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Nuclear dimensions of the Ukraine political crisis

This article is published in the Nuclear Monitor, issue 781, March 19, 2014. We normally put the Nuclear Monitor on our website 8 weeks after publication- its first sent to paying subscribers. But the following article needs urgent attention, therefor this exception.

March 19, 2014 - At the time of writing is seems likely that Ukraine’s nuclear power reactors will continue operating throughout the unfolding political crisis; that there will be no infiltration of or attacks on Ukraine’s nuclear plants despite acknowledged security concerns and reported threats; and that it is highly unlikely that the crisis will escalate to the use of nuclear weapons. Nonetheless the crisis has wide-ranging nuclear dimensions and ramifications. Perhaps the most important is that it draws attention to a question that will, sooner or later, seal the fate of nuclear power: what  happens when nuclear-powered nations go to war? Continue operating power reactors and hope that they will not be attacked? Or shut down reactors to allow for the decay of short-lived radionuclides and possibly to move nuclear fuel to a more secure location? There is no history of national military attacks on operational nuclear power plants but it can only be a matter of time. There is a history of conventional military strikes on ostensibly peaceful nuclear facilities in the Middle East, driven by proliferation fears. Examples include the destruction of research reactors in Iraq by Israel and the US; Iran’s attempts to strike nuclear facilities in Iraq during the 1980−88 war (and vice versa); Iraq’s attempted strikes on Israel’s nuclear facilities; and, most recently, Israel’s bombing of a suspected nuclear reactor site in Syria in 2007. (1) Most of those attacks were directed at ‘research’ reactors capable of producing plutonium for weapons, while Iraq attacked the partiallybuilt Bushehr nuclear power plant in 1987.(2)

Protesters seized the headquarters of Ukraine’s energy ministry on January 25, but left several hours later.  Eduard Stavitskiy, who was at the time Ukraine’s energy minister, reportedly said that all the country’s nuclear power facilities were put on high alert after the seizure. (3) In late January, Ukraine’s Security Service reported “anonymous threats to blow up hydropower and nuclear power plants, damage to which may have unforeseen and extremely serious consequences for the population of Ukraine and neighbouring states.” (4)

On March 2, Ukraine’s parliament called for international assistance to protect its nuclear power plants. (5) Ukraine’s Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk said his nation was preparing to mobilise armed forces to protect strategic locations including nuclear power facilities. (6) Ukraine’s envoy to the IAEA, Ihor Prokopchuk, said in a letter to IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano in early March: “Illegal actions of the Russian armed forces on Ukrainian territory and the threat of use of force amount to a grave threat to security of Ukraine with its potential consequences for its nuclear power infrastructure. ... Under these circumstances, the competent authorities of Ukraine make every effort to ensure physical security, including reinforced physical protection of 15 power units in operation at four sites of Ukrainian [nuclear power plants].” Prokopchuk urged Amano to “urgently raise the issue of nuclear security with the authorities of the Russian Federation.” (7) Parliamentarian Hryhoriy Nemyria said the assembly appealed to signatories of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum − in particular the US and UK − to provide assistance securing Ukraine’s nuclear plants. (8) The Budapest Memorandum, negotiated around the time that Ukraine surrendered control of 1,900 Soviet-era nuclear weapons, includes commitments to respect Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and existing borders; and to refrain from the threat or use of force against Ukraine’s territorial integrity and independence. A former US ambassador to Ukraine, who helped negotiate the Budapest Memorandum, said Russia’s military occupation of Ukrainian territory constitutes a blatant violation of the commitments that Moscow undertook in the Budapest Memorandum. (9)

Ukraine’s nuclear plants and fuel supply

According to the IAEA, there are 31 nuclear-related facilities in Ukraine that are subject to monitoring by the IAEA. They include 15 reactors located at four plants (not including the Chernobyl plant with  four reactors which have been permanently shut down). (7) The 15 operational power reactors are all Russian VVER pressurised water reactors, and most of Ukraine’s nuclear services and nuclear fuel come from Russia. (10) Nuclear power accounted for 44% of Ukraine’s electricity generation last year. (11) That heavy dependence on nuclear power may explain the decision to continue to operate reactors despite security concerns. Energoatom, the utility that operates all 15 power reactors in Ukraine, said that nuclear fuel supply has been secured for the “near future” and that it expects existing fuel supply contracts to be fulfilled. Russian nuclear fuel manufacturer TVEL has received advanced payments for four batches of nuclear fuel scheduled to be delivered to Ukraine over the coming months.  World Nuclear News noted in a March 6 report that “deliveries may be disrupted as a result of a ban that has reportedly been imposed on the transportation of nuclear fuel across Ukraine” (12) but the ban was lifted on the same day. Westinghouse supplied nuclear fuel assemblies for trial use at the South Ukraine plant between 2005 and 2009, but the trials were deemed unsuccessful, with Energoatom blaming Westinghouse and Westinghouse blaming Energoatom. (12) According to Rosatom, on January 28 the government of now-deposed President Viktor Yanukovich initiated a ban on nuclear fuel shipments to Europe via Ukraine but it was lifted on March 6 and shipments were expected to resume the following week. Rosatom said that if there were any further issues with rail transport through Ukraine, deliveries would be made by air by Rosatom subsidiary TVEL. (13) Rosatom/TVEL provide fuel for nuclear plants in Bulgaria, Hungary and Slovakia. (12)  

Other civil nuclear issues

There are uncertainties about the future of Russian involvement in Ukraine’s nuclear industry, including projects such as nuclear fuel plant production under construction. There are also reports that Russian involvement in building nuclear power plants in other countries might be jeopardised; for example Russia’s involvement in a Finnish nuclear power project has been raised. Russian involvement in nuclear projects in the Czech Republic is in doubt. A consortium that includes Russia’s Atomstroyexport is bidding on a contract to expand the Czech Republic’s Temelin nuclear power plant near the Austrian border. (14) Czech defense minister Martin Stropnicky said: “Russia has disappeared from the group of predictable democratic states. What it is doing is not acceptable.”  Czech minister for human rights Jiri Dienstbier said: “I personally cannot imagine that the Russians would continue to participate in the tender to expand Temelin.” However Czech Prime Minister Bohuslav Sobotka said he was deeply concerned by the developments in Ukraine but didn’t want to suddenly break off all business ties with Moscow. (15) The Ukraine situation has negatively impacted uranium market sentiment, due to uncertainty about the ongoing operation of Ukraine’s 15 nuclear reactors and the possible implications of the (now lifted) ban on transport of nuclear fuel from Russia to European customers via Ukraine. (16)  

Nuclear weapons

Ukraine held the world’s third-largest nuclear arsenal (1,900 weapons) after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. But Kiev in 1994 agreed to transfer all its nuclear weapons to Russia, and joined the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear state. (18)  “We gave up nuclear weapons because of this [Budapest Memorandum] agreement,” said Pavlo Rizanenko, a member of the Ukrainian parliament. “Now there’s a strong sentiment in Ukraine that we made a big mistake. If you have nuclear weapons, people don’t invade you.”  (19)  Mikhail Golovko from Ukraine’s ultra-right ‘Svoboda’ (Liberty) party recently said “Russia can not win in this situation, it is a violation of all international norms and guarantees. If they are violated, we reserve the right to recover a nuclear weapon. ... We’ll regain our status as a nuclear power and that’ll change the conversation. Ukraine has all the technological means needed to create a nuclear arsenal – which would take us about three to six months.” (17) Without overstating the significance of ultra-right sabrerattling, Ukraine’s nuclear weapons potential warrants consideration. Ukraine has no uranium enrichment facilities. All highly enriched uranium was removed from Ukraine in 2012 − 234 kgs were sent to Russia. (28)

An attempt was made in the 1990s in Ukraine to set up a complete suite of fuel cycle facilities other than enrichment, but this failed “for political and financial reasons” according to the World Nuclear Association. (10) Ukraine has no large reprocessing plants; spent fuel is stored then sent to Russia for reprocessing. However there may be some limited capacity for plutonium separation associated with its research reactors – in particular, the 10 MW research reactor at the Institute for Nuclear Research in Kiev has associated hot cells. (29) Ukraine has three operational research reactors, another under construction and another planned. (30) Reactor-grade (but weapons-useable) plutonium could potentially be separated from stored spent fuel. Power reactors could potentially be used to produce weapon-grade plutonium, as could the largest (10 MW) of the three operational research reactors. Use of civil nuclear infrastructure for weapons production would invite conventional military strikes on nuclear plants suspected of involvement in weapons production. It would also breach the Ukraine/IAEA safeguards agreement − the matter would then be referred to the UN Security Council. One of the many complications is that IAEA safeguards inspections have been suspended or deferred in a number of countries over the decades as a result of domestic or international political turmoil or military conflict. There is no information on the IAEA website as to whether any safeguards inspections have been carried out in Ukraine in recent months, or whether any planned inspections have been deferred. On March 13, interim Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk told the UN Security Council that Russia’s actions have sent a harmful nuclear nonproliferation message to the world: “The way our Russian neighbours acted undermines the entire global security and nuclear non-proliferation program. After these actions, it will be very difficult to convince anyone in the globe not to have nuclear weapons.” (20) Baltic states Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia have been shaken by Russia’s invasion of Crimea and have responded by considering moves to boost their own military capabilities. On March 13, Lithuanian Prime Minister Algirdas Butkevičius hinted that his government might decide to acquire Patriot missile defense systems in response to the Crimea crisis. “Let’s be clear about the missiles: if the national defense minister and the chief of defense say they must be purchased, nobody will stand in their way,” he said. (20)

Russian−NATO conflict

In a throwback to Cold War rhetoric, a Russian television anchor handpicked by President Vladimir Putin made a clear nuclear threat following the March 16 vote in Crimea. “Russia is the only country in the world that is realistically capable of turning the United States into radioactive ash.” (27) Steven Starr from the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation and Physicians for Social Responsibility discussed the potential for military escalation leading to Russian− NATO nuclear warfare (21): “Thus there are now multiple pathways that can lead to civil war and international conflict in Ukraine. ... In a NATO-Russian conventional conflict, in which Russian forces were prevailing, NATO would have the choice of withdrawing, calling for a ceasefire, or using its nuclear weapons against Russian forces. ... Even if NATO could manage to use its conventional forces to defeat Russian conventional forces, Russia would not allow such a defeat upon its very border. Russia would certainly use nuclear weapons to stop NATO. ...

“In a NATO-Russian conflict, in which Russia introduced nuclear weapons, NATO would be fully capable of responding in a tit-for-tat fashion. This would be the same pattern as was seen in the NATO war games of the Cold War. Once the nuclear “firebreak” is crossed, once nuclear weapons are introduced into a military conflict in which both sides have nuclear weapons, there would likely be an almost inevitable escalation of conflict, a progressive use of nuclear weapons by both sides, with progressively larger targets being taken out. "In a matter of weeks or months, a global stratospheric smoke layer would form, which would block up to 70% of warming sunlight, quickly producing Ice Age weather conditions in the Northern Hemisphere. ... Nuclear war is suicide for the human race.”

The prospect of nuclear warfare − however remote − has generated discussion about how to maximise the chances of surviving a nuclear blast: whether to take shelter, flee, etc. Since there’s no good option: “The best advice for surviving a nuclear bomb is to be somewhere else when it goes off.” (22)

Arms control treaties and nuclear security initiatives

The Ukraine crisis has raised concerns that US−Russian cooperation on nuclear weapons and security issues will be affected. Over the March 8−9 weekend, the Russian state news agency reported that a senior defense ministry official was threatening to suspend New START arms-control verification inspections because of the Crimean Peninsula dispute. (23)  The New START treaty between Russia and the US, signed in 2010, provides for 18 on-site inspections per year as part of a verification regime for a treaty that envisages significant cuts in missiles and nuclear warheads on both sides. (24) The Russian official reportedly said: “The unfounded threats towards Russia from the United States and NATO over its policy on Ukraine are seen by us as an unfriendly gesture that allows the declaration of force majeure circumstances. We are ready to take this step in response to the announcement by the Pentagon about stopping cooperation between the defence institutions of Russia and the United States. Inasmuch as these inspections are a matter of trust, then in a situation where the United States has de facto declared the imposition of sanctions then there cannot be normal, bilateral contacts on observing agreements. (24)

Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, White House coordinator for defense policy, said: “We see no reason that the tensions that exist over Ukraine should in any way obstruct the path toward fulfilling the commitments that we have made with the Russians to reduce nuclear weapons on both sides.” (25) Harvard University’s Matthew Bunn said he feared that soured relations between the US and Russia could have negative implications for nuclear security collaboration. Bunn cited multilateral talks over Iran’s nuclear program, and joint US−Russian nuclear security work inside Russia.25 US Energy Department efforts to secure nuclear materials within Russia had stalled prior to the Ukraine crisis, and that the delay could be exacerbated by the dispute. Work conducted under the Cooperative Threat Reduction umbrella agreement, also known as the Nunn-Lugar agreement, expired in June 2013 and the two countries have struggled to finalise details of a replacement pact. (25)

Bunn described “a feeling in both Moscow and Washington that I think is wrong, that the work is done on nuclear security in Russia and that there’s nothing left to do there anymore it’s not. There’s a huge problem of sustainability, there are problems of security culture, there’s still weaknesses in insider protection and we still need to be working together.” (25)  Anne Harrington, from the US Energy Department’s semiautonomous National Nuclear Security Administration, said the Ukraine crisis may further delay initiatives to secure vulnerable nuclear materials in Russia. (26)

References:

1. www.choosenuclearfree.net/power-weapons/conventional-military-strikes-on...

2. http://tinyurl.com/iraq-iran-1987

3. www.csmonitor.com/World/Latest-News-Wires/2014/0125/Kiev-protesters-said...

4. http://penzanews.ru/en/opinion/55043-2014

5. www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/02/ukraine-crisis-nuclear-idUSL1N0LZ07H2...

6. http://edition.cnn.com/2014/03/01/world/europe/ukraine-politics/

7. www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/04/us-ukraine-crisis-iaea-idUSBREA231V82...

www.business-standard.com/article/international/ukraine-tightening-nucle...

8. www.nti.org/gsn/article/ukraine-wants-global-help-securing-its-nuclear-r...

9. http://edition.cnn.com/2014/03/04/opinion/pifer-ukraine-budapest-memoran...

10. www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-T-Z/Ukraine/

11. www.iaea.org/PRIS/CountryStatistics/CountryDetails.aspx?current=UA

12. www.world-nuclear-news.org/C-Ukrainian-reactors-operate-through-turmoil-...

13. www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/08/ukraine-crisis-russia-nuclear-idUSL6N...

14. http://blogs.wsj.com/emergingeurope/2014/01/15/czech-nuclear-expansion-f...

http://reuters/1fY8sZ2

www.power-eng.com/articles/2014/03/crimea-crisis-calls-czech-russia-nucl...

www.itv.com/news/update/2014-03-03/czech-minister-rules-out-russian-firm...

15. http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405270230436070457941709140...

16. http://finance.ninemsn.com.au/newscolumnists/greg/8812567/hopes-fade-for...

17. www.eureporter.co/world/2014/03/12/has-a-ukraine-nuclear-missile-crisis-...

http://rt.com/news/ukraine-nuclear-arsenal-threat-314/

18. www.nti.org/gsn/article/should-ukraine-have-gotten-rid-its-nukes/

19. www.npr.org/blogs/parallels/2014/03/10/288572756/what-if-ukraine-still-h...

20. www.nti.org/gsn/article/kerry-lavrov-meet-london-urgent-crimea-talks/

www.rferl.org/content/ukraine-merkel-warns-russia/25295667.html

21. www.truth-out.org/speakout/item/22397-ukraine-nato-nuclear-war

22. www.gizmag.com/survive-nuclear-bomb-shelter/31057/

23. www.nti.org/gsn/article/russia-new-start-inspections-could-be-halted-ove...

24. www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/08/ukraine-crisis-russian-troops-evic...

25. www.nti.org/gsn/article/white-house-expects-russia/

26. www.nti.org/gsn/article/us-nuclear-security-efforts-russia-stalled-amid-...

27. www.nti.org/gsn/article/crimea-votes-leave-ukraine-russia-agrees-tempora...

28. www.nti.org/country-profiles/ukraine/

29. www.stcu.int/documents/reports/distribution/tpf/ipf/nuclear/ua/pdf/KINR.pdf

30. http://nucleus.iaea.org/RRDB/RR/ReactorSearch.aspx