberger's M.O. of relentless repetition of falsehoods in the hope that mud will stick.
In an 'investigative piece' ‒ titled 'Enemies of the Earth: Unmasking the Dirty War Against Clean Energy in South Korea by Friends of the Earth (FOE) and Greenpeace' ‒ Shellenberger lists three groups which he claims have accepted donations "from fossil fuel and renewable energy investors, as well as others who stand to benefit from killing nuclear plants".4 FOE and Greenpeace don't feature among the three groups even though the 'investigative piece' is aimed squarely at them.
Undeterred by his failure to present any evidence of FOE and Greenpeace accepting fossil fuel funding (they don't), Shellenberger asserts that the donors and board members of FOE and Greenpeace "are the ones who win the government contracts to build solar and wind farms, burn dirty "renewable" biomass, and import natural gas from the United States and Russia."4 Really? Where's the evidence? There's none in Shellenberger's 'investigative piece'.
In an article for a South Korean newspaper, Shellenberger states: "Should we be surprised that natural gas companies fund many of the anti-nuclear groups that spread misinformation about nuclear? The anti-nuclear group Friends of the Earth ‒ which has representatives in South Korea ‒ received its initial funding from a wealthy oil man ..."45 He fails to note that the donation was in 1969! And he fails to substantiate his false insinuation that FOE accepts funding from natural gas companies, or his false claim that natural gas companies fund "many of the anti-nuclear groups".
Shellenberger's 'investigative piece' falsely claims4 that FOE keeps its donors secret, and in support of that falsehood he cites an article8 (written by Shellenberger) that doesn't even mention FOE. EP falsely claims that FOE has hundreds of millions of dollars in its bank and stock accounts.3
EP has an annual budget of US$1.5 million, Shellenberger claims, and he asks how EP "can possibly succeed against the anti-nuclear Goliath with 500 times the resources."8
An anti-nuclear Goliath with 500 times EP's budget of US$1.5 million, or US$750 million in annual expenditure on anti-nuclear campaigns? Shellenberger claims that Greenpeace has annual income of US$400 million to finance its work in 55 nations8 ‒ but he doesn't note that only a small fraction of that funding is directed to anti-nuclear campaigns. FOE's worldwide budget is US$12 million according to EP3 ‒ but only a small fraction is directed to anti-nuclear campaigns.
1. Christine Kim, 22 oct 2017, 'South Korea's president says will continue phasing out nuclear power', www.reuters.com/article/us-southkorea-nuclear-moon/south-koreas-presiden...
2. Environmental Progress, 'South Korea', http://environmentalprogress.org/south-korea/
3. Michael Shellenberger, Mark Nelson, Madi Czerwinski, Michael Light, John Lindberg, and Minshu Deng / Environmental Progress, Aug 2017, 'The High Cost of Fear: Understanding the Costs and Causes of South Korea's Proposed Nuclear Energy Phase-Out', http://environmentalprogress.org/big-news/2017/8/22/the-high-cost-of-fear
Direct download: https://static1.squarespace.com/static/56a45d683b0be33df885def6/t/59a48e...
4. Michael Shellenberger, 16 Oct 2017, 'Enemies of the Earth: Unmasking the Dirty War Against Clean Energy in South Korea by Friends of the Earth (FOE) and Greenpeace', http://environmentalprogress.org/big-news/2017/10/16/enemies-of-the-eart...
5. Michael Shellenberger, 28 Aug 2017, 'High Cost of Fear in South Korea ‒ Investigating Nuclear Fear in Europe', http://environmentalprogress.org/big-news/2017/8/28/high-cost-of-fear-in...
6. Michael Shellenberger / Environmental Progress, 19 Oct 2017, 'Victory! Pro-Nuclear Win in South Korea Gives Momentum to Atomic Humanists Everywhere', http://environmentalprogress.org/big-news/2017/10/19/victory-pro-nuclear...
8. Michael Shellenberger, 25 July 2017, 'Greenpeace's Dirty War on Clean Energy, Part I: South Korean Version', http://environmentalprogress.org/big-news/2017/7/25/greenpeaces-dirty-wa...
10. 'Pandora's Promise Propaganda', Nuclear Monitor #764, 28 June 2013, www.wiseinternational.org/nuclear-monitor/764/pandoras-promise-propaganda
11. 'Pandora's Propaganda', Nuclear Monitor #773, 21 Nov 2013, www.wiseinternational.org/nuclear-monitor/773/pandoras-propaganda
12. Japan Times, 10 May 2017, 'The pendulum swings in South Korea', www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2017/05/10/editorials/pendulum-swings-south...
13. Nuclear Monitor #844, 25 May 2017, 'South Korea's 'nuclear mafia'', www.wiseinternational.org/nuclear-monitor/844/south-koreas-nuclear-mafia
14. Will Davis, 6 Feb 2014, 'South Korea nuclear power: Are the dark times over?', http://ansnuclearcafe.org/2014/02/06/south-korea-nuclear-power-are-the-d...
15. Mycle Schneider, Antony Froggatt et al., 2016, World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2016, www.worldnuclearreport.org or direct download: www.worldnuclearreport.org/IMG/pdf/20160713MSC-WNISR2016V2-HR.pdf
16. Choe Sang-Hun, 28 May 2013, 'South Korea Shuts 2 Reactors Over Faked Certificates', www.nytimes.com/2013/05/29/world/asia/south-korea-turns-off-nuclear-reac...
17. Se Young Jang, 8 Oct 2015, 'The Repercussions of South Korea's Pro-Nuclear Energy Policy', http://thediplomat.com/2015/10/the-repercussions-of-south-koreas-pro-nuc...
18. Choe Sang-hun, 3 Aug 2013, 'Scandal in South Korea Over Nuclear Revelations', www.nytimes.com/2013/08/04/world/asia/scandal-in-south-korea-over-nuclea...
19. Korea Times, 25 June 2014, 'Fake certificates again', http://koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinon/2014/06/137_159789.html
20. Jane Chung / Reuters, 18 May 2017, 'S.Korea coal, nuclear power targeted for cuts by presidential candidates', http://in.reuters.com/article/southkorea-election-energy-idINL3N1HI02P
21. World Nuclear Association, Feb. 2017, 'Nuclear Power in South Korea', www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-o-s...
22. 5 July 2017, 'South Korea Letter', http://environmentalprogress.org/south-korea-letter
23. 6 Oct 2017, 'SK Citizen Jury Letter', http://environmentalprogress.org/sk-citizen-jury-letter
24. 1 June 2017, 'US-Korea Letter', www.environmentalprogress.org/us-korea-letter
25. Yonhap News, 16 April 2017, 'S. Korea's nuclear power reactors not designed to deal with military attacks', http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/news/2017/04/16/0200000000AEN20170416002...
26. Nuclear Monitor #804, 28 May 2015, 'The myth of the peaceful atom', www.wiseinternational.org/nuclear-monitor/804/myth-peaceful-atom
27. Jim Green, 13 Sept 2017, 'Nuclear power, weapons and national security', http://energypost.eu/nuclear-power-weapons-and-national-security/
28. David Lowry, 26 July 2016, 'What Theresa May forgot: North Korea used British technology to build its nuclear bombs', www.theecologist.org/News/news_analysis/2987935/what_theresa_may_forgot_...
29. WHO, 13 April 2006, 'World Health Organization report explains the health impacts of the world's worst-ever civil nuclear accident', www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2006/pr20/en/
30. Nuclear Monitor #785, 24 April 2014, 'The Chernobyl death toll', www.wiseinternational.org/nuclear-monitor/785/chernobyl-death-toll
31. Nuclear Monitor #820, 16 March 2016, 'TORCH: The other Chernobyl report', www.wiseinternational.org/nuclear-monitor/820/torch-other-chernobyl-report
32. WHO, 28 Feb 2013, 'Global report on Fukushima nuclear accident details health risks', www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2013/fukushima_report_20130228/en/
Full report: WHO, 2013, 'Health risk assessment from the nuclear accident after the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami based on a preliminary dose estimation', http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/78218/1/9789241505130_eng.pdf?ua=1
33. Ian Fairlie, 2 April 2014, 'New UNSCEAR Report on Fukushima: Collective Doses', www.ianfairlie.org/news/new-unscear-report-on-fukushima-collective-doses/
34. National Research Council of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, Board on Radiation Research Effects, 2006, "Health Risks from Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation (BEIR VII – Phase 2)", www.nap.edu/catalog/11340.html or www.nap.edu/catalog/11340/health-risks-from-exposure-to-low-levels-of-io...
35. UNSCEAR, 2014, "Sources, Effects and Risks of Ionizing Radiation. UNSCEAR 2013 Report. Volume I. Report to the General Assembly Scientific Annex A: Levels and Effects of Radiation Exposure Due to the Nuclear Accident After the 2011 Great East-Japan Earthquake and Tsunami", www.unscear.org/docs/publications/2013/UNSCEAR_2013_Report_Vol.I.pdf
36. International Atomic Energy Agency, 2015, The Fukushima Daiichi Accident: Report by the Director General, www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1710-ReportByTheDG-Web.pdf
37. IAEA (Division of Nuclear Installation Safety and Department of Nuclear Safety and Security), 2011, 'Mission Report: The Great East Japan Earthquake Expert Mission. IAEA International Fact Finding Expert Mission of the Fukushima Dai-Ichi NPP Accident Following the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami', www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/meetings/PDFplus/2011/cn200/documentation/cn200_Final-Fukushima-Mission_Report.pdf
39. 12 July 2017, 'Chosun Biz Interview with Michael Shellenberger', http://environmentalprogress.org/big-news/2017/7/12/chosun-biz-interview...
42. David Brenner et al., 2003, 'Cancer risks attributable to low doses of ionizing radiation: Assessing what we really know', Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, November 25, 2003, vol.100, no.24, pp.13761–13766, www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/14610281
43. UNSCEAR, 2011, 'Report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Ionising Radiation 2010', www.unscear.org/docs/reports/2010/UNSCEAR_2010_Report_M.pdf
44. For a critique of hormesis, see Appendix D in the BEIR report, www.nap.edu/catalog/11340.html
45. Michael Shellenberger, July 2017, 'Why the World Needs South Korea's Nuclear', http://environmentalprogress.org/big-news/2017/7/24/chosun-op-ed-why-the...